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Collective bargaining in public education can be a very mis-

understood and unsettling process.

On the one hand, school boards are

usually very concerned about maintaining control of the school district's educational program, and, on the other hand, many teacher

associations usually think that the collective bargaining process will
provide them with the opportunity to resolve all of the Issues which
they perceive to be problems with their local school boards.

A study of both the development and current status of collective
bargaining in New Hampshire was considered as timely if school boards
and teacher associations were to work effectively within the process.

Therefore, the purpose of this study was to provide data concerning
the status of collective bargaining in New Hampshire prior to and

following the enactment of RSA 273-A.

The author believed that this

study would be useful to those individuals and groups involved with

ill

the collective bargaining process in New Hampshire
public school

districts.

The study was designed to determine what effect
the

enactment of collective bargaining legislation had on
certain selected
questions.
The data that were used to answer the four questions
contained
in the study were collected from those collective bargaining
agreements

in effect for the 1975—1976 school year as well as those agreements

that were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 as either single year

agreements or as the first year of multiple year agreements.

Data were

also obtained from conversations with various New Hampshire school

superintendents as well as from the records of New Hampshire state
agencies.
In general, the findings of this study demonstrate that:
1.

there has been a definite increase in the number of collective bargaining agreements in effect, as well as in the
number of staff members who are covered by these agreements;

2.

there has been a definite increase in the collective bargaining agreement clauses that provide fringe benefits;

3.

there has been a definite increase in the collective bargaining agreement clauses involving various working conditions
of the staff members;

4.

there has been a definite increase in the clauses providing
for a grievance procedure and more importantly some form
of arbitration;

5.

there has not been a substantial increase in the clauses
involving educational policy.

It would appear that RSA 273-A has had a definite effect on the

selected changes in collective bargaining in New Hampshire.
enable
The knowledge gained through the reading of this study may
iv

those groups or individuals involved in
negotiating collective bar-

gaining agreements in New Hampshire public
school districts to make

more rational decisions during the course of
the process as they
will be more knowledgeable about the status of
collective bargaining
in New Hampshire public school districts.

The information made available in this study will assist
these

organizations in avoiding overreactions to collective bargaining,
thereby, putting it into proper perspective.

The evidence clearly

demonstrates to school boards that their fear of losing control of
the school district's educational program is unfounded as the negotia-

tion of educational policy has been minimal.

The evidence clearly

demonstrates to public school staff members that the collective

bargaining process has helped them to resolve some of their concerns.
However, it has not helped them to become involved in the development
of educational policy nor in the management of the school district to

the extent that they might like.
In conclusion, the study demonstrates that the enactment of

collective bargaining legislation did not bring about radical changes
in the operation of New Hampshire Public School Districts.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

Collective Bargaining ^
Collective bergelnlng Is a process which provides the employees
of an organization with the vehicle whereby they may become Involved
'^ith the

employer In determining the rules and regulations that govern

their employment,

A collective movement Is necessary on the part of

the employees for without such a movement they would not have the

strength to bargain on equal terms with the employer.

It was not until

the enactment of the Wagner Act In 1935 that the federal government

protected the right of employees to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining and guaranteed to them the procedural rights they
needed In order to negotiate with the employer on an equal basis.
The ultimate goal of the collective bargaining process Is for
the employees and the employer to reach an agreement which Is satisfactory
to both.

While the collective agreement Is the end result of the process.

It must be considered as only a part of the collective bargaining

relationship because the essence of the relationship Is the spirit In

which the agreement Is adhered to on the part of both parties.

It Is

Review
^The discussion found on pages 1-8 Is an overview of the
represents
It
such
As
II.
Chapter
In
of the Literature that will be found
collecprocess,
bargaining
the author's understanding of the collective
education,
in
bargaining
tive bargaining in the public sector, collective
therefore, contains no
and collective bargaining in New Hampshire, and
related
Specific references to collective bargaining and
footnotes.
Issues will be found in Chapter II.
1

2

this spirit which will determine the
effectiveness of the employer-

employee relationship; amongst other things, the
spirit will be very
Important in determining the success of the succeeding
collective

bargaining agreement.
In the event that the two parties are unable to reach
an agree-

ment, there are several procedures available to them as they
attempt
to break their Impasse.

These procedures are:

mediation, fact finding,

and binding arbitration of contract provisions (interest arbitration).

All three procedures Involve the Introduction of a neutral third party
into the dispute.

In mediation, the third party discusses the dispute

with the parties in an attempt to help them reach a voluntary settlement.
The fact finder studies the dispute; and issues a report as to what he

considers to be a reasonable and just settlement.
report is not binding on either party.

The fact finder's

The arbitrator also studies the

dispute; however, the arbitrator issues a decision as to what the terms
of the settlement will be, and the decision is binding on both parties.

Of the three Impasse procedures, mediation is the primary procedure used
in the private sector.

Mediation is utilized as its intent is in keeping

with the Intent of collective bargaining which is the attainment of a
voluntary settlement.

Employers and employees in the private sector do

not utilize fact finding or binding arbitration as they are unwilling to

conclude an agreement on terms that have been suggested or dictated by
a third party.

They prefer that a strike occur rather than submit their

dispute to fact finding or binding arbitration.

3

Collective Bar gaining In the Public
Sector

While the collective bargaining movement
became an Important
part of the employer-employee relationship
In the private eoctor

during the 1930’s, It was not until the 1960
’s that It became an
Important part of the employer-employee relationship
in the public
sector.

Public employees for years had been less Inclined to accept

the collective bargaining process.

They had accepted those advantages

of public employment which Included Job security and pensions
In re-

turn for wages that were competitive with those that were paid In
the

private sector.

Public employees, for the most part, believed that the

collective bargaining process should not be used In the public sector.
This belief was encouraged by the public employers^ contention that
as the elected or appointed representatives of the people they did not

have the right to share their duties and responsibilities with the
public employees thru the collective bargaining process.

The attitude

of public employees toward the collective bargaining process began to

shift during the 1950 's as they saw their purchasing power being

eroded continuously by periods of high Inflation,

At the same time,

public employees observed that workers In the private sector, especially
those who utilized the collective bargaining process, were securing

wage gains that enabled them to maintain or Improve their purchasing
power

While higher salaries were of primary concern to public employees,

many were concerned also about obtaining more control over the manner
In which their services were provided to the public.

As a result, the

4

question of the scope of collective bargaining
became a larger issue
in the public sector than it had been in the
private sector.

Initially,

public employers resorted to the argument that they would
be negligent
in carrying out their duties to the public if they
negotiated items

which diminished the authority given to them by the public in
order to
carry out their responsibilities as public servants.

However, as time

passed, public employers became convinced that it was not realistic to

hold strictly to the idea that items, other than those that related

directly to the economic welfare of public employees were strictly the

prerogative of the public employer, and thus were not to be shared or
even discussed with public employees.

Public employers changed their

position, in part, because of political pressure arising out of

public employee strikes concerning the scope of collective bargaining.
The issue of whether or not public employees should have the

right to strike is certainly one of the more vexing questions in

public sector collective bargaining.

Public employers contend that

public employees should not have the right to strike.

They take the

position that the strike in the public sector is primarily a political
weapon.

Further, the more essential the public considers the service

to be,

the more pressure such fact will place on the public employer to

settle the dispute despite its economic cost.

As a result, the public

employers believe that the right to strike places too much power in the
hands of public employee unions.

Public employee unions, on the other

equals
hand, contend that without the right to strike they will not be
that
with the public employer at the collective bargaining table, and

equality.
the very essence of collective bargaining demands such an

5

They believe that as long as the public strike
is illegal, it will b«

more difficult to obtain a strike vote from their
membership whereas the
risk to the public employees of going out on strike
will be greater.

Collective Bargaining in Education

Teachers, as public employees, had to be convinced that the

collective bargaining process was a legitimate tool for them to use
in their efforts to improve their professional and economic positions.

However, once teachers became convinced that collective bargaining

would be most helpful to their cause, the organization of the teachers
by the National Education Association (NEA) and the American Federation
of Teachers (AFT) was extremely rapid.

The growth of the collective

bargaining movement in education has been greater than in any other
area of the public sector.

One of the reasons for the rapid growth of the collective

bargaining movement in education was the struggle between the NEA and the
AFT for control of unionism in education.

During the 1950 ’s and early

1960*8, the efforts of the NEA were directed chiefly towards a

maintenance of its professional image; thus the organization did not
promote the traditional union activities.

It was not until the AFT

began to make Important gains in membership and control of teacher

organizations at NEA expense, as evidenced by the election of the AFT as
the exclusive representative of the New York City teachers in 1961,

that the NEA began to modify its position on collective bargaining.

quite
Within a very short period of time, the position of the NEA was

similar if not identical to that of the AFT.

The power struggle that

6

ensued between the NEA and AFT was responsible
to a considerable extent
for the constant escalation of teachers'
economic demands and the

growth of the scope of collective bargaining.

This was Inevitable as

each organization was making every effort to prove
to the teachers that
It was the most effective collective bargaining
agent.

Partly as a

result of the NEA- AFT rivalry, the scope of collective
bargaining In

education Is much broader than It Is In the private sector.

Most

teachers believe that they have the right to be Involved In the develop-

ment of educational policy as a result of their training and expertise.

Teachers give far less credence to the concept of management prerogatives
than do the employees In the private sector.

To date, teachers and

school boards have not negotiated educational policies to any considerable
extent at the collective bargaining table.

One of the main arguments

against the negotiation of education policies at the collective bargaining
table has been that many of the Issues such as curriculum are too complex
to be dealt with In this manner; rather,

the trend has been to utilize

the collective bargaining process to establish mechanisms whereby these

Issues can be discussed outside the process.

Most provisions In col-

lective bargaining agreements relate to the area of personnel policies
or working conditions.

While teachers are deeply concerned about enlarging their role In
educational policymaking, their prime concern is to improve their
economic status, and most observers believe they have been successful
in this respect.

Most observers also hold that the process has been

collective
of more assistance to teachers in the initial stages of

bargaining and may not have a long term effect on the economic

7

status of teachers.

Collective bargaining has had and will continue
to have

definite impact on the educational administrator.

a

very

The many and

varied provisions contained in the negotiated agreements
will require
a certain astuteness by the administrator if these
provisions are to

be administered in a uniform and equitable manner.

It is inevitable

that negotiated agreements will make the tasks of the administrator

more time consuming and demanding.

The importance of administrative—

staff relationships with teachers will become even greater, for, as

previously stated, positive daily relationships are critical to the
successful negotiation of collective bargaining agreements.

The

successful negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement is very
important to the school administrator for when the two parties are having

difficulty negotiating an agreement the tension that builds up between
them influences the administrative-staff relationships negatively.

As

set forth above, if the two parties are unable to reach an agreement,

impasse procedures are available to them.

As with the other areas of

public sector employment, the most difficult question is how an

effective impasse procedure can be developed without giving teachers
the right to strike.

Collective Bargaining in New Hampshire
Public School Districts

As on the national scene, there was some collective bargaining

activity during the 1950’s, but the movement did not achieve major

importance until the latter part of the 1960’s.
in Manchester in 1968 and 1969.

The teachers struck

They struck in Nashua in 1970.

The

8

New Hampshire Education Association
(NHEA) sponsored collective

bargaining workshops in 1970 and 1971 as a
part of its efforts to
convince teachers that the collective bargaining
process was the most

effective method of Improving both their economic
and professional
status.

The NHEA efforts paid dividends as teachers were
able to

negotiate collective bargaining agreements with the school
boards in
Portsmouth, Peterborough, Keene, Derry and Goffstown during the
early
1970's.

Also, in the early 1970’ s, the teachers in Salem and Farmington

conducted strikes.

In both Instances, the main issue in the strike

was one of recognition in that neither of the struck school boards

were willing to negotiate with the teachers.

The teachers in Salem

were successful in that the school board agreed to negotiate, and a

collective bargaining agreement was reached.

The teachers in Farmington

were not successful in that although the school board agreed to negotiate
and an agreement was reached by the school board negotiators it was not

ratified by the school board.

The longest and most bitter strike took

place in the Tlmberlane School District.

The school board asked the

Rockingham County Superior Court to issue an injunction ordering the
striking teachers back to their classrooms.

The court refused to issue

the Injunction, and, in so doing, stated that if it were to issue the

injunction it would be taking sides in a dispute that should be
settled between the parties.

With the school board being unable to

obtain an injunction, and the two parties being unable to reach an
agreement, the strike continued.

The school board then voted to dis-

continue negotiations and replace the striking teachers.

At a special

9

school district meeting in the spring of
1974. the school board asked
the citizens to support its position.

overwhelming vote of confidence.

The school board received an

The striking teachers were advised

that if they did not return to their classrooms
by a certain date they

would be dismissed.
date were dismissed.

Those teachers who did not return on the specified
The NHEA protested the dismissals on the grounds

that the striking teachers could not be dismissed
without a hearing

before an impartial tribunal; further, that the long and bitter
strike
had engendered such bitter passions that the school board did not

qualify as an impartial tribunal.

The New Hampshire Supreme Court

stated that the school board was not disqualified from acting as it
did; further, that the teachers had violated the terms of their con-

tracts by striking and thus were not entitled to hearings before dis-

missal.

The many problems associated with the Timberlane strike provided

considerable support for the enactment of a collective bargaining
statute that would establish legal procedures for the public collective

bargaining process.

The movement itself had been initiated in the 1960 's

by the New Hampshire Education Association.

In 1973 both the New

Hampshire House of Representatives and Senate passed a public collective

bargaining bill, but the bill was vetoed by Governor Meldrin Thomson.
In 1975, however, a modified version of the 1973 bill was again adopted

by the New Hampshire legislature, and this bill was signed by the

Governor.

Thus, Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) 273-A Public

Employee Labor Relations became law.

10

Statement of the Problem
There is reason to believe that public
sector unionism is a

strong social movement that will continue to grow.

Robert Doherty

and Walter Oberer supported this contention when in
1967 they wrote

Teachers, School Boar ds, and Collective Bargaining

.

They suggested

that the collective bargaining movement amongst public
employees was

only in its infancy and they further held that the trend toward

formalizing the work relationship between public employers and public
employees would continue via collective bargaining agreements.^

Thomas

Brooks reiterated the contention expressed earlier by Doherty and

Oberer that collective bargaining in the public sector would be sure
to grow during the forthcoming decade.

Brooks expressed the opinion

that the number of strikes would increase also, but that if the ex-

periences of the private sector repeated themselves both sides would
learn to live with each other.

3

Shortly thereafter Sterling Spero and

John Capozzola wrote the Urban Community and Its Unionized Bureaucracies
and concluded that the American labor movement had not experienced any-

thing comparable to the growth of public sector unionism since the early

1930's^
If public sector unionism is to reach the present status of private

^Robert E. Doherty and Walter E. Oberer, Teachers, School Boards,
and Collective Bargaining (Ithaca, N.Y.: New York State School of
Industrial Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1967), p. 119.

^Thomas R. Brooks, Toil and Trouble; A History of American Labor
(New York: Delacorte Press, 1971), p. 321.
and Its
^Sterling D. Spero and John Capozzola, The Urban Commu nity
Lab^r
Government
Local
in
Politics
Unionized Bureaucracies: Pressure
lA.
Relations (New York: Dunellen Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), p.
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sector unionism, which is one in which
both sides have learned to coexist then a concerted effort must be made
on the part of both side,
to study and approach labor relations on
a rational basis.

They may

then move effectively to understand and Interact
with each other.

The period of time immediately following the
election of a union
as the exclusive bargaining agent for the
professional employees of a

school district is generally very trying and difficult.

On the one

hand, the school board is usually very concerned about maintaining

control of the school district's educational program and considers the

union to be a very real threat to this control.

On the other hand,

many public employees initially think that the union will provide them

with the opportunity to solve all of the problems that they perceive
that they are having with management.

School teachers in particular

see the union as the organization that will help them to protect their

professional status.^

With the very different expectations that the

public employers and the public employee unions have of the desirable
outcomes of the collective bargaining process, it is Important that

research provide information which will aid both groups to develop and

maintain reasonable positions.

The importance of research in the area

of the status of public collective bargaining after the enactment of

bargaining legislation has been recognized with studies having been

conducted in the states of Minnesota, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and
Nebraska.

In addition, a number of studies dealing specifically with

^Sumner Slichter, James Healey, and E. Robert Livernash, The
Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management (Washington, D.C,;
The Brookings Institution, 1960), p. 13.
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the scope of collective bargaining have
been conducted.

Currently there is insufficient information
relative to public

collective bargaining in New Hampshire.

Whether there has been a

change in the number of exclusive bargaining
agents or collective

bargaining agreements since the enactment of RSA
273-A is not known.
It is not

known whether the number of professionally negotiated

collective bargaining agreements has Increased since the enactment
of
RSA 273-A.

Composition of the bargaining units as contained in the

recognition clauses of the collective bargaining agreements negotiated

before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A is not known.

The informa-

tion necessary to assess the status of the scope of collective bargaining before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A has not been gathered

and analyzed.

Some school board members contend that school boards

should be more aggressive at the collective bargaining table in that
they shr*ild introduce their own proposals rather than simply react to
those introduced by the teacher associations or unions.

Unknown also

is the extent to which school boards have Introduced their own proposals

neither is it known whether there has been a change in this practice
since the enactment of RSA 273-A.

In school districts where collective

bargaining agreements have not been s-ettled prior to the annual school
district meeting, it is not known whether there have been changes between the negotiating positions held by the school boards prior to the

annual school district meeting and the position that they agreed to in
the collective bargaining agreements finalized subsequent to the

meeting.

13

The Public Employee
to administer RSA 273-A.

Ubor

Relations Board (PELRB) was
established

Despite the fact that all PELRB
decision. «r.

published, if only in mimeographed form,
except for newspaper accounts,

very little is known about the work of this
Board.

We do not know

whether there has been a change in the number
or the type of cases that
have been heard by this Board.

Neither is it known whether the de-

cisions of the Board have resulted in a change in
the permissible scope
of collective bargaining.

The purpose of the study will be to provide

data concerning the status of collective bargaining in New Hampshire
prior to and following the enactment of RSA 273-A that would be useful
to decision makers in New Hampshire.

A study of both the development and current status of collective
bargaining in New Hampshire is definitely needed if school board members
and teachers are to work effectively within the collective bargaining

process.

This study will give a description of selected developments

which have occurred relative to collective bargaining in New Hampshire
public school districts before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A.

Significance of the Study

The data that will be compiled and considered in this study will
be helpful to the following organizations in assisting them to make

decisions relative to the collective bargaining process.
1.

Local chapters of the New Hampshire Education Association and
the New Hampshire Federation of Teachers

2.

Local school boards

3.

New Hampshire Education Association

14
A.

New Hampshire Federation of Teachers

5.

New Hampshire School Administrators
Association

6.

New Hampshire School Boards Association

The data that will be compiled should
further an understanding of
the implications and ramifications of the
adoption of a public sector

bargaining statute.

It should also provide information
furthering a

general understanding of the collective bargaining
process.
On a national basis some 204 dissertations have been
written in
the area of collective bargaining since January 1970.

Only two

dissertations have dealt with the Impact of collective bargaining in

educational decision making in New England.

A number of studies dealing

specifically with the scope of collective bargaining have been conducted.
With the exception of one study that was conducted in Massachusetts, the
others studied the scope of collective bargaining in states outside of
the New England area.

More importantly, this author could find no

record of any dissertations relating to any aspect of collective bar-

gaining in the three northern New England states.

Assuming that the

socio-economic structure of the three Northern New England states is
different from that of other parts of the country, the need for a

collective bargaining study for at least one of these states becomes
apparent.

The need is borne out also by the fact that relevant infor-

mation available to the author has been found solely in primary sources:
newspapers, New Hampshire Education Association newsletters. New Hampshire

School Boards Association newsletters, and interviews with Individuals
who have played significant roles in the collective bargaining process
as it has evolved in New Hampshire public school districts.

No
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bibliography relative to the subject of
collective bargaining in New
Hampshire was found. All facts set forth
herein were gained only after

many interviews and a thorough review
and search of the above-mentioned
sources
The purpose of the author's research In
the area of collective

bargaining in the public sector was not to convince
school board
members that collective bargaining is good or bad,
but rather to bring
the entire matter into perspective so that school
board members will

accept collective bargaining as a fact of life; if this
occurs, the

collective bargaining process should improve.
is essentially a power struggle.

Collective bargaining

From the school board members' view-

point, teacher power seems to be increasing at the expense of the school

boards'.

This is inevitable in that the school board initially had all

of the formal power; if the power of the teachers is to increase, it

has to be at the expense of the present power structure.^

When teachers first organized for the purpose of collective
bargaining, many school boards were totally unprepared and even today

many school boards are unaware of the requirements and implications of
the collective bargaining process.

Not only were school boards un-

prepared for collective bargaining, but, in addition, they found themselves negotiating from a defensive position because they lacked sound

personnel policies.^

There is a need also for teachers to put the

^Doherty and Oberer, Teachers, School Boards, and Collective
Bargaining p. 121.
,

^Edward Shils and E. Taylor l^ittler. Teachers. Administrators
and Collective Bargaining (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968),
Unions and
pp. 151-52; and Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, The
p. 120.
Institution,
1971),
Brookings
the Cities (Washington, D.C.: The
.
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collective bargaining process in its proper
perspective, for initially.
they tend to expect more from the process
than it is capable of delivering.

Limitations of the Study

The study will not test generalizable hypotheses
or propositions

concerning collective bargaining in the United States because
the
study is limited to New Hampshire.
This study is limited to the specific questions addressed.

The

author does not imply that there have not been other changes before
and after the enactment of RSA 273-A.

The author does not imply that

there is no other useful information about collective bargaining in

New Hampshire.

Furthermore, the study is limited to the content of

collective bargaining agreements reviewed and does not include any

Information about the implementation of these agreements.

g

Charles R. Perry and Wesley A. Wildman. The Impact of Negotiations in Public Education; The Evidence From the Schools (Worthington,
Ohio; Charles A. Jones. Co., 1970), p. 69.

CHAPTER

II

REVIEW OP THE LITERATURE

Collective Bargaining

Nature of the colle ctive bargaining process

.

The workplace can be

viewed as a society, and as In any society It has a need
for rules and
regulations.

In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement,
man-

agement formulates the rules and regulations, and has unrestricted
power.

When the employees organize for the purpose of collective bar-

gaining, the power relationship within the organization Is altered

significantly for the employer Is no longer In a position to arbitrarily

establish rules and regulations.

The employer must now negotiate the

rules and regulations of the workplace with the representatives of the
union.

Collective bargaining Is a continuous formal process between an
employer and a labor organization acting as the exclusive representative of a defined group of employees of the employer for the purpose
of regulating relations at the work place as well as establishing

wages and work standards.

2

^Edwln F. Beal, Edward D. Wickersham, and Philip K. Kienast,
The Practice of Collective Bargaining (Homewood, Illinois; Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1976), p. 7; and Slichter, Healey, and Livemash, The
Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management pp. 4, 5, and 947-49.
,

^Harold W. Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 2; and Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast, The Practice of Collective Bargaining , p. 1.
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In the management -employee relationship, with one
major

exception, management Is the Initiator.
and the employees who react.

It Is management that acts

The major exception occurs when a

union is established because It Is the union that initiates the
collective bargaining process.

The fact that the employees organize

a union and negotiate a contract with their employer does not change

the individual work relationship that each employee has entered into

with the employer as that relationship was established between the
employee and the employer at the time that the employee was hired.
The union does not supply employees for the employer, and a new in-

dividual employment relationship is established between the employer
and the individual employee each time a new employee is hired.

The

written document that is negotiated by the employer and the union is
a contract, the essence of which establishes rules governing the

employer’s work contract with the employees.

3

The primary purpose of collective bargaining is to negotiate a

written agreement to establish rules and regulations governing the
relationship between the employer and the employees; without such
agreement a workable relationship is well nigh impossible.^

The

actual negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, however,
is only one segment of the collective bargaining relationship.

The

major aspect of the relationship is the day to day administration of
agreement
the work rules as contained in the collective bargaining

^Ibld., pp. 61, 171, 204, 249 and 250.
^Ibld.
p.

116.

,

p.

ective Bargaining,
17; and Davey, Contemporary Coll
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rtat has been negotiated.

Managea.ent administers the work
rules and

the union reacts to management's
action when appropriate In the
form
of a grievance when It feels that
management has violated or misin-

terpreted a provision of the collective
bargaining agreement.

In this

country, the vast majority of collective
bargaining agreements establish
a grievance procedure that culminates
In binding arbitration, a process

that Is unique to the United States.^

The emphasis here Is on the

arbitration of grievances (rights arbitration)
rather than on the
s^^bltration of contract terms.

As previously stated, the employment relationship is
between the

individual worker and the employer; the collective bargaining agree**
ment is between the employer and the union which represents the

employees that are organized into a specific bargaining unit.

If

individual employees were to bargain with the employer, the result

would too often reflect the disparity between the economic strength
of the individual employee and the employer.

It is the ability of

the employees to engage in concerted action, particularly to strike
on the one hand and the ability of the employer to lock out the employees
on the other hand that is the major force driving the two sides toward
an agreement.^

Kenneth 0. Warner, ed.. Collective Bargaining in the Public
Service: Theoiry and Practice (Chicago: Public Personnel Association,
1967), pp. 68-69; and Slichter, Healey, and Llvernash, The Impact of
Collective Bargaining , p. 17.
^Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining pp. 77, 133, and 192;
Beal, Wlckersham, and Kienast, The Practice of Collective Bargaining ,
p. 203; Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., "The Limits of
Collective Bargaining in Public Employment," in Public Employee Unions:
A Study of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor Relations , ed. A. Lawrence
Chickering (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1976),
12.
p. 53; and Wellington and Winter, The Unions and the Cities , p.
,
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Collective bargaining Is a pragmatic
process, and. therefore,
negotiators will use power when they
think that they have it. and
they

will tend to minimize the role of
power when they think that they
do
not have it.^ A union’s demands
tend to be predicated upon its
assessment of its power relative to that
of management.

Management's

appraisal of its power position will influence
the degree to which
it resists the union demands,^

As alluded to in the previous paragraph,
power is the ability
to employ economic force.

For the union, it is the ability of the

union leadership to obtain a strike vote from the union
members and
to keep the members on strike for a period of time
sufficient to win

major concessions from management.

The union officials must analyze

carefully their ability to obtain a strike vote as well as the members'

ability to absorb the effects of a strike.

Should the union leadership

miscalculate the situation and fail in their attempt to obtain a
strike vote from the rank and file members, management would be in
a stronger negotiating position than it was before the aborted strike

vote.

The bargaining power of the union would also be weakened if

the membership was not willing to remain on strike for a period of time

sufficient to gain major concessions from management.

In all proba-

bility. the employer would then be able to settle the dispute without
Additionally, this

having to grant major concessions to the union.

would damage the credibility of the union officials, and their

^Davey. Contemporary Collective Bargaining

,

p.

97.

Q

Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast, The Practice of Collective

Bargaining , p. 211.
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miscalculation would weaken also the union’s
bargaining position in
the future whereas management would be
less concerned about subsequent

strike threats.

Finally, an unsuccessful strike tends to
weaken the

loyalty and esteem given by union members to its
leadership.

Power for management is the ability to withstand
a strike or to
initiate a lockout.

It is as Important that management analyze the

situation accurately as it is for the union leadership to do
so.

Man-

agement must consider the potential financial loss resulting from

customers who may choose to do business elsewhere as well as the financial
loss associated with non-production for the period of the shut down.
If management is unable to withstand a prolonged strike or to sustain a

pr'otracted lockout, its bargaining power will be weakened seriously, and
it probably will have to grant concessions to the union that it would

otherwise not have granted in order to settle the dispute.

Manage-

ment's miscalculation probably will adversely affect its future

bargaining power as the union will not be as concerned about management's ability to withstand a strike or a lockout.
There has been a great deal of discussion relative to the

Importance of the equality of power.

Until the passage of the Wagner

Act in 1935, there was no procedural equality under the law between man-

agement and labor.

The courts ruled in favor of the employer in labor

relation matters, and the unions were not allowed to use the procedures

necessary to establish themselves as equals with the employer.

It

was the Wagner Act that brought procedural equality to labor relations.
As the years passed by and the strength of the unions grew, the Wagner
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Act was looked upon as the legislation
that tipped the balance of

power in labor's favor.

The Taft-Hartley law. passed in
19A7. was

seen as an effort to redress the imbalance
of power between labor
and management.

It should be emphasized that federal
legislative

efforts and public policy have been to establish
procedural equality
and not substantive equality.

The thrust has been to ensure that

both labor and management have equal opportunity
under the law.
Tlieoretically , at least, the federal government has not
attempted to
tip the scales in favor of either management or labor.

While leg-

islation can be passed in an attempt to equalize power between labor
and management, it will not necessarily equalize power relationships
in specific situations.

It

is likewise not possible to assess the

power relationship in a specific situation solely thru the use of

general principles for they vary to such a degree from one situation
to another that it is all but impossible to assess unless one is direct-

ly involved in that situation.
In those situations where the balance of power is heavily tipped
in favor of one side, the astute negotiator will not use his or her

strength to destroy or take unfair advantage of the other side as he or
she knows that the power relationship is so fluid that the balance of

Q

Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining p. 53; and Herbert
Northrop and Gordon F. Bloom, Government and Labor (Homewood, Illinois
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), p. 75.
,

R.

^^Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining p. 95; and Slichter,
Healey and Livernash, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on M anagements
,

p.

6.
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power could turn very quickly in favor
of the other slde.^^

However,

the ultimate strength of the parties
will be reflected in the agreement.

While in most instances the party that has
the greatest strength will
not try to take unfair advantage of the
other side, the final provisions

of the contract will certainly be more favorable
to the stronger of the
two parties.

Preoccupation with the question of power can lead the

parties to forget the primary objective of collective bargaining
which
is to negotiate an agreement that is mutually satisfactory.

In fact,

when the negotiators are more concerned with reaching an agreement than
they are with which party has the most power, there is a much greater

possibility that the agreement will contain something of importance to
each side.

When the parties are not able to reach a settlement that is
mutually satisfactory, they find themselves at a point of impasse.
There are several ways of breaking the point of Impasse without having
to resort to economic force:

mediation, fact finding, and binding

arbitration.

Mediation is a process whereby a neutral third party, most often
a government employee, becomes Involved in the collective bargaining

sessions.

The mediator serves as a catalyst in assisting the parties

to reach a voluntary agreement.

He or she cannot compel the parties

to reach an agreement for the only power that the mediator has is that

^^Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining

^^Ibid., pp. 98-99.

,

p.

96.
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of persuasion.

The mediator listens to what each side
has to say.

Tha

listening aspect of the mediation process can
be psychologically very

valuable as it gives each of the negotiating parties
an opportunity
to vent its hostility as well as to state its
real feelings and

bargaining position.

The skilled mediator can then assess the situation

and determine the real Issues that separate the two parties.

It also

gives the mediator the opportunity to determine which of the members
of the negotiating teams if any are significant factors in the inability
of the two teams to reach an agreement.

1

1

If mediation is to be successful, the mediator has to establish

his credibility as a knowledgeable and astute practitioner of col-

lective bargaining.

Additionally, he or she must possess a high degree

of skill at working with people in conflict situations.

must be more than just a listener.

The mediator

He or she must draw on his or her

knowledge for thoughts and suggestions as to how to bring the parties
together and oftentimes these suggestions must be put forward in such a

way that the parties think that they are their own.

14

Fact finding combines aspects of both the mediation and the

arbitration process.

The fact finder, like the mediator, tries to

move the parties toward a voluntary settlement during the course of
the investigation that he or she conducts in determining the facts of

the situation.

Like the arbitrator, the end result of the fact finder’s

^^Ibld., p. 201; and Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast, The Practice
of Collective Bargaining , p. 209.

Beal,
^^Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining p. 201; and
Bargaining,
p. 209.
ective
Coll
Wickersham, and Kienast, The Practice of
,
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work Is a report reflecting his or her
opinion of a Just and reasonable
settlement.

Fact finding Is still a voluntary process,
however, as

the parties are free to accept or reject the
fact finder’s report.

Fact finding is one of the procedures of the National
Emergency Dis-

putes Provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, however, it is
seldom used
to settle disputes in the private sector.
It is Important to note the distinction between binding and
arbitra-

tion of grievances (rights arbitration) and binding arbitration of future

contract terms (interest arbitration).

The former affects only the terms

and provisions of collective bargaining agreements that have already been

negotiated, and is a procedure that is found in most agreements.

The

latter affects terms and provisions that have not been agreed to, and is
not a common procedure for settling disputes in the private sector.

Neither is it a common procedure for settling disputes in the public
sector.

The parties that engage in voluntary arbitration agree to submit

their dispute to an arbitrator and further agree to be bound by the

decision of the arbitrator.

The parties submitting their dispute to

compulsory arbitration do not do so of their own free will.

They are

compelled to do so by the provisions of a statute or the regulations

governing the collective bargaining procedures under which the parties
are negotiating.

Grievance arbitration is a quasi-judicial process.

The arbitrator conducts a hearing where he or she receives testimony,
offers of proof, and argument on the dispute.

ing ,

The arbitrator weighs the

Bargain^^Beal, Wlckersham, and Kienast, The Practice of Co llective
207.
Bargaining
p.
Collective
,
p. A68; and Davey, Contemporary
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evidence, considers the argument, and renders
an award which eEtablishes
the terms for the Issues In dispute.
In negotiating an agreement, the process of fact
finding and

binding arbitration are not commonly employed In the private
sector.
Both management and union prefer to utilize their respective
economic

weapons of the lockout and the strike rather than allow a third party
to determine the contract terms.

Binding arbitration relative to

the settlement of future contract disputes is not in keeping with the

spirit of collective bargaining as its goal is not a mutually accept-

able agreement.

Although compulsory arbitration is considered

an anathema to both labor and management, and is not part of the

private sector indlstrial relations scene in the United States, it
has some prevalence in public sector employee labor relations as

discussed on page 48.
If one holds to the position that the essence of the impasse

procedure is to help the parties reach a mutually acceptable agreement,
then mediation is the most effective of the impasse procedures that
are available to the negotiating parties.

It is the

mediation process

that affords the disputing parties the best opportunity to work out a

mutually acceptable agreement that will allow them also to function

^^Beal, Wlckersham, and Kienast, The Practice of Collective
Bargaining pp. 414-16.
,

^^Davev. Contemporary Co llective Bargaining , p. 197; Slichter,
on ManageHealey, and Livernash, The Impact of Collective Bargai ning
ment , pp. 750 and 751.
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effectively within the workplace.^®

In the final analysis,

it is not the procedure that is of utmost
importance, but rather a

positive attitude on the part of both parties toward
the collective

bargaining process.

It must be an attitude that is based on a
mutual

willingness to work toward an agreement.

When one or both negotiators are not negotiating in good faith,
it is often as a result of the constraints that have been placed
upon

them by their constituents.

The members of the negotiating teams

come to the collective bargaining table with the realization that

their agreement is only tentative because it must be approved by their

respective constituents.

In this connection, it should be noted that

the members of the management negotiating team are in most Instances

more sure of their position than the members of the union negotiating
team.

This is so because managerial authority flows from the top

management, and there are few people involved in the decision making
process relative to management’s collective bargaining position.

On

the other hand, authority in a union flows from the rank and file

membership up to the leadership and members of the negotiating team.
All union officials, whether they hold office on the local, state,
or national level are elected by the membership or regionally elected

representatives of the membership.

^^Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining , pp. 197 and 207.
^^Ibid., p. 198; and George Meany, "Union Leaders and Public
in
Sector Unions," in Public Employee Unions; A Study of the Crisis
173.
Chickering,
p,
Public Sector Labor Relations, ed.
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If one accepts the theory that all organizations exist
for the

purpose of satisfying the collective needs of a specific group of
people together with the fact that all union leaders are elected, then
the responsiveness of the members of the union negotiating team and

the union officials to the desires of the membership becomes more

understandable.

20

As with most groups of people, the memory of the

union membership is short lived, and as previously demonstrated,

effective union leadership will not guarantee automatic acceptance of
the most recently negotiated collective bargaining agreement by rank

and file voters.

It is for this reason that the union must have an

agreement that the membership will ratify for no matter how economically
sound or fair the agreement may be, it will all be for naught if the

agreement is rejected by the membership.

It is precisely because of

this political pressure on the union collective bargaining team that

the collective bargaining positions that are held to by the union

collective bargaining team are not always as economically sound as

management would like to see them.

21

History of the development of collective bargaining

.

The basis for

modern unionism can be traced back to the nineteenth centry and the
English Industrial Revolution whose effects were felt in the United

Collective
^^Beal, Wickersham, and Klenast, The Practice o f
Ba_^
Collective
Bargaining, pp. 5 and 308; and Davey, Contemporary
gaining, p. 257.
266 and 319; and Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast,
The Practice of Collective Bargaining^, p. 307.

^4bld.,

pp.
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States during the mid-nineteenth century.

society had been primarily agrarian.

Prior to this time, American

American industry consisted

mainly of light manufacturing and crafts.

The vast majority of the

firms were small, and in many Instances the work was performed
in the
home.

As the American economy expanded, the craft unions continued to

grow.

At the same time, however, the factory system was continuing

to grow rapidly and in fact replaced segments of the craft operations.

During this period, the Civil War significantly influenced the development of the factory system because only through factory mass production

techniques could the large quantities of materials needed to supply the
armies of the North and South be produced.
In 1869 the Knights of Labor was founded in Philadelphia.

the Knights had become a national organization.

By 1878

The influence of the

Knights was short-lived, and their major impact was made in the railroad and mining industries.

The effort of the Knights of Labor to

organize the factories ended in total failure.

This failure occurred

because the Knights could not control hiring in the factories as they
could admission to the various craft unions.

Consequently, the Knights

had no hold over the factory owner as the owner could simply go out
and hire large numbers of unskilled workers as he needed them,
the Knights of Labor movement was significant in that it awakened workers to the potential of the union movement.

As the Knights of Labor

Samuel Gompers,
movement lost its impetus in the late nineteenth century,

of Colle ctive
^^Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast, The Practice
Bargaining , pp. 28 and 29.
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president of the Cigar Makers International Union,
moved to consolidate
the power of the craft unions, and he put
together an organization

that has lasted to this day, the American Federation
of Labor.

Collective bargaining as we know it today had its origins
with
the American Federation of Labor, but that organization
did not attempt
to organize the semi-skilled or unskilled operatives.

The International

Workers of the World did, however, and their major impact was in the
textile industry in Lowell and Lawrence, Massachusetts.

However, as

with the Knights of Labor, the success of the Industrial Workers of
the World was also short lived.

The experience of the Industrial

Workers of the World once again demonstrated that in order for the
industrial union movement to be successful in factories it was necessary
that a factory be organized as a whole and not in separate groups as

was the case with the craft unions.

Furthermore, the entire working

force in the factory had to be organized within a very short period of
time.

Experience had shown clearly on more than one occasion that un-

less this was done the factory owner would be able to replace the

striking workers with very little difficulty.
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After the short lived success of the Industrial Workers of the

World in the early twentieth century, the industrial union movement
was dormant until the Great Depression of the 1930' s.

It was a period

of time in which radical thoughts and movements were prevalent in the

^^Ibid., p. 33.
^^Ibld., p. 35.
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country.

It was a period that saw the rapid
growth of industrial

unionism as the semi-skilled and unskilled workers
were organized by
the Congress of Industrial Organizations
which put to good use what

experience had shown to be the essential elements in
the unionization
of the factory; namely that the organization had
to be total and

simultaneous so that the union controlled the physical access
to the
factory.

The union movement was accompanied by a considerable amount

of violence.

In 1934 the longshoremen in San Francisco struck.

The

police utilized mounted officers, tear gas, and fire hoses during the
course of the strike, and the workers fought back with rocks and bolts.
At the end of the strike, there were two dead and 67 injured.

fall of 1934, textile workers in North Carolina struck.

In the

Before it was

over, the strike involved workers from almost every textile center in
the nation, and at the peak of the strike approximately 376,000 workers

had left their jobs.

During the course of the strike, ten people were

killed and 27 were wounded.
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In 1937, 70,000 workers in the

Bethlehem, Republic, Youngstown Sheet
struck.

&

Tube and Inland steel plants

During the course of the strike, 18 people were killed and

hundreds of others were wounded.

2S

Irving Bernstein, A History of the American Worker 1933-1941;
Turbulent Years (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), pp. 274-75;
and Sidney Lens, The Labor Wars; From the Molly Maguires to the Sitdowns
(Garden City, New York; Doubleday & Company, Inc,, 1973), pp. 253-59,

^^Irving Bernstein, A History of the American Workers 1933-1941;
Turbulent Years , pp. 309-15,
^

^Sidney Lens, The Labor Wars; From the Molly Maguires to the
Sitdowns p. 319,
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The rapid growth of unionism in the private
sector was aided

greatly by the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 which
as previously
stated established procedural equality between management
and labor.
It should be

noted that the growth of unionism in the 1930' s was

confined to the private sector.

The reasons why a similar growth

did not take place in the public sector were many and varied, not
the
least of which was the fact that the Wagner Act did not extend to

public employment.

The union movement in the private sector would

continue to grow in membership and strength.

It has only been

since the latter part of the 1950's that interest in private sector

unionism as well as the number of private sector union workers began
to taper off and eventually decline.

In 1976 approximately 22 percent

of the workers in the private sector were unionized.

The spectacular

growth of unionism in the public sector has taken place during the
same time period as the decline of unionism in the private sector,
and in 1976 approximately 45 percent of the workers in the public

sector were unionized.
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Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector

The labor organizers of the 1930's did not find the same fertile

field for the development of unionism in the public sector as they did
in the private sector.

While the compensation of public employees

^^Beal, Wickersham, and Klenast, The Practice of Collective
Bargaining , pp. 43-46.
Y.
^^Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America (New York; Thomas
and
Wickersham,
Beal,
and
394-97;
Crowell Company, 1966), pp. 377 and
451.
Bargaining
p.
,
Kienast, The Practice of Collective
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during this and the succeeding decades was low in
comparison to that
of employees in the private sector, public
employees during this

period did have certain advantages that most private sector
employees
did not have.

Amongst the most prized advantages for public employees

were pensions and job security.

These were certainly important to

workers who had lived through a period of high unemployment, and who
had only recently seen enactment of social security legislation.

Public employees were willing to trade higher wages for these other

more highly prized fringe benefits and working conditions.^®

A series of events took place after World War II that drastically
altered the complacent attitude of public employees.
followed both World War II and the Korean War. 31

High inflation

The collective

bargaining process played a significant role in helping private sector
employees to secure pay raises that enabled them to maintain or Increase
their purchasing power during this period.

Subsequent to World War II,

a tremendous demand for goods and services arose which resulted from

the return of the members of the armed services, the accumulation of

money during World War II by the consumers, and the end of rationing.
The demand for Increased services and production was not restricted
to the private sector.

The public also wanted more from their national,

^®Sam Zagaria, "Introduction,” in Public Workers and Public Unions,
Hall, Inc.,
ed. Sam Zagaria (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice &
1972), p. 1.

^^Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community and Unionized BurRelations,
reaucracles; Pressure Politics in Local Government Labor
pp.

1-2.
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state, and local governments. 32
In the 1950's and early 1960's public employees
found themselves
In somewhat the same position as that of unskilled labor
In the mid to

late 1930' s.

The number of public employees had grown considerably and

their services were in greater demand.

As collective bargaining was not

generally available to public employees, the pay increases that they received during this period did not enable them to maintain their purchasing
power.

Public employees were restricted to the lobbying process in their

efforts to secure salary Increases.

were unsuccessful.

Their lobbying efforts generally

This is usually the

case in an economy that is

experiencing high inflation as a high inflation rate works against those
employees whose salary increases depend upon legislative approval.
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Meanwhile, employees in the private sector were securing fringe benefits

comparable to those previously held, for the most part, only by public
employees.

The gains made by private sector employees in the areas of

economics and fringe benefits were well noted by those who worked in

32

Gus Tyler, "Why They Organize," in Education and Collective
Bargainings Readings in Policy and Research eds. Anthony M. Cresswell
and Michael J. Murphy (Berkeley, California: McCutchen Publishing Corp.,
1976), p. 16-18.
,
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Lee C. Shaw, "The Development of State and Federal Laws," in
Public Workers and Public Unions , ed. Sam Zagarla, p. 36.
3A

Wellington and Winter, "The Limits of Collective Bargaining in
the Crisis in
Public Employment," in Public Employee Unions; A St udy of
and Morton R.
Publ ic Sector Labor Relations ed. Chickering, p. 57;
Russell and
York;
(New
Service
Public
Godine. The Labor Problem in the
Russell, 1967), pp. 131-32.
,
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the public sector.
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The tremendous growth In the number
of public service workers

was accompanied by an ever increasing
depersonalization in their

relationship to management.

The rules and regulations that governed

the public work place as determined by
management became even more

rigid.

Public sector employees found that they had little if any

input as to the rules and regulations under which they
worked.

As is

common in a societal group that experiences rapid growth, the
public

employees were filled with considerable unrest.

At the same time, they

were dissatisfied because their working relationships with management
were becoming less personal.

Finally, the influx of young males

served as a catalyst inasmuch as they were dissatisfied with their

economic lot and provided some of the leadership in the growing militancy amongst public sector employees.

After many years of living

under the paternalistic system, a system which had not brought them
the economic gains that they felt they deserved, their trust and

reliance on the paternalistic system disappeared.

37

35

Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast, The Practice of Collective
Bargaining p. 453; and Wellington and Winter, "The Limits of Collective
Bargaining in Public Employment," in Public Employee Unions; A Study
ed. Chickering, p. 57.
of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor Relations
,

,

^^Wellington and Winter. "The Limits of Collective Bargaining In
Public Employment," in Public Employee Unions: A Study of the Crisis in
Public Sector Labor Relations , ed. Chickering, p. 55; Beal, Wickersham,
and Kienast, The Practice of Collective Bargaining pp. 450, and 453-54;
and Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service , p. 168.
,

^^Robert A. Nisbet, "Public Unions and the Decline of Social Trust,"
in Public Employee Unions; A Study of the Crisis in Public Se ctor Labor
Relations , ed. Chickering, p. 20; Tyler "Why They Organize, in Educaj^
tlon and Collective Bargaining: Readings, in Policy and Research, eds.
Strikes, and
Cresswell and Murphy, p. 23; and Arnold M. Zack, Impasses,
98.
Resolutions," in Public Workers and Public Unions , ed. Zagarla, p.
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While the public sector union movement
did not become an Important
part of the American labor relations
scene until the 1960'8. a number
of public employee unions had been in
existence for many years.

The

National Association of Letter Carriers of the
U.S.A. was founded in
1889.

The American Federation of Teachers, the
International Associa-

tion of Fire Fighters, the American Federation of
Government Employees,
and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees

were founded in 1916, 1918, 1932, and 1936 respectively.
as recently as 1956,

However,

the membership of those unions numbered less than

one million, and the membership was composed mostly of blue collar

craftsmen or postal employees. 38

The growth of public sector unionism

received a significant impetus in the 1960 's from the executive and

judicial branches of the federal government.
F.

In 1962 President John

Kennedy signed Executive Order 10988 which gave federal workers the

right to organize.

The real importance of Order 10988 was that it gave

legitimacy to the union movement for federal employees.

Actually, the

scope of negotiations permitted under Order 10988 was quite narrow;
it did not even allow the negotiation of wages.

Order 10988 were great.

The ramifications of

It served as a catalyst to the union movement

amongst state and particularly amongst local government workers.
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Prior to the 1960 's, the courts had held that public employees did not

^®Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast, The Practice of Collective
Bargaining , p. 450; and Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining ,
p.

343.

^^Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining

,

pp.

341’-42,
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have the constitutional right
to Join a union/®

m

1968 the United

States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit In Mc'Uuehlln v.

Tilendls held that the right of the
individual to
was protected by the First Amendment.

fora,

and Join a union

Subsequently, several other

circuit courts of appeal handed down similar
rulings.

As suggested

above, until these decisions, the courts
had held that public employees

did not have the right to bargain with public
employers in the absence
of an express statutory enactment.

decision in Mc'Laughlin v. Tilendls
verse their previous decisions.

Following the Seventh Circuit
.

however, the courts began to re-

While all of the above was taking

place. Industrial union officials were being confronted with
a loss
of Interest in the private sector union movement.

Membership decreased

with an accompanying decline in the union treasuries.

A natural

partnership arose out of the growing dissatisfaction of public employees and the unions desire for additional sources of revenue and
for new worlds to conquer.

A2

Public employees, then, have joined forces to form unions
primarily for the same reasons that people have worked together over

40

Shaw, "The Development of State and Federal Laws>’' in Public
Workers and Public Unions , ed. Zagaria, p. 26,

^^Ibid., pp. 21-22.
A2

Theodore W, Kheel, "Introduction; Background and History," in
Public Employee Unions; A Study of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor
Relations ed. Chlckerlng, pp, 5-6; Spero and Capozzola, The Urban
Community and Unionized Bureaucracies; Pressure Politics in Local
Government Labor Relations p. 17; Northrup and Bloom, Government and
Labor pp. 142-43; Doherty and Oberer, Teachers, School Boards, and
Collective Barbaining , p. 33; and William J. Moore, "Comment on Collective
Negotiations and Teachers," in Education and Collective Bargaining;
Readings in Policy and Research eds. Cresswell and Murphy, p. 249.
,

,

,

,

38

the centuries.

Aristotle brought this out when he stated in his

Politics that "man is by nature a political animal."

reflection applies here:

His succinct

man has a natural tendency to join with

others with whom he has common needs. Interests, and problems, etc.^^
The labor movement in the United States has not seen anything com-

parable to the recent growth of public sector unionism since the ex-

pansion of industrial unionism in the 1930 ’s.

Actually, the growth

of public sector unionism has proceeded at an even more rapid pace

than the growth of industrial unionism for in less than two decades public

sector unions have organized forty-five percent of the potential
membership.

To compare, unions in the private sector have organized

only twenty-two percent of the potential membership in more than four
decades.

The greatest increase in public sector union membership has

taken place amongst local public employees.

AA

The discrepancy in the rate of growth is not the only difference

between public and private sector unionism.

Another major difference

involves the issue of sovereignty and accountability.

Publicly

elected and appointed officials take the position that they are

accountable to the public for the performance of the agencies under

in
^^Nisbet, "Public Unions and the Decline of Social Trust,"
Labor
Sector
Public Employee Unions: A Study of the Crisis in Public
Organize,
Relations, ed. Chickering, pp. 13-15; and Tyler, "Why They
Policy and Researc_h
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eds. Cresswell and Murphy, p. 13.
^

U nions, ed.
^^Zagarla, "Introduction," in Public Workers and Public
and Unlo_ n2
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Urban
The
Zagarla, pp. 1 and 3; Spero and Capozzola,
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Labor
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Lo
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th,
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Structure,
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p. lA; and Jack Stieber, Public
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their control.

They also hold that the right of the
public to the

services of these agencies Is paramount;
that the Interests of those

who work for these public agencies Is subservient
to the Interests of
the public.

45

The sovereignty Issue was one of the factors
that

originally held back the growth of public unionism.

Public management

refused to negotiate with public employees because it felt
that as the

representative of the sovereign it did not have the right to share
its
responsibilities and authority with employees.
and political pressure,

As a result of social

(which in part explains the decision in

Mc’Laughlin v. Tllendis considered above)

,

public sector management

gradually modified its position, and entered into collective bargalning relationships with public employees. 46

Because of the sovereignty issue, the desire of many groups
of public employees to have a greater voice in the performance of

their duties, the issue of the scope of negotiations is a much more

involved issue in the public sector than it is in the private sector.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that collective

bargaining costs in the private sector are financial whereas collective

Theodore W. Kheel, "Introduction: Background and History," in
Public Employee Unions; A Study of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor
Relations ed, Chickering, p, 1; Harvey C, Mansfield, Jr., "The Prestige
of Public Employment," in Public Employee Unions: A Study of the Crisis
in Public Sector Labor Relations ed. Chickering, p. 38; and Beal,
Wickersham, and Kienast, The Practice of Collective Bargaining pp.
457-58 and 464.
,

,

,

^^Ibid., pp. 458-59; Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community and
Unionized Bureaucracies; Pressure Politics in Local Government Labor
the Public
Relations, p. 192; and John W. Macy, "The Role of Bargaining in
8-9.
Service," in Public Workers and Public Unions , ed. Zagaria, pp.
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bargaining costs in the public sector are
political as well as
financial.

Private sector management will view union
demands solely

from the point of view of whether or not
it will be able to meet the
costs of the union demands and still make a
profit.

Publicly elected

officials will view the cost Impact of union demands
from their

perceived reaction of the various interest groups within
their constituency to such demands.

In considering accession to union demands,

elected officials will weigh quite heavily how accession will effect
their chances for reelection.

Additionally, in the public sector the

implications of demands are much more significant to the consumer as he
does not have the opportunity of acquiring the services from another

supplier.

Public agencies tend to monopolize the particular service

that they deliver and, as many of the nonmonetary demands that are

made by public unions affect, or may appear to affect, either the
quality of the delivery of the service, accession to nonmonetary demands
in the public sector then becomes a political issue.
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The fact that public sector management modified its position on
the sovereignty issue and entered into collective bargaining relation-

ships with public sector employees should not be construed to mean
that management went from a position of refusing to negotiate with
the unions to a position of agreeing to negotiate any and all aspects

of the work relationship.

Management for the most part has moved to a

^^Wellington and Winter, "The Limits of Collective Bargaining in
Public Employment," in Public Employee Unions; A Study of the Crisis in
Public Sector Labor Relations^ ed. Chickering, pp. 64-65.
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position whereby it defines scope of negotiations
to Include only
economic matters, fringe benefits, and working conditions.

A chief

area of controversy today is a definition of bargalnable
"working

conditions."

The union takes the position that any item or issue is

a proper subject matter for negotiations while public management
takes
the position that only those matters that directly affect the well

being of the union members are negotiable.

It is management’s con-

tention that those items that affect the manner in which the service of
the organization is delivered or the quality of that service are not

proper subject matters for negotiations.
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The concept of co-determination or the involvement of the em-

ployees in the determination of how and to what degree the service is

delivered has not been very prevalent in the private sector in the
United States.

Employees in the private sector are concerned with

that which affects their material well being; as a result their

primary concern at the collective bargaining table is placed on what
are commonly referred to as "bread and butter Issues."

The fact that

co-determination plays a much greater part in public sector collective

bargaining is attributable in large part to the greater number of professionals engaged in public service who traditionally have always
had some role in determining the quality of service.

While they are

and
concerned about economic benefits, as a result of their training

also
concomitant commitment to professionalism they are concerned

Unionized Bureau:^
^®Spero and Capozzola. The Urban Community a nd
173.
cracies; Pressure Politics in Local Labor Relations, p.
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about the service that they provide,

These employees believe that the

sharing of the expertise that they possess is
critical to the development of effective delivery systems to the public.

They believe that

the refusal of public management to accept their
expertise prohibits

them from exercising the professional responsibility that
they have
to their clients.

49

In stating its position relative to the question of scope, public

management refers again to the concept of sovereignty.
that public service

is^

Management holds

provided for the direct or indirect benefit of

all segments of society; this being so, the service should not be

controlled by any specific group, especially the one that has more of
a vested interest in the service than any other group.

As stated

previously, it is management’s position that only economics, fringe
benefits, and those working conditions that directly affect the material

well-being of public employees are proper matters for the collective
bargaining table.
Despite the sovereignty doctrine, the tendency over the years
has been for the definition of scope to become increasingly broader;

consequently, far more items are accepted today as proper subjects for
the collective bargaining table than was the case previously.

The

^^Ibld., p. 193; Zagaria, "Introduction,” in Public Workers and
Public Unions , ed. Zagaria, p, 2; and Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast,
The Practice of Collective Bargaining p, 463,
,

^^Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community and Unionized Bureaucracies; Pressure Politics in Local Labor Relations, p, 194,
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reasons for this are many and varied.

The negotiating parties have

come to realize that a much more effective solution
is achieved if
they are able to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement.

Management

has come to realize that the continued reliance on a management's
rights

clause is unrealistic; further, that the scope of collective bargaining

must provide a broad enough channel to encompass the areas of employee
dissatisfaction.

In many instances, the issue is no longer whether or

not professionals should be involved in the decision making process of
the agency they represent, but rather by what method they should be

Involved

.

^

^

As management became more experienced at the negotiations table,
it came to realize that it was not easy to define in a precise manner

those areas that are or are not bargalnable.

As a result of this

growing uncertainty as to whether or not certain Issues were bargainable, management became less inclined to risk major confrontation over
the question of whether or not a particular item was a proper subject

matter for the collective bargaining table.
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The scope of collective bargaining grew as management became

willing to negotiate a specific item or issue in return for a concession

^^Zack, "Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions," in Public Workers
and Public Unions ed. Zagaria, p. 121; Wellington and Winter, The
Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment," in Public
tion's,
Employee Unions; A Study of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor Rela
Con^
Urban
The
ed. Chickering, pp. 51 and 66; and Spero and Capozzola,
Labor
and Unionized Bureaucracies; Pressure Politics in Local
,

munity
Relations , p. 191.

Bureau^^Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community and Un ionized
191.
Relations,
p.
Labor
cracles: Pressure Politics in Local
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from the union.

The most common example of this would be management's

willingness to agree to nonmonetary issues in return for the union's
agreement to a lower wage scale.

In many small communities, the trade

off of nonmonetary items for monetary concessions represents a political decision as it would seem to be politically more expedient to win

monetary concessions in exchange for nonmonetary items the implications
of which many people initially would not fully or even partially com-

prehend

.

Scope is not the only area in public sector collective bargaining
over which there has been a considerable degree of uncertainty.

vexing question is who speaks for management.

Another

As a result of the

separation of powers and checks and balances system, those who represent
the executive branch in the public sector do not speak with the same

authority at the bargaining table as those who represent management in
the private sector.

The monies that are necessary to fund a collective

bargaining agreement entered into by the executive branch must be
appropriated by the legislative branch.

Therefore, public sector

management cannot reach an agreement at the collective bargaining table

with the same degree of finality as private sector management.

In

those Instances where the executive and legislative branches have

worked well together, there has been a minimum of uncertainty and
difficulty.

have
However, when such cooperation does not exist, there

refused to appropribeen occasions in which the legislative bodies have

bargaining agreements.
ate the necessary monies to fund the collective
are not working well
Situations wherein the two governmental branches
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together may present the union with an opportunity to Improve its

position by negotiating a better contract with the legislative branch
after it has already reached an agreement with the executive branch.
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Perhaps the most vexing question of all in the area of public
sector collective bargaining is the right to stike issue.

Public

employers contend that a strike is a direct act of defiance against the
They contend that the essence of statehood is that the authority

state.

of the state is greater than any of the agencies or departments that
If the

are utilized by the state to provide services to its citizens.

employees of these agencies or departments are allowed to challenge the
state, the very essence of statehood is challenged.
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In the public sector, the more essential the service the greater

settle
the pressure the public will impose on the political leaders to
the strike no matter the economic costs.

A strike in the public sector

weapon.
then becomes a political weapon rather than an economic
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have a considerable
Public employers contend that public employees already

Sector Collective Bar^^Arvid Anderson, "The Structure of Public
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amount of political influence simply because of their
large numbers.

Public employers maintain that the power that would be
acquired by
public employees as a result of being given the right to
strike when

combined with the power that they already have as a result of their
lobbying efforts would give public employees a disproportionate amount
,

of power.
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Public employers believe that collective bargaining in the public
sector can be effective without the right to strike.

They cite the

tremendous growth of public sector unionism itself as proof of their
position.

Public employers contend that while public employees do not

have the right to strike, they do have the power to strike.

It is

management's knowledge that public employees may strike, albeit illegally that keeps the public employer at the collective bargaining table

in an attempt to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement.

As proof

of their position, public employers cite the tremendous increase in the

number of strikes during the last two decades; further, that the majority of these strikes have resulted in little or no legal retribution.

Public employee unions contend that the right to conduct a legal
strike is essential to the collective bargaining process, for it la the

^^Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community and Unionized Bureaucracies; Pressure Politics in Local Labor Relations , p. 190; and Wellington and Winter, "The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment," in Public Employee Unions; A Study of the Crisis in Public
Sector Labor Relations , ed. Chickering, pp. 67-69.
^^Kheel, "Introduction; Background and History," in Public E^mployee
Unions; A Study of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor Relations, ed.
Chickering, p. 10; Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast, The Prac tice of Collective Bargaining , pp, 450 and 459; and Davey, Contem porary Collective
Bargaining , p. 351.
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ever threatening presence of a strike that keeps management
at the

bargaining table, striving to reach an agreement.

They believe that

there is a considerable difference between the power to strike and
the
right to strike.

It is their opinion that the latter involves a much

greater risk, and as a result their members are much more hesitant to
strike.
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Public employee unions believe that public employers have

relied far too heavily on the sovereignty doctrine.

They contend that

there are very few governmental functions that are truly sovereign in
nature.
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They cite situations where public employees are performing

functions that are quite similar if not identical to that performed by

private sector employees.

As the private sector employees have the

right to strike and public employees do not, it is the contention of
the public employee unions that their members are being treated as

second class citizens.
In the last few years, a number of state governments have agreed

with the position of public employee unions as by 1975 six states
had granted public sector employees the right to strike.

In most

instances, the right to strike is qualified in that the negotiating

parties must first utilize all aspects of the impasse procedure.

Only after the public employer has rejected the report of the fact

Bureau^®Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community and Union ized
Beal
and
8-9;
Relations
pp.
Labor
cracies: Pressure Politics in Local
459
Bargaining,
p,
e
Collectiv
Wlckersham, and Klenast, The Practice of
,

Study in
^^Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service; A
Political Pluralism, p. 30.

A8

finder may the public employees exercise the
right to strike.

The

right to strike in these states is further qualified
by the fact
that it is not granted to those public employees who
perform a service
that is essential to the public welfare and safety, l.e. fire and
14
police.
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In that the movement to grant public employees the legal right
to strike has made slow progress, public employee unions contend that

public employers have a moral obligation to cooperate in the develop-

ment of alternatives to the right to strike, i.e. binding arbitration
of future contract terms.

The search for alternatives to the right to strike is but one

example of the Issues currently facing public sector collective bargaining.

The scope of collective bargaining is still an unresolved

issue because as the public employee unions have become more satisfied

with their economic gains, they have turned to involvement in the
resolution of policy matters.

One of the policy Issues that has become

increasingly Important to the public sector unions in the last few
years has been that of job security.

The combination of the economic

problems that are presently facing the United States together with the

increasing tax rates of the local, county, state and federal governments

^^Beal, Wickersham, and Klenast, The Practice of Collective
Bargaining , pp. A88-89.

Public
^^Kheel, "Introduction; Background and History," in
Labor Relation s,
Employee Unions; A Study of the Crisis in Pu blic Sector
Bargaining in the Public
ed, Chickering, p. 10; and Macy, "The Role of
Zagaria, p. 17.
Service," in Public Workers and Public Unions ed.
,

have resulted in a growing taxpayer's revolt.

Public employee unions

are well aware that the taxpayer's revolt has
and will result in per-

sonnel reductions, and consequently, they are insisting
that layoff and

recall procedures favorable to present union members be
included in
their collective bargaining agreements.

The growth of public sector unionism is one of the more significant developments that came out of the rising spirit of disobedience
in which this country found itself engulfed during the 1960's.

The

atmosphere at this time was one of protest against traditional authority,
and it was a period of time in which public employees found the courage
to question the concept of sovereignty.
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The movement is significant

by the very fact that it involves those people who are employed by the

public.

Even if this were not the case, the movement would still be

significant because of the sheer number of people involved.

The

number of public employees who belonged to labor organizations was
less than one million in 1955.

During the next decade, this number had

Increased to one and one half million, and by 1975 the number of public

employees who belonged to labor organizations had grown to approximately
six million.

This same period of time saw a tremendous Increase in the

number of people in the public sector as the public payroll increased
from six million employees in 1950 to ten million in 1965, and

^^Zack, "Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions," in Public VJorkers
Urban
and Public Unions , ed. Zagaria, p. 101; Spero and Capozzola, The
Labojr
Community and Unionized Bureaucracies: Pressure Politics in Local
Practice
Relations , pp. 8 and 9; and Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast, The
A53-54.
of Collective Bargaining, pp.
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approximately 3.6 million of the four million new
employees were
employed by state and local governments,^^

Collective Bargaining In Education
The public demand for more governmental services
or benefits was

typified by the G.I. Bill of Rights and the large number
of returning

servicemen after World War II who took advantage of the Bill.

Educa-

tion was becoming more important in the minds of the American people.

Many saw education as the passport to the good life.

Additionally,

education had become more important because of the need to provide
skills and training for a rapidly expanding economy.

This increased

emphasis on the importance of education was coupled with a tremendous

growth in school enrollment.

The post-war baby boom would mean also

a rapid rise in the number of people employed by the local school
.
districts
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The biggest success of public unionism took place amongst local

government employees, and it was in education that the major share
of this increase took place.

During the 1966-1967 school year, 1,531

collective bargaining agreements were in existence covering 609,304

fi

^

Ibid., p. 450; Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community and
Unionized Bureaucracies: Pressure Politics in Local Labor Relations ,
pp. 342-43.
p. 13; and Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining
,

^^Tyler, 'Vhy They Organize," in Education and Collective Bargaining: Readings in Policy and Research , eds. Cresswell and Murphy,
pp. 16-18.
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public school teachers.

Within four years, the number of collective

bargaining agreements Increased to 3,522 and the
number of public
school teachers covered by these agreements
Increased to 1,337,146.^^
Teachers, together with other public employees, were
dissatisfied with their wages.

The teacher union movement was influenced by

the significant wage gains made by blue collar workers
and also by

the teachers' Inability to obtain salary Increases comparable
to the

rising cost of living.

During the period 1960-1967, the average

annual salary Increase of teachers was 4.5%.

This increase was actually

less than what it had been between the years 1947-1960.

The two fore-

most and immediate goals of teachers as they organized for the purpose
of collective bargaining were to improve their economic status and
to establish a power position from which they would be able to retain

their improved economic status.

Another very significant cause of teacher militancy was

Zagaria, "Introduction," in Public Workers and Public Unions ,
Zagaria, p. 3; and Frederick R. Livingston, "Collective Bargaining
and the School Board," in Public Workers and Public Unions , ed.
Zagaria, p. 63.
ed.

Fox and E. E. Johnson, "Unionization of Professionals:
What Can We Expect?" in Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public
Sector Vol. 4, No. (1975): 413-14; Myron Lieberman and Michael H.
Moskow, Collective Negotiations for Teachers (Chicago: Rand McNally &
Company, 1966), p. 57; Moore, "Comment on Collective Negotiations and
Teachers," in Education and Collective Bargaining; Readings in Policy
and Research, eds. Cresswell and Murphy, p. 248; Thomas Michael Love,
"The Impact of Teacher Negotiations on School System Decision Making,"
(Ph.D. thesis. University of Wisconsin, 1968), p. 7; Doherty and Oberer,
Teachers, School Boards, and Collective Bargaining , p. 21; Patrick W.
Carlton, "Educator Attitudes and Values: Differences in Collective
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dissatisfaction with the traditional power structure as found In
education.

After many years of living under a paternalistic system,

a system which had not brought them the voice In their profession that

they felt they deserved, their trust and reliance In the system dis-

appeared.

The dissatisfaction with the power structure became In

creaslngly more acute during the post-war period as the rapid Increase
In the number of personnel employed In education brought with It more

rigid and Impersonal work regulations.

At the same time, the relation-

ship between school teachers and school administrators became even
less personal.

The belief that teachers should have a greater voice

In their profession slowly evolved Into one of the goals of collective

bargaining.

Another social factor that substantially contributed to the
development of the collective bargaining movement In the 1960 ’s was

Charles A. Jones Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 24-27; and Perry and
Wlldman, The Impact of Negotiations In Public Education; The Evidence
From the Schools (Worthington, Ohio; Charles A. Jones Publishing Co.,
1970), pp. 14-15.
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the fact that a greater number of males began to
choose education as
a career.

In 1925 males accounted for 17% of the work
force in

education but by 1965 this figure had Inceased to 35%.

It was the

male teachers who provided much of the union leadership.

As the prin-

cipal wage earners of their families , males were more concerned
about

their economic status than married female teachers who at that time

regarded their salaries as a supplement to the family income.

While it was not until the 1960’s that collective bargaining
became a nationally significant force in public education, the actual
commitment to the movement was made by the American Federation of

Teachers during the 1950 's.^^

The movement was slow in developing.

Teachers had to be convinced that collective bargaining was a legiti-

mate process for public employees to utilize and that it could be
effective in helping them to achieve their goals. In 1961, an election
was held to determine whether the American Federation of Teachers (AFT)
or the National Education Association (NEA) would be the exclusive

bargaining agent of the teachers in New York City.

The AFT won the

^^Engel, "Teacher Negotiation: History and Comment," in Education
and Collective Bargaining: Readings in Policy and Research, eds.
Cresswell and Murphy, p. 23; Carlton, "Educator Attitudes and Values:
Differences in Collective Negotiations," in The Collective Dilemma^
Negotiations in Education eds. Carlton and Goodwin, p. 28; Perry and
Wildman, The Impact of Negotiations in Public Education: The Evidence
From the Schools , pp. 14-15; and Doherty and Oberer, Teachers, School
Boards, and Collective Bargaining , p. 21.
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election.

The subsequent declaration of the AFT as the
exclusive

bargaining agent for the teachers In New York City, and
the success
of that organization In helping those teachers to achieve
their goals

represented the first major break through In the collective bargaining

movement In public education.
The remainder of the decade was to be a period of Intensive

organization on the part of both the AFT and the NEA.

The AFT was

assisted by organized labor In Its efforts as Is demonstrated by the
fact that the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial

Organization (AFL-CIO) donated $362,000.00 to the AFT during the
period 1963-1965 and the sum of $1,200,000.00 during the period
1961-1968.

election.
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The AFT’s first major victory was the New York City

Others were to follow, as the AFT successfully organized

other large cities such as Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, and
Cleveland.

The AFT built its national membership from approximately

fifty thousand to over two hundred and fifty thousand.

While the

majority of the AFT membership is located in large cities, the AFT
has also won elections In smaller cities such as Newark, New Jersey

^^Moore, "Comment on Collective Negotiations and Teachers," in
Education and Collective Bargaining: Readings In Policy and Research,
Cresswell and Murphy, p. 247; and Fox and Johnson, Unionization
eds
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and towns such as Pembroke, New Hampshire^^
the early 1960 s, the NEA had maintained a policy against

both strikes and militant unionism In an effort to maintain a professional Image; however. It then saw Itself threatened by a much more
nillltant AFT which was by no means reluctant to assume a strong union

posture.

The threat of the AFT to the NEA was acutely felt by the

latter organization when the AFT won the New York City election.
As a result of the Imposing presence of the AFT, pressure from
Its own NEA membership, and a realization that the AFT methods produced

better results than Its own, the NEA began to change Its posture on

collective bargaining.

By the mid 1960's, It no longer opposed

strikes, and although It still attempted to maintain Its position of

professionalism, there was little difference between the two organizations In regard to the tactics employed to win recognition and con-

cessions from school boards.
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The power struggle between the NEA and the AFT was
a major

factor in the growth of militancy amongst teachers.

As pointed out

previously, if one accepts the premise that organizations exist
for
the purpose of satisfying the collective needs of a specific
group of

people, then elected union leaders must respond to the needs and

desires of the union membership in the collective bargaining process.

The need of the NEA and the AFT to be responsive to the wishes

of its respective members added to the desire of each organization
to Increase its power base by increasing its membership resulted in

constant escalation of union demands at the collective bargaining
It was a contest in which each side was determined to prove

table.

to teachers that it was the more effective collective bargaining

agent,
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The struggle between the NEA and the AFT and the concomitant

escalation of demands is one of the reasons why the scope of collective

bargaining is a more controversial question in education than it is
in the private sector.

In their efforts to meet the needs of their

members and to convince other teachers that they should Join their
organization, both the AFT and the NEA have taken the position that
any item or issue that affects the educational process is a proper
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matter for collective bargaining.

The AFT took the position that the

scope of collective bargaining is unlimited as early
as 1965, and the

NEA took this position at approximately the same time.

Both organiza-

tions recognized that the question of professional dignity was
extremely

important to teachers.

Professional dignity is much more important

to teachers than it is to industrial workers.

Teachers, as a result

of their training and concomitant commitment to professionalism are

concerned about the service that they provide.

They believe that the

sharing of their expertise is critical to the development of effective

delivery systems to the public.

They believe that the refusal of

public management to accept their expertise prohibits them from

exercising the professional responsibility that they have to their
clients.

Thus, teachers are less persuaded by the argument of manage-

ment prerogative than are Industrial workers.

Proponents of a broad scope of collective bargaining in education
state that teachers have the expertise and interest which entitles

them to a role in determining policy matters.

They further state

Love, "The Impact of Teacher Negotiations on School System
Decision Making," pp. 175 and lA-15; Doherty and Oberer, Teachers,
School Boards, and Collective Bargaining , pp. 145 and 502; John H.
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that the public Is better served by a broad
scope as this allows the

public to take advantage of the teachers expertise,
and that it is In
the best interests of the public for public policy
to be developed by

all of the concerned parties.

Proponents of increased teacher participation state that the
school board which stands firm behind the concept of management

prerogative will create considerable resentment on the part of the
teachers; that teachers who are denied the opportunity to participate
in the development of policies, especially those policies that pertain

to professional matters, tend to be more militant.

Those school

boards that pay particular attention to the specific professional

concerns and needs of the staff members in their employ reduce con-

siderably the degree of militancy amongst their staff members.
is in the area of

It

professional autonomy and not the area of bread

and butter issues that the majority of the most bitter union-school

board disputes have taken place.
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Initially many school boards relied solely on the
sovereignty
issue in their efforts to restrict the scope of collective
bargaining.
As time passed, sovereignty became less of a viable
defense, and as
a result of

political and social pressure, the scope of collective

bargaining began to expand.

The principal reason given for attempting

to restrict the scope of collective bargaining has now become the

thought that it is not realistic to discuss many Issues at the

collective bargaining table because of their complexity.

Consequently,

many teacher unions and school boards have begun to look at collective

bargaining as a process that could be utilized to develop a mechanism

whereby the more complex Issues could be discussed outside of the
collective bargaining process.
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The argument was now put forward that the mere fact that issues

other than economic and fringe benefits were being discussed at the

collective bargaining table did not mean that the school boards were

capitulating on the question of scope.

It did not

mean that school

boards were relinquishing all of their rights but simply that they
should not refuse to listen to the concerns of the teachers on the
basis of management prerogative.

Often, whether or not a school board

is willing to discuss items that are not considered to be subject
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to mandatory bargaining depends
on the school board's perception
of

the union as a nuisance or as an
organization with which the school

board can work to bring about improvements
in the educational program
In spite of all of the opposition, the
scope of collective

bargaining in education has grown, and may be
broader than in any
other area of the public sector.

Furthermore, the scope of collective

bargaining in education is likely to continue to grow.

As concessions

are granted in one community it becomes more difficult
for the

neighboring communities to resist similar demands.

A study by

Ronald Fitzgerald of some 129 Massachusetts comprehensive collective

bargaining agreements gives further proof to the statement that
scope of collective bargaining has grown in that the study reveals
that there are very few areas related to the operations of the schools
that are not covered in one or more of the agreements that were

analyzed.®^
The ultimate goal of both the NEA and AFT is to secure a real
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voice for their members in the development of the policies that
govern
the operation of the public schools.

It is inevitable that a shift in

power will take place because prior to the advent of collective

bargaining school boards by law held most of the power, although in
many communities much of it may have been controlled by the school
superintendents.

Administrators and school boards had both the

practical power and the legal right to make unilateral decisions while
the teachers could only submit proposals to express their concerns and

needs.

The administrators and school boards could accept or reject

them as they saw fit.
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With the advent of collective bargaining the teachers were
given a share in decision making.

One of the most immediate practical

effects of collective bargaining was to give teachers a degree of

control over managerial decisions and to assure teachers access to the

decision making process.

The collective bargaining process has very

definitely affected the working conditions of the teachers; for as
stated previously, it has given teachers an opportunity to be a party
determination had
to determining their working conditions whereas this

prior to collective bargaining been the exclusive prerogative
of the school board.
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As this sharing of power is new to both the
teachers and the

school boards* both must be careful that they understand
fully the
Implications of any action that they take in their new relationship.
There is a tendency on the part of the teachers to expect too much
from the collective bargaining process.

Many see the process as their

opportunity to satisfy all of their grievances and correct all of the
Inequities in the system.

Teacher expectations of the collective

bargaining process are greater in those systems where they previously
had little or no power.

As a correlative, there is a tendency on the

part of school boards to view collective bargaining as a threat.

The school boards that are threatened the most by collective bargaining are found in those school districts where teachers had little or
no involvement prior to collective bargaining.

8A

Thomas Love's study further brings out the fact that collective

bargaining has had its greatest impact in the area of working conApproximately 90-95% of the provisions contained in the 176

ditions.

comprehensive agreements that he analyzed dealt with personnel
policies.

The results of this study indicated also that the impact

of collective bargaining as far as the negotiations of educational

policy at the collective bargaining table and the subsequent Inclusion
been
of educational policies in collective bargaining agreements had

insignificant.

Although Love found the Involvement of the teachers in

insignifipolicy development at the collective bargaining table to be

mechanisms that had
cant, he also found them to be very involved thru

84

Ibid., pp. 69 and 71.
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been established outside the collective bargaining process.

The

most common method of teacher involvement was found to be in the
form
of recommendations thru committees that had been established by the

administration.

The most significant limitation of this process is

the fact that it is only advisory.

As a result. Love concluded that

in the long run this process would not result in a meaningful change
in the power structure.

Fitzgerald supported the position of Love

and others that the collective bargaining process is not commonly

used to discuss such items as curriculum development because of
their complex nature.

He considered collective bargaining to be a

problem solving process.

However, as all problems cannot be solved

quickly or even anticipated it is not possible to find the solutions
to all of the problems at the collective bargaining table.

Therefore,

it is Fitzgerald's contention that the collective bargaining process

should be utilized to define a decision making process which would

provide for meaningful teacher involvement.
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Fitzgerald's analysis of the public school collective bargaining agreements that had been negotiated in Massachusetts for the

1968-1969 school year disclosed that 46% of the collective bargaining

agreements that had been negotiated in school districts with an
enrollment of 1,000 or more pupils specified a process for teacher
involvement.

One of the many examples of teacher involvement is
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found in the collective bargaining agreement between the Philadelphia

teachers and the Philadelphia Board of Education which specifies
that the superintendent of schools meet with teachers at least once
a month to discuss educational policy.
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Thomas Love found that the scope of collective bargaining did
in fact become broader In those school districts where the teachers

utilized the collective bargaining process and, furthermore, that the
scope of collective bargaining became even broader in those school
districts in which a collective bargaining agent had been designated
as the exclusive representative of the teachers.

Both Love and Shlls

concluded that those contracts that had been negotiated by the AFT

were more comprehensive than those negotiated by the NEA.

It is

Love's opinion that greater emphasis will be placed on negotiating

educational policy at the collective bargaining table as the teachers
learn to use the collective bargaining process more effectively.
However, Perry and Wlldman contend that the improvement of their
.
economic status will still be the main concern of teachers.
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It would appear that the collective bargaining process has at

their
least had a short terra effect in helping teachers to improve

economic status.

Part of the difficulty in assessing the contribution

Administrators,,.
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of collective bargaining in the salary area is
that the United States

experienced a teacher shortage for a number of years.

During this

time, education officials were working extremely hard
to Increase

salaries in order to retain and attract quality teachers.

This latter

fact was probably as responsible as collective bargaining for increas-

ing salaries during the 1960 's and the early part of the 1970' s.

Fitzgerald concluded that pay increases in the initial agreements were
ten to twenty percent higher because of the collective bargaining

process.

Perry and Wildman support Fitzgerald's conclusion that

initially collective bargaining was instrumental in bringing about

higher salaries whereas they believe that larger salary increases are
given to those public sector groups that are able to apply the most
pressure.

Many economists also contend that the union impact on

wages is likely to be more significant in the initial agreements.
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Salary Increases have a very definite impact on the quality of educational programs.

Fitzgerald found that the additional salary increases

granted in the 1966-1967 agreements were compensated for by utilizing

new revenues and by making minor economies.

Furthermore, that salary

Increases in the 1967-1968 agreements were paid for by liquidating sur-

pluses and reductions in the educational programs.

Perry and Wildman
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also support the idea that there were no significant increases
in the amounts of money raised by communities to support
the salary

Increases; rather they concluded there was a reallocation of re-

sources
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The most commonly held opinion appears to be that with the

exception of the initial agreements, the collective bargaining process
has not been of significant assistance to teachers in their efforts
to improve their economic status.
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When teachers first began to

use collective bargaining to improve their economic status, the pres-

sure that they exerted against school boards was not met with an

equivalent pressure.

School boards were not as well prepared to

negotiate as were the teacher unions.

In the Intervening years,

school boards have spent a considerable amount of money in order to

become more formidable bargaining opponents.
Furthermore, for a number of years, the sympathy of the public
was with the teachers and not with the school boards.
felt that teachers were underpaid.

The public

As teachers salaries increased

and as the cost of living index went up, the public attitude has
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to the point where it is no longer in sympathy with the

teachers

economic demands beyond that which is necessary to keep

them even with the cost of living.

Inflationary pressures have a

8^®^ter effect on public employers than they do on private employers
and the question of maintaining moderate budget increases is more

critical if the public employers wish to remain in their positions.
As the collective bargaining process was adopted by other public

employee groups, the teacher unions found themselves in competition

with these groups in their efforts to secure salary Increases.
On the other hand, the public found itself in the position of being

squeezed economically by the competing demands of all public employee
groups.

As a result of this competition, the long run effect that

the collective bargaining process will have on the salary Increases
of a particular public employee union will depend to a considerable

extent on the collective bargaining ability of that union and the

pressure which it is able to exert upon the community.

Over a period

of time, it is not reasonable to assume that the total community

financial effort will increase to any considerable extent.

Therefore,

in the absence of technological advances that will increase productivity

allocated
in education with a consequent dollar savings that can be

bargaining
to teacher salaries, it is doubtful that the collective
r
u
teachers.
process will significantly affect the economic status of
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While the collective bargaining process may not have had a
significant effect on teacher salaries, it has had a significant
effect on personnel policies especially in the areas of administrative
and grievance practices.

Teacher collective bargaining agreements

have brought to education an increasingly complex body of rules and
regulations.

There is no question but that the collective bargaining

agreements have narrowed and will continue to narrow the scope of

managerial discretion.

Unilateral decision making by the employer

is most prevalent in districts where the teachers are not represented

by an exclusive bargaining agent.

It is least prevalent in districts

92

where the AFT is the exclusive representative of the teachers.

A direct consequence of the inclusion of personnel policy
provisions in collective bargaining agreements is that public school

administration has become much less flexible.

Precedents are set

and what the school administrator did in the past for one staff

member he must do in the future for another.

Close scrutiny of the

collective bargaining agreements by union representatives will insure
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^^Murphy and Hoover, "Negotiations at the Crossroads:
and Col^
Education
in
Professionalization or Reinforced Bureaucracy,"
and
Cresswell
eds.
Research
lectlve BarRaining: Readings i n Policy and
on
Negotiations
Murphy, pp. 476 and 481; Love, "The Impact of Teacher
and Wildman, T^
School System Decision Making," pp. A8 and 167; Perry
Evidence From the Schoo^,
Impact of Negotiations on Public Education; The
Healey, and Livemash, The Impact p_
pp. 214, 39, and 216; and Slichter,
279,
Collective Bargaining on Management , pp. 9 and
,

,
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that administrators will adhere closely
to these agreements.

Further-

more, as the teacher unions become more
experienced at the collective

bargaining table, the agreements will become more
sophisticated, and
school administrators can expect that seniority will
prove to be an
Important restriction on the decision making process.
The public school administrator, therefore, will probably
have
to be more capable than was necessary in the past if he
or she is to be

effective.

He or she will have to be aware of the implications of his

or her decisions, for as previously stated, the public employee union

will be ever-vlgilant to be sure that the provisions of the collective

bargaining agreement are administered fairly.

Most collective bargaining

agreements in education contain a grievance procedure, and many of these

provide for some form of arbitration.

Given the history of collective

bargaining in the private sector where 94% of the collective bargaining
agreements provide for final and binding arbitration, it probably is
only a matter of time before the majority of the collective bargaining

agreements in education provide for final and binding arbitration.
One of the areas most significantly affected by collective bargaining
is the management of employee discipline.

The presence of collective

bargaining, therefore, will force educational administrators to sharpen
their managerial skills.
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The existence of collective bargaining agreements in education

will require additional management staff to effectively administer

^^Ibid.

,

pp. 9 and 279.

Col^^Metzler, "The Role of Management in Negotiations," in The
Goodwin,
p.
and
Carlton
eds.
lective Dilemma; Negotiations in Education ,
Bargaining
Collective
of
Impact
The
88; Slichter, Healey, and Livemash,
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the agreements.

In this respect the absence of the profit motive

in the public sector is very significant; in private
Industry, when

administrative specialists are added to the payroll, the price of the
product to the consumer is raised in order to meet the additional cost.
In the public sector, however, such additional costs must be passed to

the consumer in the form of additional taxes.

It may be difficult

to convince the public of the necessity for such additional staff.

The presence of collective bargaining will force educational

administrators to engage in more of a team effort.

Top-level manage-

ment will have to keep all levels of management Informed relative to
labor policies in order that the policies may be carried out properly.

Furthermore, all levels of management must be consulted relative to
the terms of the agreement prior to its final ratification.

This

communication is essential if top-level management is to understand
the ramifications of all Issues being negotiated.

As previously

stated, the character and ability of lower level supervisors become

even more important in a collective bargaining relationship than in
a non-collective bargaining relationship; the character and ability

of lower level supervisors will be crucial in determining whether or

not stable employment relationship is maintained.
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The existence of a stable employment relationship must be
the
considered to be one of the most important factors in helping

satisfactory
parties to achieve a reasonably quick and mutually

and Love.^ "The Impact of
on Management pp. 104-05. 181, 627, and 740;
Making, pp. 94 and 116.
Teacher Negotiations on School System Decision
of Co llective
^^Slichter, Healey, and Livernash, The Impact
952.
and
915,
Bargaining on Management , pp. 14-17, 545-46,
,
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collective bargaining agreement.

If the parties are not able to

reach such a settlement, they will have to resort to Impasse procedures; such procedures have often been less than satisfactory In

education.

Actually, the Issue of an effective Impasse procedure

In the public sector has been one that Is quite complex and emotionally

charged; this has been particularly so in education.

The chief issue

that people have agonized over is how to develop an effective impasse

procedure, without recourse to the strike that will result in the

disruption of public service.
Public employers contend that a strike is a direct act of

defiance against the state.

They contend that the essence of state-

hood is that the authority of the state is greater than that of any
of the agencies or departments that the state uses to provide services
to its citizens.

If the employees of these agencies or departments

are allowed to challenge the state, the very essence of statehood is

challenged.

Public employers argue against giving public employees

essential
the right to strike, because in the public sector the more
impose on the
the service the greater the pressure the public will
the economic
political leaders to settle the strike, no matter what

costs are.

A strike

weapon
in the public sector is thus a political

and Collectiv e
^^Cresswell and Murphy, "Overview," in Education
eds. Cresswell and Murphy,
Bargaining; Readinr.s in Policy and Research
,

p.

297.

^
^

c Service; A Study^
^^Godine, The Labor Problem in the Publi
and
Political Pluralism , pp. 170-72; and Spero
Politics in Loc
Pressure
Bureaucracies;
Community and Uni tized
Labor Relations, p. 265.

72

rather than an economic weapon. 98

Public employers also contend

that the right to strike, when combined with the power
that the

employees already have as a result of the large number of votes that
they represent, would give public employees disproportionate power.

The proponents of the right to strike in the education field

state that one of the initial arguments against the right to strike,
that the public health and safety might thereby be endangered, is

fallacious in that most experts now agree that a teacher strike is
not a threat to public health and safety.

strikes occur anyway.

They state that teacher

In an analysis of 87 strikes, David Gray and

Patricia Dyson found that 46 out of 87 court imposed strike injunctions

were violated; further in 33 Instances in which penalties were sought
by the public employer, the courts Imposed penalties in only 20

instances.

It

is their conclusion that the injunction process and

contempt proceedings are minimally effective.

The proponents of the

right to strike state that the available impasse mechanisms are inThey contend that the right to strike is a political

adequate.

weapon for which no substitute will be found, and without which the

^®Bcal, Wlckersham, and Klenast, The Practice of Collecti ve
Bargaining p. 456, and Wellington and Winter, "The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment," in Public Employee Unlonsj
Chi eke ring,
A Stud y of the Crisis in Public Sector Lab or Relatlon^B. ed.
,

p.

68.

nized Bureau^^Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community and Unio
190; and
cra cies; Pressure Politics in Local Labor Relations p.
in Public
Wellington and Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining
the C risis in
Employment," in Public Employee Unions; A Study of
67-69.
Chickering,
pp.
Public Sector Labor Relations, ed.
,
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two parties cannot be equals in the collective bargaining process.^®®

The opponents of the right to strike take the position that a strike
in education is an act of defiance against the state, and further that
it denies the very essence of statehood.

It is a political weapon in

that a large number of people are affected by the disruption of the

educational process, and these people will place a considerable amount
of pressure on the school board to settle the strike without regard to

the economic cost.

It is their contention that the right to strike

will give teachers a disproportionate amount of power.
Doherty and Oberer contend that if it is not possible to give

public employees the right to strike, the most effective impasse
procedure is one that allows binding arbitration.

The opponents of

binding arbitration of future contract terms state that this procedure
places a serious restriction on the two parties in that they are less
likely to strive to reach an agreement.

The parties are apt to withhold

Murphy,
^^^Ibid.
p. 300; Anthony M. Cresswell and Michael J.
in
Readings
Bargaining:
Collective
and
Education
"Introduction," in
A.
David
XVI;
Murphy,
and
p.
Creswell
Policy and Research eds.
Public
Gray and Patricia B. Dyson, "Impact of Strike Remedies in
i_n
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ve
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of
Journal
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The
Shanker,
Albert
and
the Public Sector Vol. 5, No. 2 (1976): 128;
in
Making,
Future of Teacher Involvement in Educational Decision
and
Carlton
eds.
The Collective Dilemma; Negotiations in Education ,
,

,

Goodwin, p. 80.
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their final offer and wait for the arbitrator to determine the term*
of the contract.

Doherty and Oberer state that this argument is

invalid in education whereas teachers do not have the right to strike.
It is their position that if the School board does not accept the

decision of the arbitrator then the teachers should have the right to
strike.

Perry and Wildman take the position that it is not likely that

binding arbitration of future contract terms will become an acceptable
impasse procedure in most states.
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Fact finding that includes a provision for the Issuance of a

public report is a widely accepted procedural alternative to the
right to strike and binding arbitration.

Mediation is also recommended

as an Impasse procedure, although it is held that for mediation to be

effective both parties must agree to the process.

Mediation is the

most effective impasse procedure in keeping with the spirit and intent
of the collective bargaining process, the essence of mediation being
to assist the two parties to reach a mutually acceptable agreement.

104

^^^Cresswell and Murphy, "Overview," in Education and Collective
Bargaining; Readings in Policy and Research , eds. Cresswell and Murphy,
p.

306.

Collective
^^^Doherty and Oberer, Teachers. School Boards and
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"Mechanisms
Bargaining, pp. 104 and 105; Harry A. Becker,
in
Education,"
Collective Bargaining Impasses in Public
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Educa_2
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and Lieberman
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As more states pass collective bargaining legislation, and as the

use of the collective bargaining process continues to grow in public

education, greater emphasis will be placed on developing a procedure
for satisfactory and effective settlement of disputes

David Ross and Lawrence Raful conducted a study of the collective

bargaining statutes that had been passed by the various state legislatures and they found that the following provisions had been made
in order to provide for an impasse procedure:
1.

Twenty-three states provide for mediation.

Of the twenty-

three, one state requires that the mediation process be

entered into by mutual agreement.
2.

Eighteen states provide for fact finding.

Of the eighteen,

one state provides that the Governor has the authority to

make the fact finding recommendations binding within ten
days of the legislature's adjournment.
3.

Three states provide for non-binding arbitration.

4.

Eleven states provide for binding arbitration.

Of the

eleven, three states require that the binding arbitration

process be entered into by mutual agreement, one state

provides that if mutual agreement is not reached only
pensions,
those matters that do not relate to salaries,
one state
and insurances will be submitted to arbitration,
the parties
requires that in addition to mutual agreement,

Resolution," in Public Workcj s
^^^Zack, "Impasses, Strikes, and
and Public Unions, p. 104.
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must have the authorization of the state legislature, one

state provides for binding arbitration of non-monetary item
only.
5.

One state does not have any specific provisions for an

Impasse procedure in its collective bargaining statute,

The New Hampshire History of Collective Bargaining
in Public School Districts

While the events described in the previous sections of this
chapter were taking place on the national scene, similar events were
taking place in New Hampshire.

The first Job action occurred in

Manchester, New Hampshire when the Manchester Teachers Guild, now

known as the Manchester Education Association (MEA) went on strike
in 1957.
day.

The main issue was money, with the strike lasting only one

However, the Issues as to whether or not teachers had the

right to organize, enter into collective negotiations, and strike

were appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.

The Court decided

that teachers did have the right to organize and bargain, but that
they did not have the right to strike.

Ross and Lawrence Raful, A Legislator’s Guide to
Collective Bargaining in Education Research Brief, Vol. 3, No. 4
(Denver; Education Commission of the States (1975)), pp. 6—35.
^ Doris M.

,

^^^Thomas Adams, interview held at New Hampshire Education
Association Office, 103 North State Street, Concord, New Hampshire.
Guild,
May 13, 1977; and City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers
100 N.H. 507 (1957).
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the 1957 Manchester strike was concluded, interest
In

collective bargaining waned.

One of the reasons for the ensuing

loss of interest in collective bargaining as stated by Thomas
Adams,

NHEA Director for Professional Development, was the active Influencs
of the administrators in the New Hampshire Education Association.
It was Adams’

contention that the active presence of the administrators

was a moderating influence on the policies of the NHEA.

1

OR

After

several years, interest began to pick up again when Robert Lewis,

Executive Director of the NHEA, proposed the adoption of a standard
two-page contract by all New Hampshire school districts.

Although

it was called a "contract" it was really a policy statement on how

the district would conduct negotiations.

The intent of the "contract"

was not to establish collective bargaining but to establish procedures
for what is referred to as meeting and conferring.

The "contract"

also contained a grievance procedure.
Lewis approached the New Hampshire School Administrators Associa-

tion (NHSAA), and asked the Association to support the "contract" and

promote its adoption.

The NHSAA appointed Superintendents Maurice

Gray and Jason Boynton, and retained Attorney Franklin Hollis to re-

view the proposed "contract."

Gray, Hollis, and Boynton met with

representatives from the NHEA and worked out a revised draft which
was subsequently adopted by both the NHEA and the NHSAA.

108

Adams, interview. May 13, 1977.

It was then
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adopted by many New Hampshire School Boards.
The NHEA was also trying to improve the economic position
of
its members by lobbying in the New Hampshire Legislature.

Mrs.

Margaret Grothey, president of NHEA, spoke on behalf of HB522 at
the 1967 legislative session.

HB552 provided for the payment of

additional state revenues to local school districts so that the
school districts might increase teacher salaries without increasing
local taxes.

Mrs. Grothey pointed out that New Hampshire salaries

were not competitive with the surrounding states.

Further, New

Hampshire had many non-certif led teachers because so many New
Hampshire certified teachers were leaving to work in other states.
HB552 was supported in the House, but on June 30, 1967, it was

killed in the Senate, presumably for lack of funds,

While not seeing collective bargaining as a threat, the New

Hampshire School Boards Association (NHSBA) was not totally dismissing
On May 26, 1967, it sponsored a negotiations seminar at the

it.

special delegates assembly.

John Metzler and Myron Lieberraan described

negotiation experiences in other states, pointing out critical
aspects of negotiations for the benefit of board members and

Jason Boynton, Interview held at University of New Hampshire
School of Education, Durham, New Hampshire, May 18, 1977; and Progress
Report on Professional Negotiations," New Hampshire Educator Vol. XLVL,
No.

5

(May 1966)

:

3.

^^^"HB552 Introduced: Has Bi-Partisan Sponsorship," New Hampshire
Margaret
Educator Vol. XLVII, No. 4 (April 1967: 1; "NHEA President
Ed ucator,
Hampshire
552,"
New
Grothey testifies at Public Hearing on HB
New
Ham_2z.
Vol. XLVII, No. 5 (May 1967): 2; and "The Story of HB552,"
:1.
shire Educator, Special Back to School Edition (September 1967)
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admlnls trators .

^^ ^

Having failed in their efforts to convince the 1967 Legislature
of the need to improve the economic conditions of teachers, the NHEA

called upon the NEA for assistance in the latter part of 1967.

The

result was a joint investigation of educational conditions in New

Hampshire, resulting in a recommendation for major tax reform and a

special legislative session.

When the report was released to the

public, it was followed by a vote of the NHEA Assembly of Delegates

calling for an action program to Implement the report.

The delegates

also called upon the lawmakers to adopt legislation affirming the

right of school teachers to organize for the purpose of collective

bargaining.
In June 1968, the NHEA Executive Board issued a sanctions

alert in the State of New Hampshire informing all appropriate

agencies that sanctions were imminent unless significant improve-

ments were made in the state's educational system.

In November of

that year the assembly of delegates voted overwhelmingly to continue
the sanctions alert.

They also voted to reassemble in February,

1969 to reassess the situation.

and
^^^"More Than a Hundred Attend May 26 Negotiations Seminar
ociation
Ass
Special Delegate Assembly," New Hampshire School Boar ds
Newsletter June 1967, p. 4.

Investigation,
^^^"NHEA President Delivers Report in Joint
1967): 1; "N^^(October
New Hamnshire Educator Vol. XLVII, No. 8
Tax
NHEA Investigation Report: Calls for Major
No. 5 (May 1968). 4,
Session," New Hampshire Educator Vol. XLVIII,
To Take Action August
"NHEA Board Issues Sanctions Alert Assembly
).
>
(June 19
22," New Hampshire Educator Vol. XLVIII, No. 6
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In 1968 the first contest between the NEA and
AFT occurred

when the AFT won the right to be the exclusive bargaining
agent for
the Nashua teachers.

Also in 1968, the Manchester Education Association

(MEA) went on strike for the second time.

Major issues were the

scope of negotiations, the inclusion of the school principals in the
contract, and money.

The Manchester teachers held a professional day

on March 6, 1968, and voted 501-12 to impose sanctions on the Man-

chester School District.

This was the first time that sanctions

had been Imposed on a local New Hampshire School district.

The action

was taken when teachers and principals learned that there had been no

progress in negotiations.

The MEA also maintained that insufficient

progress had been made in Implementing a joint NHEA-NEA report Issued
in 1965, which related to educational conditions in Manchester.

Among other things, that report had called for the development of a

procedure for negotiations, settlement of teacher problems, and the

establishment of a competitive salary scale.

1

13

The negotiated con-

tract included school principals, widened the scope of negotiations,
and made salary concessions.

This was the first comprehensive master

agreement in the state.

"Assembly of Delegates Continues Sanctions Alert-Reconvenes in FebXLVIII, No. 9 (November 1968); 1;
ruary ," NewJlam£shire_Edu^^
Issue Professional Advisory, Conto
Votes
and "Assembly of Delegates
Educator Vol. XLIX, No. 3
Hampshire
tinue Sanctions Alert," New
(March 1969): 1.

^^^"Sanctions Imposed on Manchester: 4A0 Submit Resignations,"
1 and 2.
New Hampshire Educator Vol. XLVIII, No. 3 (March 1968):
^^^Adams, interview. May 13, 1977.
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The following year the MEA went out
on strike again.

John

Tucker, Assistant Executive Director
of the NHEA and Tom Adams were
in charge of the strike for the MEA.

In Adams’ words, it was fortunate

that the strike was settled on a weekend,
because the MEA was due in

court the following Monday to answer why it
had defied the temporary

restraining order.

Judge Grant did not fine the MEA, as the member*

had returned to work.

However, Norman Pettigrew, the president of

the MEA, was sentenced to prison for an indefinite
period of time.

The sentence was then suspended.

The sentence was greeted with

amusement by many, since this was traditionally the sentence given
to the insane.
In 1969 Robert G. Lewis retired as Executive Secretary of the

NHEA and was succeeded by John Haffernan, who came to NHEA from

Wisconsin in July 1969.

It is Boynton’s contention that the NHEA

Board of Directors was taking, very seriously, the statement pre-

viously issued by Governor John King.

"If you hope to win the

struggle you are in, you have to stop being shrinking violets and
get Involved, and get involved publicly .

The Board of Directors

had come to the realization that their association was going to have
to become more than just a professional organization.

^^^Adams, Interview, May 13, 1977; and City of Manchester v.
Manchester Education Association, et al., Hillsborough County Superior
Court, eq.

//

12202, 1969.

^^^"Assembly Delegates Continues Sanctions Alert-Reconvenes in
February," p. 1.
^^^Boynton, interview. May 18, 1977.
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It was also in 1969 that the NHEA Assembly of
Delegates voted

to issue a Professional Advisory Phase II sanctions alert.

The

Assembly of Delegates voted not to follow thru with the sanctions
but rather to accept the recommendation of the NHEA Executive Council.
This recommendation was to send an advisory to the teaching profession

up-dating its members on conditions in New Hampshire.
The legislature failed to raise any additional revenues to im-

prove the situation, and in the fall of 1969, Robert

Lewis called

G.

for a full-scale investigation of what he termed "seriously-deteriora-

ting" educational conditions in the state.

This would follow the

investigation that had been carried out by a joint NHEA-NEA team in
1968.

The full-scale investigation would never take place.

While

the NHEA called for a full-scale investigation, it had also come to

realize that the investigation route had not brought about any significant change.

The full-scale investigation faded away.
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The first major job action by the AFT took place in Nashua in

1970 when the Nashua Teachers Union (NTU) went on strike.

The strike

lasted for eighteen days, but, unlike Manchester, Nashua did not close
its schools.

The major issues in the Nashua labor dispute were salaries and
the arbitration of grievances.

The Governor offered to provide a

mediator if the teachers resumed their teaching duties.

The Board

in
^^®"Assembly of Delegates Continues Sanction Alert-Reconvenes
January
Begin
to
February," p. 1; "NEA-NHEA Full Scale Investigation
1969): p. 1; and
(November
No.
9
XLVII,
Vol
Educator
7." New Hampshire
School
Hampshire
New
Jason Boynton, interview, held at University of
1977.
of Education, Durham, New Hampshire, August 5,
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agreed and the teachers returned to their classrooms.

A settlement

was reached which included binding arbitration of grievances.

Upon

s^f-tlement of the dispute^ Nashua had its first master agreement.

During the 1970-1971 period, the NHEA office began to set

negotiations goals.

workshops."

They began running what they called "salary

The term salary workshops was deliberately chosen instead

of collective bargaining workshops as in the early stages the NUEIA

had to convince New Hampshire teachers of the advantages of collective

bargaining.

The general attitude of teachers was that collective bar-

gaining was a technique that professional people simply did not use.
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The work of the NHEA, however, produced results, as other school

districts began to sign master agreements with the teacher associations.
In 1971 the Portsmouth School Board signed a master agreement with the

Association of Portsmouth Teachers (APT)

.

The APT held a number of

professional demonstrations on Saturdays and after school, but they
did not strike.

One of the main issues separating the parties was

arbitration of grievances.

A settlement was reached, and a master

agreement was signed when the school board agreed to the inclusion
of arbitration that would be final.

inclusion of the word binding.

The board would not agree to the

This was to remain an issue for

May 18,
^^^Adams, interview. May 13, 1977; Boynton, Interview,
Nashua Teachers Union Local
1977; and The Nashua Board of Education v.
Superior Court, Eq.
1044,* AFT, AFL-CIO, et al., Hillsborough County
//13722,

1970.

New Hampshire _Ej^^^°"NEA Announces Regional Salary Schools,"
School Attracts
Salary
"NEA
cator VoLXLVII, No. 6 (June 1967): 3; and
Committee,
Salary
NHEA
Record Attendance: Salary Goals Released by
1968): 6.
New Hampshire Educator Vol. XLVIII, No. 9 (November
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several years until the board finally agreed
to the Inclusion of the

word binding.
The following year the Contoocook Valley
Education Association

entered into negotiations with the Contoocook Valley
Regional School
Board.

An agreement was reached and the Contoocook Valley
became

the first rural area to have a comprehensive master
agreement

The first comprehensive master agreement was also signed in
Keene at
this time.

Collective bargaining in Keene proved to be very difficult.

The 1970-1971 school year came to a close without a settlement with

each party accusing the other of not negotiating in good faith.

The

NHEA and

KEIA

strike.

When negotiations recommenced at the beginning of the next

were distributing leaflets and were preparing for a

school year, the NHEA tried a new strategy by withdrawing its direct
Involvement from the negotiations.

Several months later, a settle-

ment was reached between the KEA and the Keene School Board.
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The 1972-1973 school year was a very active one with master

agreements being signed in Goffstown and Salem.
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While Derry and

Goffstown settled their agreements with minimum difficulty, a

bitter dispute was taking place in Salem over the refusal of the
school board to enter into a master agreement with the Salem

^^^Adams, interview. May 13, 1977.
1

22

Adams, Interview, May 13, 1977.

^^^"News From Region IV," New Hampshire Educator Vol. LIII, No.
(October 1973): 5.
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Education Association.

After over two years of bitter negotiations

culminating in a strike of two weeks, the Salem School Board agreed
to recognize the Salem Education Association, and entered into a

master agreement with that Association which Included a negotiations

procedure with provisions for mediation, a standard evaluation procedure for teachers, and a grievance procedure that provided for ad-

visory arbitration.
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As bitter as the situation was in Salem, it was more difficult
in Farmington with the two mcijor issues being recognition and money

since Farmington had one of the lowest salary scales in the state.

After a number of unsuccessful bargaining sessions, the Farmington

Educational Association (FEA) struck.

The teachers went back to

their classrooms after a memorandum of understanding was signed

pledging the school board to negotiate in good faith.

Negotiations

continued, and a master agreement was prepared and presented to the

school board for ratification in July 1973 which the Board refused
to sign.

^^^"Salem Contract A Reality,” New Hampshire Educator Vol. LIII
"Salem School
No. 8 (October 1973): 4; Adams, interview. May 13, 1977;
Authorities Say Teacher Strike Illegal,"; Manchester (N.H.) Union
Enters Third
Leader, 6 March 1973, pp. 1 and 12; "Salem Teachers Strike
and
14;
1
March
1973,
pp.
7
Leader
,
Dav." Manchester (N.H.) Uni on
Union
(N.H.)
Manchester
Out,"
"Salem School Teachers Vow to Stay
But Heated,
Leader, 9 March 1973, pp. 1 and 20; "Salem Meeting Short
and
1^1 ^nd Salem
1
Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader , 10 March 1973, pp.
Rockingham
al.,
et.
School District v. Salem Education Association
County Superior Court, Eq. 7405, 1973.
Ed ucator Vol. LII,
^^^"What's a Farmington Weigh," New Hampshire
Strike
interview. May 13, 1977;
No. 7 (September 1973): 10; Adams,
Febru
6
Union Leade r,
Closes Farmington Schools," Manchester (N.H.)
Says Strike to Continue.
ary 1973. pp. 1 and 14; "Teacher Unit
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While 1972-1973 was an active year, it was just a prelude for
the 1973-1974 school year, which would bring with it "Timberlane ,"

the longest teacher strike in the United States.

The main issue of

the Timberlane strike was control of the educational program with a

group of highly motivated teachers becoming gradually more disconcerted

when they felt that they were not involved in the development of school
4
.
district
programs.
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From 1968 to 1973, the Timberlane Regional Education Association
(TREA) negotiated with the Timberlane Regional School Board.

The

TREA was able to make monetary gains, but it was not able to make any
professional gains.

In 1973

concerns that had been evident for

several years became major issues between the two parties.

After

a number of negotiating sessions, the two major Issues that separated

the two parties were academic freedom and arbitration of grievances.

The stalemate continued, and in January 1974, the executive
The following day all

committee of TREA called for a strike vote.

Manchester (N.H.) Union L eader 7 February 1973, p. 2; "Teachers Told^
1
Jobs At Stake," Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader , 8 February 1973, pp.
Union
(N.H.)
Manchester
Strike,"
School
and 20; "Union Enjoined in
in Strike
Leader, 9 February 1973, pp. 1 and 14; "Negotiations Continue
pp. 1
1973,
February
10
Leader
by Teachers," Manchester (N.H.) Union
(N.H.)
Mancheste_r
Farmington,"
and 12- "Ruling Deferred on Court Order at
School
In
"Injunction
Union Leader , 13 February 1973, pp. 1 and 14;
February 1973, pp. 1
Strike Upheld," Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader 14
Manchest er (N.H.)
and 12; "Farmington Teachers Still On Strike,"
SidesHold Fast^in Fara-^
Leader, 15 February 1973, pp. 1 and 18; "Both
February 1973, pp. 1
ington Strike," Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader , 17
(N.H.) U nIon
and 16; "Farmington Teachers Warned," Manchest^
May Be
^^^Jeachers
Open
to
20 February 1973, pp. 1 and 14; "Schools
February 1973. p. 3, and
Tardy." Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader , 23
y
Union Lead^, 27 Feb
Farmington Schools Open," Manchester (N.H.)
1973, pp. 1 and 12.
,

,

.

^n^

.

^^^Adams, interview. May 13, 1977.
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but fifty of the teachers voted to go on strike, and
picket lines

were formed.
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Attorney Lewis Soule representing the school board

Immediately asked the Rockingham County Superior Court for an injunction restraining the teachers from striking.

Soule's main position

was that the strike was Illegal, and, therefore, the teachers should
be ordered back to work.

Jack Middleton representing the TREA argued

that the 1957 New Hampshire Supreme Court decision outlawing teacher

strikes should not be used as precedent because that decision was
not made on a point of law.

Rather, it was made on what was consider-

ed to be public policy at the time.

Middleton contended that the

public's attitude toward the bargaining rights of teachers had changed

considerably in favor of their right to bargain, and that, therefore,
the Injunction should not be granted.

Judge Leonard Hardwick found that although it was within the

jurisdiction of the court to issue the injunction, it would not be
Judge Hardwick felt that

proper for the court to do so at this time.

the right to strike went hand-in-hand with the right to bargain, and

that no one was denying the right of the TREIA to bargain.

In

^^^Ronald Amblehl, "Strike Three You're Out," New Hampshire
"Education
School Boards Association Newsletter June 197A, p. 3; and
4.
1974):
(January
No.
LIV
1
,
Picket," New Hampshire Educator Vol.
Unloj\
128"Timberlane Board to Ask Injunction," Manchester (N.H.)
Files
Board^
School
"Tlmberlane
Leader, 28 February 1974, pp. 1 and 16
1 and
Injunction," Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader 1 March 1974, pp.
n
Uni
(N.H.)
Manchester
_q
16; "Strike Injunction Hearing Recessed,"
Denied,
Injunction
Leader, 6 March 1974, p. 3; and "TimberlaneStrike
1 and 12.
Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader , 12 March 1974, pp.
;

.
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his opinion, both sides had retained professional negotiators and

with continued effort, they should be able to arrive at a solution.
If the court was to intefere at this point,

it would be taking aidea

in a dispute that should be settled by the parties themselves.

The

Timberlane Regional School District appealed the decision to the
New Hampshire Supreme Court, which after hearing the appeal, upheld
the decision of the Superior Court.

The Timberlane Regional School

Board kept the schools open by employing substitute teachers, and
the strike continued.

129

At the annual school district meeting in March, the school

board asked the voters for support.
school board's position.

The people voted to support the

Several weeks later, when the Timberlane

School Board voted by the narrow margin of five to four to permanently

discontinue negotiations, and replace the striking teachers, it also
decided to call a special school district meeting.
was set for May A, 197 A.
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The meeting

The purpose was to ask the voters of the

board to disschool district to affirm the decision of the school
replace the striking
continue negotiations on a permanent basis and

teachers Right to
12’"Rocklngham County Superior Court Declares
1974). ‘and 5.
(April
" Rew Hampshire Educator Vol. LIV, No. 4
Boards
School
"Timberlane Case in Review," New Hampshire
Regional^School^^
timberlane
and
1
2;
Newsletter September 1974, pp.
Aa=°'latlon. et al.. Rock
District V. Timberlane Regional Education
and Timberlane Region
Lgham County Superior Court. Eq. //6879 1974;
N.H. 245 (1974).
al School District v. TREA, 114
^nchester (N ,H,) Union Leader ,
^^“"Negotiations End at Timberlane,"
Manchester
"Deadline Fixed at Timberlane.
19 April 1974, p. l; and
pp. 1 and 12.
(N.H.) Union Leader . 20 April 1974,
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teachers.

The citizens who attended the special school district

meeting voted by the overwhelming majority of 1,780 to 589 to
support
the school board's position.

The TREA had seriously misjudged its

support amongst the voters of the school district.

Having received an overwhelming vote of confidence, the school
board held to its position.

The striking teachers were advised

individually that they must return to their classroom on or before a
certain date.

Failure to do so would mean that their contracts with

the Tlmberlane Regional School District would be considered null and

void, and that the district would then be free to contract with other

teachers.

Superintendent Robert Crompton did not renominate those

teachers who did not return by the date set by the school board and
the school board and the administration began to replace the striking

teachers

Attorney Jack Middleton challenged the right of the Tinberlane
Regional School Board to sit as an impartial body in a hearing con-

cerning tenured teachers who had been engaged in a bitter strike
against the Board itself.

Hampshire Supreme Court.

The case was finally decided in the New

Justice Griffiths, writing for the Supreme

hearing
Court, held that the striking teachers were not entitled to a

whereas they had struck during the term of their contracts.

By

"Spring May
^^^Ambiehl, "Strike Three You're Out," p. 3; and
Scho ol Boarc^ ,
re
Hampshi
Be Late, But Strike Season Has Arrived," New
Association Newsletter April 1974, pp. 1 and 2.
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abandoning their contracts, they forfeited whatever rights they
had
to a hearing.

The TREA continued to maintain a picket line but for

all Intents and purposes the Timberlane strike was over.^^^

The New Hampshire History of Public Sector
Collective Bargaining Legislation

The most important development since the Timberlane strike in
1974 has been the enactment of a collective bargaining statute RSA

Actually the movement to pass a state collective bargaining

273-A.

law was initiated by the NHEA during the 1960's.

The NHEA formed

a coalition with other public employee associations for the purpose

of passing the bill.

legislative sessions.

They introduced such a bill in several different
The New Hampshire School Boards Association's

(NHSBA) position was to support a collective bargaining bill with

certain provisos.

The New Hampshire School Administrators Association

NHSAA) did not take a clear-cut position.

The NHSBA provisos were

that bargaining would be limited strictly to economic and fringe

benefits and would not in any way whatsoever abrogate local control
of education.

As the initial bills that were introduced by the coali-

tion of the NHEA and the other public employee associations did not
was
accommodate the provisos of the NHSBA, the latter organization

opposed to the bills.
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Union
^^^"Court Backs Timberlane Board," Manchester (N.H.)
v. Timberal.
et
Farrelly
,
Leader 16 August 1974, pp. 1 and 14; and
(1974).
lane Regional School District, 114 N.H. 560
,

Interview,
^^^dams, interview. May 13, 1977; and Boynton.

May 18, 1977.
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The NHSBA then began to introduce its own bills.

Attorney

Arthur Nighswander, NHSBA General Counsel, NHSBA Executive Secretary
Jason Boynton and Superintendent Herman Donegan were asked by NHSBA
to draft a bill.

The situation still remained a statemate, however, as

neither the NHEA nor the NHSBA had enough strength to push its respec1

tive bill through the New Hampshire Legislature.
In the 1971 legislative session, Representative David Bradley

sponsored HB576 on behalf of the NHSBA.

The House Education Committee

supported HB576 by a nine to eight vote, but the House Committee on
Executive Departments and Administration opposed the bill.

Attorney

Nighswander made the major presentation of the bill for the NHSBA.
The Nashua Teachers Union (NTU) was opposed to the bill and asked an

AFT public relations specialist to speak on its behalf.

He opposed

HB576 because the bill prohibited strikes and, in fact Included

penalties for those who did strike.
of the NHEA.

Jack Middleton Spoke on behalf

He stated that the NHEA was opposed to HB576 because

of its limited scope, the prohibition against strikes, and the in-

clusion of penalties for those who did strike.

He also opposed the

separation of administrators from the bargaining unit.

Attorney

HB576
Middleton then distributed copies of amendments which revised
in the best interests of the NHEA.

HB576 was presented to the

recommended by the
House as submitted by Representative Bradley and

House Education Committee; it drew a tie vote.

13A

Boynton, interview. May 18, 1977.

The bill was then
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laid on the table and did not come up for another vote
during the
IOC

legislative session.
In the 1973 legislative session Representatives Van Loan,

Boucher and Stevenson sponsored HB889 on behalf of the NHSBA.
Spanos and Nixon sponsored SB196 on behalf of the NHEA.

passed their respective chambers.

Senators

Both bills

The President of the Senate then

asked Jason Boynton and Jack Middleton to work out a compromise bill.
The amendments to IIB889 that were agreed to by Boynton and Middleton

were then introduced by Senator Bradley and a compromise bill was presented to Governor Thomson for his signature.

vetoed HB889 as amended.

The Governor promptly

Governor Thomson’s major objection to the

bill was that it included teachers.

It was a pleasant surprise for

Adams, as the NHEA did not consider it to be a good bill.

The NHEA

had supported the bill because its members wanted a collective bar-

gaining law; however, the NHEA leadership did feel that it was more
of an NHSBA bill than it would like to see.

hand, was not pleasantly surprised.

Boynton, on the other

He had already prepared an

editorial for the NHSBA Newsletter explaining HB889 and complimenting

everyone who had worked so hard to pass the bill.

His overall opinion

much needed
of HB889 was that it was a step forward, bringing about

structure to the collective bargaining scene.

Boynton released the

on Education Legislation: Important Negotiations
135„i97i
Newsletter, May 1971,
Bills," New Hampshire School Boards Association
Hampshire School
New
Close!"
It Was
p. 3; "Negotiations Bill-Almost
and Boynton, inter1;
Boards Association Newsletter , Summer, 1971, p.
view, May 18, 1977.
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newsletter with its first page editorial primarily as
he had prepared
it.

The editorial appeared with the word "Vetoed" in large
black

capital letters stamped across it.

Boynton also added a statement to

the effect that if any difficulties arose due to the lack
of a col-

lective bargaining statute, people would know where to point the
finger of blame.
The Tlmberlane strike provided the impetus that was needed to

bring into existence a collective bargaining law that would cover
public employees.

After the Tlmberlane strike, the strategy of the

NHSBA for the 1975 legislative session was to introduce the bill that
had been vetoed by the Governor in 1973.

The main concern of the

NHSBA was how to get the Governor to sign the bill.

Boynton also

felt that after the 1973 experience, the bill that would have the

best chance of becoming law would be one that covered all public

employees
In the 1975 legislative session, the House of Representatives

passed the NHEA sponsored collective bargaining bill.

The Senate,

however, would not pass the NHEA sponsored bill under any circumstance

whatsoever, and the NHEA was well aware of the Senate’s position.
The Senate as a body, however, did feel that some form of collective

bargaining legislation was necessary if collective bargaining confrontations such as Tlmberlane and Farmington were to be avoided.

shire School
^^^Jay Boynton, "Negotiations Law Passed,” New Hamp
Boynton,
Boards Association Newsletter Summer 1973, pp. 1 and 2;
1977.
May
13,
interview.
Interview, May 18, 1977; and Adams,
,
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A Committee of Conference composed of Senators Brovm, Jacobson, and
Downing and Representatives Sackett, Skinner, Close, and McGlynn
was asked to prepare a report.

The Committee of Conference in turn

asked several people who represented various public employers and

public employee associations to meet and draw up a compromise bill.

Jason Boynton representing NllSBA and Attorney Jack Middleton repre-

senting NHEA were the two most prominent members of the group.

In

addition to NllSBA, the following public employers were represented:
State of New Hampshire Highway Department and the State of New

Hampshire University System.

Representatives from the following public

employee associations were also present:

State Employees Association

(SEA), AFT, American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees

(AFSCME).

The committee also assigned a legislative assistant. Attorney

Richard LaFontaine to the group.
t)'e

He was to serve as a mediator between

representatives of the public employers and the representatives of

the public employees.

Boynton, who had previously been in contact with the Governor’s
office, met with Governor Thomson, and the Governor personally assured

him that he would not sign the collective bargaining bill that was
being sponsored by the NHEA.

Boynton and the Governor then reviewed

his concerns regarding
the NHEA bill, and the Governor expressed to him
the bill.

on Conference
Of those who had been asked by the Committee

appear that Boynton was the only
to draft a compromise bill, it would
would be acceptable to the
one who had direct knowledge as to what
Governor.

the Governor
During Boynton’s meeting with the Governor,
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assured Boynton that he would not sign any bill unless the bill contained all the changes specified by the Governor.

This fact was made

known to Jack Middleton, as well as to the other members of the group.
Therefore, they knew that if the compromise bill did not meet with the

Governor's views on the matter, it would not pass the Senate nor would
it be signed by the Governor.

There were many substantive changes in

the bill that had originally been introduced by the NHEA, and there

were many compromises.

The bill that was drafted by the group was not

one that either the NHEA or the NHSBA liked, but it was one they felt

would work.
The draft was then presented to the Committee of Conference,

which in turn recommended it to the House and Senate.

The House and

Sentate passed the bill in the exact form in which it had been presented to them.

As the bill did not contain the elements that were

objectionable to the Governor, he signed it, and RSA 273-A came into
being.

Didn't
^^^Jay Boynton, "New Hampshire Gets Bargaining Law-I
July
Know That," New Hampshire School Boards Association N ewsletter,
1977.
1975, p. 1; and Boynton, interview. May 18,

CHAPTER

III

DESIGN OF THE STUDY

The overall design of the study was directed at the collection
of data for the purpose of providing useful information about selected

changes that have taken place relative to collective bargaining as
it existed in New Hampshire School Districts prior to the enactment

of RSA 273-A and as it exists now.

Because the main objective of the study was to provide infor-

mation that would be helpful to members of the various groups that
participate in the New Hampshire collective bargaining process, the
list of questions below was distributed to various members of these
groups.

The questions themselves were developed by the author from

a public sector collective bargaining course taught by Professor

Jason Boynton at the University of New Hampshire and from a dis-

sertation entitled "The Impact of Teacher Negotiations on School

Decision Making" written by Thomas Love in 1968.

The questions

considered for use in this study, and which were ranked by a
sampling of persons are found immediately following.

Some Selected Questions

1.

exclusive bargaining
What has been the change in the number of
273- A?
agents before and after the enactment of RSA

2.

master agreements
What has been the change in the number of
273-A?
before and after the enactment of RSA
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3.

What has been the change in the number of professional negotiators
utilized as the chief negotiator at the collective bargaining table
before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A?

4.

What has been the change In the composition of the bargaining units
as contained In the Recognition Clause of the master agreements
negotiated before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A?

5.

What has been the change In the scope of collective bargaining
before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A? For the purpose of
this study, scope of collective bargaining will Include:
I.

Negotiations Procedures

Definition of scope
Time limits
Grievance procedure
Grievances limited to agreement
a.
Final determination by superintendent
b.
Final determination by school board
c.
Final determination by arbiter-advisory
d.
Final determination by arbiter-binding
e.
Resolution of interest disputes
Per RSA 273-A
a.
Per the provisions of the master agreement
b.
No strike clause

1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

II.

Organizational Benefits (Union Security)
Dues deductions
Agency fee
Use of facilities
Organizational grievances
Class action grievances
Representational rights in grievances
Organizational access to employer’s records
Time off for Association activities

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

III.

Direct Economic Benefits
of experience
Compensation by preparation and years
Compensation by merit

1.
2.
4*.

5.

6.

7

.

the school district
Credit for experience outside
Retirement bonus
Medical insurance
flat amount
a.
percentage
b.
full payment
c.
Dental insurance
flat amount
a.
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percentage
full payment
Life Insurance
a.
flat amount
b.
percentage
full payment
c.
Disability insurance
flat amount
a.
percentage
b.
full payment
c.
Course reimbursement
flat amount
a.
b.
percentage
full payment
c.
maximum amount budgeted or "cap"
d.
Comprehensive extra-curricular activity pay schedule
Athletic pay schedule
Personal leave
a.
3 days or more
b.
1 or two days
Sick leave
15 days or more per annum
a.
less than 15 days per annum
b.
cumulative to more than 60 days
c.
cumulative to less than 60 days
d.
Sabbatical leave
Maternity leave
Adoption leave
Bereavement leave
Military leave

b.

c.

8.

9.

10.

11.
12.
13.

14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

IV.

Policy Matters
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

6.
7.

8.
9.

10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Class size
Teaching load
Preparation periods
Curriculum
Textbook selection
Need for specialized teachers
Staff evaluation
Posting of vacancies
Staff selection
Staff transfer
Promotions
Staff termination
Reduction in force
teachers
Professional requirements for beginning
Staff development
Amount budgeted for staff development
School calendar
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18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Length of school year
Length of school day
Academic freedom
Discipline for just cause
Restrictions on faculty meetings

6.

What has been the change in the number of school board proposals
placed upon the collective bargaining table before and after the
enactment of RSA 273-A?

7.

What has been the change in the number of cases heard by the
Public Employee Labor Relations Board since the establishment of
said Board?

8.

What has been the change in the type of cases heard by the Public
Employee Labor Relations Board since the establishment of said
Board?

10.

9.

What has been the change in the definition of scope of collective
bargaining by the Public Employee Labor Relations Board since the
establishment of said Board?

What have been the changes in the master agreements that are
settled after the annual school district meeting?
These people receiving the selected questions were:

Thomas

Adams and Joseph LaMarca of the New Hampshire Education Association
(the New Hampshire Chapter of the National Education Association),

Charles Stott of the New Hampshire Federation of Teachers (the New

Hampshire Chapter of the American Federation of Teachers), Richard
Goodman and Eugene Cote of the New Hampshire School Boards Association
Association),
(the New Hampshire Chapter of the National School Boards

Evelyn LeBrun and Edward Haseltine of the New Hampshire Public
Dolloff,
Employee Labor Relations Board, and Richard Thompson, Peter
and Mark Beauvais
Henry McLaughlin, Henry LaBranche, Berard Masse,

Association (the New
of the New Hampshire School Administrators
School Administrators).
Hampshire Chapter of the American Association of

Douglas Hatfield,
Additionally, the questions were sent to Attorney
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Attorney Robert Leslie, and William Kingston all of whom are employed
by New Hampshire School Boards as professional negotiators.

The llet

of questions was sent also to the following people who had very little

or no experience whatsoever In negotiating with organized groups:

Terry Paul and Dahrlene Hendershot who represented the teaching

faculties In Hennlker and Amherst, New Hampshire, Edith Carson, a former
school board member In Amherst, New Hampshire, and Gordon Flint, super-

intendent of schools In New Hampshire Supervisory Union 43.
The Inqulrees were asked to designate those five of the questions
that they regarded as most Important and the five questions that they

regarded as least Important.

Additionally, they were asked to suggest

other questions that they would like the author to consider.
1.

Fourteen separate responses were received amounting to 70Z of
those contacted.

Responses were received from at least one representa-

tive of each group.

The results of the survey are presented In

Table 1 (page 101).

After reviewing the responses, the author selected the
following four questions as those to be considered further In this
study:

What has been the change In the scope of collective bargaining
purpose
before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A? For the
will Include.
of this study, the scope of collective bargaining
I,

Negotiations Procedures
1.
2.
3.

4.

Definition of scope
Time limits
Resolution of Interest disputes
Per RSA 273-A
a.
agreement
Per the provisions of the master
b.
No strike clause

TABLE

1

RESPONSE OF INQUIREES RELATIVE TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
QUESTIONS CONSIDERED FOR INCLUSION IN THE STUDY

Question
Number

Number of Respondents
Selecting Question
as Most Important

Number of Respondents
Selecting Question
as Least Important

5

lA

0

A

11

2

10

7

5

6

7

6

3

6

7

2

5

7

9

5

7

1

A

7

8

3

8

7

3

9
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Multiple year contracts
Reseirve clause

5.
6.

II.

Organizational Benefits
IXies deductions
Agency fee
Use of facilities
Grievance procedure
a.
Grievance limited to agreement
b.
Final determination by superintendent
Final determination by school board
c.
d.
Final determination by arbiter-advisory
e.
Final determination by arbiter-binding
Organizational grievances
Class action grievances
Representational rights in grievances
Organizational access to employer's records
Time off for Association activities

1.
2.
3.

4.

5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

III.

Direct Economic Benefits
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

9.

10 .

11
12

.

.

Compensation by preparation and years of experience
Compensation by merit
Longevity pay
Credit for experience outside the school district
Retirement bonus
Medical insurance
flat amount
a.
percentage
b.
full payment
c.
Dental insurance
flat amount
a.
percentage
b.
full payment
c.
Life insurance
flat amount
a.
percentage
b.
full payment
c.
Disability insurance
flat amount
a.
percentage
b.
full payment
c.
Course reimbursement
flat amount
a.
percentage
b.
full payment
c.
maximum amount budgeted or cap
d.
Comprehensive extra-curricular pay schedule
Athletic pay schedule
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13.

14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

IV.

Policy Matters /Working Conditions
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
2.

3.

Personal leave
a,
3 days or more
b.
1 or 2 days
Sick leave
a.
15 days or more per annum
b.
less than 15 days per annum
c.
cumulative to more than 60 days
d.
cumulative to less than 60 days
e.
sick leave bank
Sabbatical leave
Maternity leave
Adoption leave
Bereavement leave
Military leave

Class size
Teaching load
Preparation periods
Curriculum participation
Textbook selection
Need for specialized teachers
Staff evaluation
Posting of vacancies
Staff selection
Staff transfer
Promotions
Staff termination
Reduction in force
Professional requirements for beginning teachers
Staff development (Recertification)
Funds budgeted for staff development
School calendar
Length of school year
Length of school day
Academic freedom
Discipline for just cause
Restrictions on faculty meetings

the bargaining
What have been the changes in the composition of
collective
of
units as contained in the recognition clauses
the enactment o
bargaining agreements negotiated before and after
RSA 273-A?

bargaining agreements were

In school districts where collective
district
not finalized prior to the annual school
^
held by the
positions
were the changes between the negotiating
district meeting an
school boards prior to the annual school
bargaining agreecollective
position that they agreed to in the
meeting.
ment finalized subsequent to the

lOA

4.

What has been the change in the number of collective bargaining
agreements in effect before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A?
The first two questions set forth above were selected by a majority

of the respondents as being among the five most important of the ten

questions.

The first question set forth above was selected by all of

the respondents as being among the five most important.

The second

question was a very clear choice also, as it was selected by eleven
of the respondents as being among the five most important, and only

two of the respondents regarded it as being among the five least

Important.

The third question was not as clear a choice as it was

selected by seven respondents as being among the five most important
and five of the respondents as being among the five least important.

While the fourth question was not a selection of the respondents,
had been
it was chosen by the author because of the importance that
process
placed on legislative recognition of the collective bargaining

was lobbying for the
by the New Hampshire Education Association when it

passage of RSA 273-A.

In the spring of 1977, when this author was

examination, he Interconducting the research for his comprehensive

LaMarca and Thomas Adams,
viewed several people, among whom were Joseph

Association field agents.
both of whom were New Hampshire Education
Hampshire Education AssociaLaMarca and Adams were asked why the New

RSA 273-A.
tion had supported the passage of

They stated that the

Hampshire Education Association,
members and the leaders of the New
that the collective bargaining
believed It was of prime Importance

sanction.
process be given legislative

In the mind of the author,

assistance to
not RSA 273-A has been of
some proof as to whether or
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the constltutents of the New Hampshire Education Association would
be the number of additional collective bargaining agreements entered

Into subsequent to the adoption of RSA 273-A.
As stated previously, the respondents were asked also to suggest

questions that might be considered In this paper.
of the respondents compiled with the request.

However, only a few

One respondent thought

that the tenth question should be whether or not the Incidence of

execution of collective bargaining agreements prior to the annual school
district meetings was greater after the enactment of RSA 273-A than It
was prior to Its adoption.

A second respondent suggested that an

analysis be made of the differences In the nature of the collective

bargaining demands made by the teacher associations and teacher unions
subsequent to the adoption of RSA 273-A from those previously made.

A third suggested that It might be significant to quantify the differences In the salary Increases before and after the enactment of

RSA 273-A.

A fourth respondent made the following suggestions for

further Inquiry;
1.

2.

been more effective
Has the Impasse procedure provided In RSA 273-A
passage?
than procedures used before Its
negotiations to salary
Has RSA 273-A helped school boards to limit
affected by
least
conditions
and fringe benefits and working
management?

3.

workable for both sides
Has the negotiations process been more
since the passage of RSA 273-A?

4.

units to organize for purposes
Has RSA 273-A prompted additional
of negotiations?

5

appropriating money for an agreeAnalyze the issues relative to
annual meeting.
ment reached subsequent to the
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All of the suggestions were considered by the author; however,

with the exception of one suggestion that had already been Incorporated
Into the study, the suggestions did not relate directly to the re-

search project and It was decided not to Include them In the project.
Rather, the author will make reference to them when recommendatlona

are made for further research.

Several of the respondents also made suggestions relative to

section IV of the first question found on page 103. One respondent
thought that the term "Policy Matters" should be replaced by the

term "Other Substantive Matters".

It was his contention that by

employing the caption "Policy Matters", the author was thereby making
the (perhaps) unwarranted assumption that all of the matters appearing

under that caption were In fact policy matters.

A second respondent

suggested that the term "Policy Matters" be changed to "Conditions of
Employment", while a third respondent stated simply that policy should
not be discussed at all during negotiations.

The author believes

Is a policy
that the decision as to whether or not a particular Item

matter Is one that must be made by the negotiating parties.

Once

whether or not the
that decision Is made, the parties must decide

particular Item Is one that will be negotiated.

However, the author

"Policy Matters" to "Policy
did amend the caption of section IV from

Matters /Working Conditions".
first question as originally
The author made other changes to the
drawn.

"Multiple year contracts" and
In section I, subsection 5,

added.
subsection 6. "Reserve clause" were

A final change was made

grievance
the subsection relating to the
In section I by transferring
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procedure to section II.

Section III, subsection 14 was changed to

Include "Sick leave bank".

Answers to the first, second, and fourth questions were obtained
by examining the collective bargaining agreements entered into by New

Hampshire School Districts for the 1975-1976, 1977-1978, and 1978-1979
school years.

Additionally, the records of the New Hampshire Public

Employee Labor Relations Board were reviewed.

In selecting the

collective bargaining agreements to be considered, those covering the
1976-1977 school year were not included, as this was a transitional
period under RSA 273-A.

This statute became legally effective in

August 1975, but was inapplicable to the collective bargaining
process until December 21, 1975, which was well after the collective

bargaining process for the 1976-1977 school year had commenced.

At

adoption,
the same time, the negotiators were aware of RSA 273-A's

have some impact
of its provisions and that this undoubtedly would

on them.

bargaining
It is this author’s opinion that the collective

been atypical.
agreements for the 1976-1977 school year may have

Method of Collecting Agreements
bargaining agreements from
The author acquired the collective
districts by personally contacting
the New Hampshire public school
superintendents.
the various school district

The agreements collected

definition;
were those that met the following

A collective bargaining agreement
which stipis a written agreement
ulates those terms and conditions
parties
of employment tliat the
of
result
a
as
to
have agreed
negotiations.
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The superintendents were contacted in April 1978.

They were

quite cooperative and most of the collective bargaining agreements

were received during the months of April and May.

A number of

superintendents were not able to forward collective bargaining agreements as the school districts that they represented were still

negotiating the 1978-1979 collective bargaining agreements with the
teacher associations or unions that represented the bargaining units
in those districts.

The author periodically contacted such super-

intendents to discuss the status of their negotiations.

As collective

bargaining agreements were settled in these districts, copies were
forwarded to the author.
The author personally spoke to the superintendents in order to

reduce the possibility of misunderstanding as to the type of information being sought as well as to ensure a better return of the material

being sought.

In order to further reduce the possibility that there

would be collective bargaining agreements of which the author was
Employee
unaware, he reviewed the records of the New Hampshire Public

certification
Labor Relations Board to determine the recognition or

New Hampshire
status of the teacher bargaining units in the various

public school districts.

Either the certification status or the

is the exclusive
recognition status has the effect that the union

bargaining agent for the unit.
unit that had
Certification status was granted to a bargaining

school district as the exclusive
been selected by the staff members of a
in an election held and
bargaining agent for said bargaining unit

Employee Labor Relations Board.
supervised by the New Hampshire Public
has granted recognition status
The PELRB, following its own criteria,
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to bargaining units that had both a history of collective
bargaining

and a signed collective bargaining agreement with the respective
public

employer prior to the enactment of RSA 273~A in 1975.

Of the school

districts whose superintendents advised the author that they did not
have a collective bargaining agreement in effect for the 1975-1976

school year, the bargaining units in four of the school districts had

been recognized by the Public Employee Labor Relations Board.

Upon

reviewing the history of collective bargaining in these districts with
the superintendents, this writer was advised that there was in fact a

signed collective bargaining agreement in effect for the 1975-1976

school year, although the agreements in question could not be considered
to be very comprehensive in nature.

Copies of these documents were for-

warded to the author, and were subsequently included in the research.
This writer also made inquiry of those school districts whose teacher

bargaining units had been certified but whose superintendents had advised
the author that the school districts had not entered into a collective

bargaining agreement with the respective bargaining units.

In reviewing

the status of collective bargaining in these districts, this writer was

informed that even though the teacher bargaining units had been certified,
into between the
a collective bargaining agreement had not been entered

exception.
school district and the teacher bargaining unit with one
the 1977-1978
The one exception was a retroactive agreement covering

the latter part of
school year, the terms of which were agreed to in

April 1978.

school
The status of collective bargaining in those

certified, but which
districts whose teacher bargaining units are
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still do not have collective bargaining agreements will be reviewed
In Chapter IV when this writer discusses the change In the number of

collective bargaining agreements before and after the enactment of

RSA 273-A.

Method of Data Collection

As the collective bargaining agreements were received, they were

analyzed In relation to the various sub-items In question number one.

The data obtained from these analyses were the sole source of Information
that the author used to answer question one.

agreement
The recognition clause In each collective bargaining
the composition
was reviewed for the purpose of determining changes In

negotiated before the
of the bargaining units contained In agreements
273-A agreements.
enactment of RSA 273-A as opposed to post RSA

This

positions that were added
writer reviewed changes In relation to those
changes In relation to those
to the bargaining unit as well as the

bargaining unit.
positions that were excluded from the

As with ques-

served as the sole source of Information number one, these agreements
two.
tion In answering question number

the
bargaining agreements covering
As eleven of the collective

finalized at the time that
1978-1979 school year had not been
eleven would
was gathered, and as those
data for the third question
annual
agreements finalized after the
comprise a majority of the
collective
was decided that only those
school district meeting. It
1977-1978 school
were negotiated for the
bargaining agreements that
the third question.
provide the data to answer
to
used
be
would
year
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step in procuring the information used to answer question

number three was to determine the signature date of each collectiva

bargaining agreement.

The signature page of each agreement was

examined, but unfortunately many of the signature pages of the col-

lective bargaining agreements that had been forwarded to the author

were blank; additionally, some of those that were signed did not have
a date affixed.

This writer then reviewed the records of the Public

Employee Labor Relations Board and was able to determine a signature
date for all except four of the collective bargaining agreements that

were in effect for 1977-1978.
Of the collective bargaining agreements for which the author was

able to obtain a signature date, it appeared that execution of the

agreements probably took place after the annual school district

meeting in twenty-six instances.

This writer was able to contact all

but one of the superintendents involved, and of the twenty-five

superintendents contacted, nine superintendents advised the author
that the terms of the agreement had in fact been agreed to after the

annual school district meeting.

Fifteen superintendents stated that

agreed to bethe terms of a collective bargaining agreement had been
signing of the
fore the annual school district meeting but the official
district meeting.
agreement was not held until after the annual school
school district he
One superintendent advised the author that the
of government and, thereserved operated under the city council form

district meeting.
fore, did not have an annual school
the superintendents, and
The author discussed the situation with
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in only 3 few Instances where collective bargaining agreements were
.

finalized subsequent to the annual school district meeting did the
school board modify the negotiating positions that they had held prior
to said meeting.

Only one superintendent was able to produce

documentation showing the changes In the position held by the school
board prior to the annual school district meeting and what It eventually agreed to in the final version of the collective bargaining agree-

ment.

The other superintendents told the author that they would look

for the documentation but they were not too optimistic about finding
it.

The details of the information that the author discussed with

the superintendents relative to the above will be discussed in question
III, Chapter IV when the author discusses the changes between the

negotiating positions held by the school boards prior to the annual
school district meeting and the collective bargaining agreement finalized subsequent to the meeting.

Compilation of the material used to answer the fourth question
was done as follows.

The author developed a chart by listing all of

the school districts in the state alphabetically.

Notations were

district as to whether or
then made alongside the name of the school
in effect during any one,
not a collective bargaining agreement was

encompassed in the study.
two, or all three of the school years

The

number of collective bargaining
chart was then used to compute the
years and thereby establish
agreements In effect in each of the three
in the number of collective
whether or not there had been a change
to after the enactment of
bargaining agreements before as opposed
In order to demonstrate
of the change.
RSA 273-A, and if so, the extent
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the change in the number of teachers covered by collective bargaining

agreements before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A, information
was taken from the Summary of Reference Data on Supervisory Unions

which is published by the New Hampshire State Department of Education.^
This document lists the number of teachers in each school district.

The total number of teachers covered by collective bargaining agree-

ments in any of the three years was computed by simply adding the

number of teachers in the school districts that had collective bargaining agreements in effect for that year.

this Information.

There are two limitations to

The data is published in the fall of the year for

the previous school year.

Therefore, the author had the information

was compelled to
for the 1975-1976 and the 1977-1978 school years, but

year as that
use the 1977-1978 information for the 1978-1979 school

information would not be available until September 1979.

Additionally

teachers, and the bargaining
the data cites only full-time classroom

full-time classroom teacher.
units often include others in addition to

limitation to be serious.
However, the author did not consider either

Education, Summay _o
^New Hampshire, State Department of
1976. PP*
T?pfprpnce Data on Superivsory Unions , July 1,
lEducation. Summary of Refer e
New Hampshire. State DepartmLt of
1978, pp. l-o*
Data on Supervisory Unions , July 1,
,

CHAPTER

IV

RESULTS OF THE STUDY

The information that was gathered and analyzed in order to
answer the four questions that were selected to be studied was obtained

primarily from the collective bargaining agreements that were forwarded
to the author by the New Hampshire school superintendents.

All but

three of the collective bargaining agreements in effect for the periods

1975-1976 and 1977-1979 were obtained.

The author also utilized infor-

mation that was gathered in his many conversations with these same
superintendents.

Lastly, information gathered from the records of the

Hampshire
New Hampshire State Department of Education and the New
by the author.
Public Employee Labor Relations Board was also utilized
to the questions
The results of the study will be presented in relation

selected in Chapter III.

In Chapter IV the questions will be answer-

listed in Chapter III.
ed in a different order than they were

The

better position to underauthor believes that the reader will be in a
public school districts if
stand collective bargaining in New Hampshire

following order:
the questions are answered in the

What has been the

bargaining agreements in effect bechange in the number of collective
changes
RSA 273-A7: What have been the
fore and after the enactment of
the recognibargaining units as contained in
in the composition of the
before
bargaining agreements negotiated
tion clauses of collective
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and after the enactment of RSA 273- A?; In school districts where col-

lective bargaining agreements were not finalized prior to the annual

school district meetings, what were the changes between the negotiating

positions held by the school boards prior to the annual school district

meeting and the positions that they agreed to in the collective bargaining agreements finalized subsequent to the meeting?; and what has
been the change in the scope of collective bargaining before and after
the enactment of RSA 273-A?

For the purposes of this study, the scope

of collective bargaining Includes those items listed on pages 100-103.

WHAT HAS BEEN THE CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN EFFECT BEFORE AND AFTER THE
ENACTMENT OF RSA 273-A?

The data that were utilized to anwer this question were obtained
by tabulating the number of collective bargaining agreements that were

forwarded to the author by the New Hampshire school superintendents for
each of the three years.

In the tabulation, the author also included

were not forthe three 1978-1979 collective bargaining agreements that
warded.

bargaining
The number of personnel covered by these collective

members in those
agreements was computed by counting the number of staff
agreement had been
school districts in which a collective bargaining

negotiated.

of Reference Data
This information was taken from the Summary

number of staff members in each
on Supervisory Unions which lists the
districts.^
one of the New Hampshire public school

1-8.
^Ibid., pp. 1-8; and Ibid., pp.

This information
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relative to the status of collective bargaining in those school

districts wherein the teacher bargaining units are certified but

which still do not have collective bargaining agreements was compiled from the notes taken by the author during his conversations

with New Hampshire public school superintendents.

As can be seen

in Table 2 (page 117), the number of collective bargaining agree-

ments in effect immediately before the enactment of RSA 273-A in
August 1975, which would be those in effect for the 1975-1976
school year, was 52.

This number increased to 78 for the 1977-

1978 school year, which amounted to an increase of 50 percent over
the 1975-1976 school year.

The number of collective bargaining

agreements in effect for 1978-1979 Increased to 86, which amounted
to an increase of eleven percent over the 1977-1978 school year.

In addition to reporting the change in the number of agreements
in effect for each of the three years, it was decided to report the

change in the number of collective bargaining unit members that were

covered by said agreements for each of the three years.
seen in Table

2

As can be

(page 117), the number of collective bargaining unit

members in 1975-1976 was 6,158.

This number increased to 8,023 for

an Increase of 30 perthe 1977-1978 school year, which amounted to

cent over the 1975-1976 school year.

The number of collective bar-

bargaining agreements ingaining unit members covered by collective
year, which amounted to an
creased to 8,356 for the 1978-1979 school

1977-1978 school year.
increase of four percent over the

273-A because it believed
The NHEA supported the passage of RSA
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TABLE

2

NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN EFFECT AND
STAFF MEMBERS COVERED BY SAID AGREEMENTS BEFORE AND
AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF RSA 2 7 3-

After RSA 273-A

Before RSA 273-A

1977- 1978

1975-1976

freq.

Ing
feet

Staff members
covered by
said agreements

freq.

pet
annual
gain

1978- 1979

freq.

pet

annual
gain

52

78

50X

86

IIX

6158

8023

30X

8356

AX
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legislative recognition of the collective bargaining process

would assist teachers in their efforts to enter into collective
bargaining agreements with school boards.

Based on the results as

tabulated in Table 2, this author would conclude that the NHEA
achieved its purpose because during the period of time that was
studied, the net change in the number of collective bargaining

agreements in effect was 34 which was an increase of 65 percent over
the three years.

The net change in the total number of teachers

covered under these agreements was 2,198, which was an Increase of
36 percent over the same period.
In considering the net change that has taken place in the total

number of collective bargaining agreements in effect and the number
of collective bargaining unit members covered by these agreements,

one very interesting question that arises is the potential for growth.
As of July 1, 1978, there were 157 public school districts in New

Hampshire that maintained schools.

The 86 collective bargaining

agreements that were in effect for the 1978-1979 school year covered
93 school districts.

If collective bargaining agreements were to

would bring
be negotiated in the remaining 64 school districts, this
in effect to
the total number of collective bargaining agreements

74% over the total number of
150, and this would be an increase of
of 288% over the
agreements recorded for 1978-1979 and an increase

agreements recorded for 1975total number of collective bargaining
1976.

represent 954 staff members
The additional 64 agreements would

to 9,310 which would be
bringing the total number of staff members
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an increase of eleven percent over the 1978-1979 school year, and an

increase of 51 percent over the total number of staff members covered
by collective bargaining agreements in 1975-1976.

According to the provisions of RSA 273-A, a school board is not
required to enter into a collective bargaining relationship with a
teacher association or union unless the association or union represents
ten or more staff members with a "community of Interest."

It is,

however, possible that a school board may wish to enter into a col-

lective bargaining relationship with a teacher association or union
even though the association or union does not represent the requisite

number of staff members per RSA 273-A.

Therefore, the author reviewed

the number of agreements to determine how many, if any, had been

negotiated with associations or unions representing less than ten
members.

There are nine such agreements.

Four of the nine have

been negotiated in supervisory unions in which collective bargaining

was conducted on a supervisory union-wide basis.

Therefore, in

those supervisory unions where collective bargaining is conducted on
are
a supervisory union-wide basis all of the school districts

subsequent
Included in the collective bargaining process and in the

number of staff
collective bargaining agreement without regard to the
in each school
members represented by the collective bargaining unit

district.

school
Accordingly, this writer concluded that in those

where a collective
districts having less than ten staff members
exist it is highly unlikely
bargaining relationship does not already

under current law.
that such a relationship will develop
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The author then considered those school districts having ten
or more staff members that do not have a collective bargaining agree-

ment.

There were twenty-six such school districts that did not have

collective bargaining agreements for the 1978-1979 school year.

If

agreements were to be negotiated in all twenty— six school districts
this would bring the total number of agreements to 112 which would
be an increase of 30% over the total number of agreements recorded
of agreefor 1978-1979, and an increase of 115% over the total number

ments recorded for 1975-1976.

The additional 26 collective bargaining

total number
agreements would represent 774 staff members bringing the

would be an increase of
of staff members represented to 9,130 which
an increase of 48
nine percent over the 1978-1979 school year, and

covered by collective
percent over the total number of staff members

bargaining agreements in 1975-1976.
in the aforementioned
Twelve of the district teacher associations

granted recognition status under the
26 school districts have been

provisions of RSA 273-A.

associations
However, seven of the twelve

with
collective bargaining agreement
have not chosen to negotiate a
remaining
respective school districts. The
the school boards in those
negotlatlo
in time to enter Into
five had not been recognized
of the five
The Interest shown by four
the 1978-1979 school year.
a formal
whether they would enter into
was such that it was doubtful
school year.
relationship for the 1979-1980

The author discussed

superintendents in
bargaining with the
collective
of
the status
districts.
several of these school

districts is
One of the school
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quite affluent, and the staff members are amongst the highest paid in
the state.

The teachers also are very active in the development of

the school district’s educational program.

Thomas Adams, NHEA field

representative, advised the author that, as a result of their financial
and professional satisfaction, it had been very difficult for the
NHEIA to

develop interest amongst the staff members of this school dis-

trict in the collective bargaining process.

The school district super-

intendent was also of the same opinion.
The staff members in several of the school districts meet with
of a
the school boards, however, the agreements that are reached are

very Informal nature.

In one of the districts, the staff members, in

Relations Board,
the election conducted by the Public Employee Labor
teachers organhad initially chosen to be affiliated with a statewide
ization.

changed their
However, after the election the staff members

organization that they no
minds and advised the statewide teachers’
longer wished to maintain their affiliation.

recognized in two of Che
Collective bargaining units had been
come after the date on which
districts, however, the recognition had
and
of their Intent to bargain,
they had to notify the school boards

bargain under the provisions of
therefore, they were not eligible to
A bargaining unit in another
year.
RSA 273-A for the 1978-1979 school
ha
sufficient time, and two meetings
district had been recognized in
of
however, a considerable amount
been held with the school board;
bargaining unit
second meeting, and the
the
since
elapsed
had
time
to the school board.
had not yet given its proposal
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The status of collective bargaining in these school districts
then appears to be one in which the staff members either are not par-

ticularly Interested in the collective bargaining process, or if
interested, are satisfied to have an informal relationship with the

school board.

WHAT HAVE BEEN THE CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF
THE BARGAINING UNITS AS CONTAINED IN THE RECOGNITION CLAUSES OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
NEGOTIATED BEFORE AND AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF RSA
273-A?

The data that were utilized to anwer this question were obtained

from the collective bargaining agreements that were forwarded to
the author by the New Hampshire school superintendents for each of
the three years 1975-1976, 1977-1978, and 1978-1979.

Fifty-two

1975collective bargaining agreements covering 59 school districts were in

effect for the 1975-1976 school year.

The author was able to collect

the 52 agreements, and, consequently, all of the information from the

1976 collective bargaining agreements that pertained to this

question is Included in the data analysis.
1976-1977
The collective bargaining agreements covering the
author considered
school year were not included in the research as the
1976The negotiators were
this period of time to be a transitional year.
its provisions.
aware of RSA 273-A, but they were not bound by

Assum-

on the negotiators, it is the
ing that this would have had some impact

agreements for the
author’s opinion that the collective bargaining
1977 school year may have been atypical.

Chapter III.
cussed in more detail on page 107

This issue was dls
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Seventy-eight collective bargaining agreements covering 85
school districts were in effect for the 1977-1978 school year.
author was able to collect the 78 agreements.

The

Of the 78 agreements,

six are multiple year agreements, and were negotiated at the same
time as the 1975-1976 agreements prior to the enactment of RSA

273-A (August 1975), and will not be considered for this question.

Fourteen agreements covering 20 school districts were negotiated
as part of a multiple year agreement, and were negotiated at

the same time as the 1976-1977 agreements.

Because the 1976-

1977 agreements are not being considered in this study, those four-

teen 1977-1978 agreements will also not be considered.

Therefore,

agreements
for the purpose of this question 58 collective bargaining

covering 59 school districts for 1977-1978 will be considered.

These

are single year
58 agreements were all negotiated in 1976 or 1977 and

agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.
93 school
Eighty-six collective bargaining agreements covering

yesr.
districts were In effect for the 1978-1979 school

was able to collect 83 of the 86 agreements.

This author

Of the 83 agreements,

negotiated as part of a
28 covernlng 29 school districts were
negotiated along with the 1977
multiple year agreement, and were
Included In the data for 1977-1978
1978 agreements. These 28 were
data for 1978-1979. Additionally,
and will not be Included In the
as part
school districts were negotiated
five agreements covernlng six
same time
and wore negotiated at the
of a multiple year agreement,
also not
These five agreements will
as the 1976-1977 agreements.
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be considered.

Therefore, for the purpose of this question 50

agreements covering 55 school districts for 1978-1979 will be
considered.

These 50 agreements were all negotiated in 1977 or

1978 and are single year agreements or the first year of multiple

year agreements
As can be seen in Table 3,

(page 125) the number of collective

bargaining agreements containing a recognition clause immediately
before the enactment of RSA 273-A was 43 of the 52 agreements (83Z).
The number of collective bargaining agreements negotiated for 1977-

1978 and 1978-1979 that contained a recognition clause was increased
to 55 out of the 58 agreements (95%) and 48 out of the 50 agreements

(96%) respectively.

The number of recognition clauses in effect for

1975-1976 that included specific personnel positions was 24 (46%).
1978The number of recognition clauses negotiated for 1977-1978 and

change to 35
1979 that included specific personnel positions was to
(60%) and 32 (64%) respectively.

The number of recognition clauses

personnel positions
in effect for 1975-1976 that excluded specific

was 31 (60%)

.

negotiated
The number of recognition clauses that were

specific personnel positions
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 that excluded

was 39 (67%) and 34 (68%) respectively.

The number of recognition

included department chairmen
clauses in effect for 1975-1976 that
was six (12%).

negotiated for
The number of recognition clauses

department chairmen was increased
1977-1978 and 1978-1979 that included
recognition
respectively. The number of
to eight (14%) and seven (14%)
chairmen was
that excluded department
clauses In effect for 1975-1976
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TABLE

3

NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS CONTAINING RECOGNITION CLAUSES AND CHANGES IN THE
COMPOSITION OF THE BARGAINING UNITS AS CONTAINED IN THE RECOGNITION
CLAUSES OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED
SINCE THE ENACTMENT OF RSA 2 7 3- A AND THOSE
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ADOPTION
OF RSA 273-A

After RSA 273-A

Before RSA 273-A

1975- 1976^
N = 52

1977- 1978^
N - 58

1978- 1979^
N - 50

freq. pet

freq. pet

freq. pet

Recognition clause

43

83%

55

95%

48

96%

Recognition clauses
including specific
personnel positions

24

46%

35

60%

32

64%

Recognition clauses
excluding specific
personnel positions

31

60%

39

67%

34

68%

Recognition clauses
Including department
chairmen

6

12%

8

14%

7

14%

Recognition clauses
excluding department
chairmen

17

33%

16

28%

16

32%

Recognition clauses
including nurses

14

27%

14

24%

17

34%

Recognition clauses
excluding nurses

10

19%

16

28%

13

26%

1

2%

5

9%

3

6%

10

19%

18

31%

15

30%

Recognition clauses
including part time
staff members
Recognition clauses
excluding part time
staff members

126

TABLE

3

— Continued

The Intent of the author was to consider all of the agreements
that were In effect liranediately before the enactment of RSA 273-A.
2

The intent of the author was to consider only those agreements
Therefore, he reviewed only single
that were negotiated for 1977-1978.
year agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.

The intent of the author was to consider only those agreements
that were negotiated for 1978-1979. Therefore, he reviewed only single
year agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.
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17 (33%).

The number of recognition clauses that were negotiated

for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 that excluded department chairmen was
16 (28%) and 16 (32%) respectively.

The number of collective bargain-

ing agreements In effect for 1975-1976 that Included nurses was

fourteen (27%).

The number of recognition clauses that were negotiated

for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 that included nurses was to change to

fourteen (24%) and seventeen (34%) respectively.

The number of recogni-

tion clauses in effect for 1975-1976 that excluded nurses was ten (19%).
The number of recognition clauses negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-

1979 that excluded nurses was increased to sixteen (28%) and thirteen
(26%) respectively.

The number of recognition clauses in effect for

1975-1976 that included part time staff members was one (2%).

The

number of recognition clauses negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979
that included part time staff members was to change to five (9%) and

three (6%) respectively.

The number of recognition clauses in effect

for 1975-1976 that excluded part time staff members was ten (19%).
and 1978The number of recognition clauses negotiated for 1977-1978
and 15 (30%)
1979 that excluded part time staff members was 18 (31%)

respectively.
trend toward greater
RSA 273-A appears to have brought about a

have been negotiated since
specificity in the recognition clauses that
in Table 3.
its enactment, and this is borne out

The percentage of

rose from 83 in 1975-1976
agreements containing a recognition clause
to 96 in 1978-1979.

the recognition
This trend can also be seen in

specific personnel positions.
clauses including and excluding

The
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percentage of the former rose from A6 to 64 during the three year
period that was studied while the percentage of the latter rose from
60 to 68 during the same period.

This trend was also noted In the

recognition clauses Including department chairmen as well as In the
recognition clauses Including and excluding nurses and part time staff
members

With regard to the number of collective bargaining agreements
change.
containing a recognition clause, the author did not find a large
clause.
Prior to RSA 273-A most agreements (83%) included a recognition

recognition
Since RSA 273-A almost all agreements (96%) include a
clause.

to 55 in
While the number did increase from 43 in 1975-1976

great in that more agree1977-1978, the percentage increase was not as

ments were negotiated in the latter year.

When the number of agree-

50, the number of agreements
ments negotiated in 1978-1979 declined to

to 48.
containing a recognition clause declined

clauses containing spedThe percentage increase of recognition
and 1977the school years 1975-1976
flc personnel positions during
recogninumerical Increase because more
1978 was not as great as the
Although the number
for the latter year.
tion clauses were negotiated
declined
specific personnel positions
including
clauses
recognition
of
showed a slight
percentage of such clauses
the following year, the
were negotiated
fewer recognition clauses
increase because once again
that the
1j
t-Vio author would conclude
Based on the data, the autn
for 1978-1979.
substantial number of the
been substantial. A
overall Increase has not
personnel positions.
not list specific
do
still
clauses
recognition
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Of the 67 recognition clauses that included specific personnel

positions in 1977-1978 and 1978-1979, ten had been in effect in 19751976.

When these ten were renegotiated in 1977-1978 and 1978-1979,

guidance counselor and librarian were each added to two of the inclusion
sections as found in the ten recognition clauses.

Reading coordinator,

permanent substitute, part time staff members, media specialist, driver

education teacher, staff members on leave, department chairmen who
teach three or more periods per day, team leaders, and subject co-

ordinators were each added to one of the ten recognition clauses.
The percentage increase of recognition clauses excluding specific

personnel positions during the school years 1975-1976 and 1977-1978
was not as great as the numerical increase because more recognition

clauses were negotiated for the latter year.

While the number of

recognition clauses excluding specific personnel positions declined
by five in 1978-1979, the percentage change between the two years was

negligible because fewer recognition clauses were negotiated for that
year.
Of the 73 recognition clauses that excluded specific personnel
in
positions in 1977-1978 and 1978-1979, eight had been in effect

1975-1976.

When these eight were renegotiated in 1977-1978 and

two of the
1978-1979, the following positions were each added to

clauses:
exclusion sections as found in the eight recognition

education director,
assistant principal, guidance counselor, vocational

education coordinator,
superintendent, assistant superintendent, special
and hourly paid personnel.

Additionally, part time teachers, nurse.
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business administrator, media director, curriculum coordinator, and
director of guidance were each added to one of the exclusion sections
as found In the eight recognition clauses.

The change In those recognition clauses Including and excluding

department chairmen was negligible.

The change In recognition clauses

including school nurses was also small, although the recognition
clauses both including and excluding school nurses did show an Increase

between the years 1975-1976 and 1978-1979.
There was an Increase In both the percentage and the number of

recognition clauses including part time staff members between the
years 1975-1976 and 1977-1978.

There was a decline in both the per-

centage and the number of such clauses the following year; however,
difficult to
the numbers in all three years are so small that it is

attach any meaning to the change.

The overall increase in the number

members was more
of recognition clauses excluding part time staff

substantial.

that
Part of this change can be attributed to the fact

1977-1978 than in 1975-1976
more recognition clauses were negotiated in
the overall change
While there was a slight decrease in 1978-1979,

was from 19 to 30 percent.

the
The author would conclude that during

to exclude part time personnel
period studied there was more interest

than to include them.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
IN SCHOOL DISTRICTS WHERE

^0 ^HE ^WAL
AGREEMENTS WERE NOT FINALIZED
CHANGES
THE
WERE
SCHOOL DISTRICT MEETING, WHAT
BETWEEN THE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS
^^T
SCHOOL DISTRIC
SCHOOL BOARDS PRIOR TO THE ANNUAL
IN
TO
THEY AGREED
MEETINGS AND THE POSITION THAT
AGREEMENT FINALIZED
THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
SUBSEQUENT TO THE MEETING?

^

™
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The data that were used to answer this question were obtained

from the signature pages of the collective bargaining agreements that

were collected by the author, the records of PELRB, and conversations
that were held with the New Hampshire public school superintendents.

Public school districts in New Hampshire are permitted by state
statute to hold their annual school district meetings between March
first and April twentieth.

The author was able to determine the

signature date for all but four of the collective bargaining agreements that were in effect for 1977-1978.

From the signature dates

that were noted, it appeared as though the execution of 26 of the

after the
78 agreements that were in effect for 1977-1978 took place

annual school district meeting.

The author personally contacted the

the
superintendents who were involved, and was advised that in 15 of

had been settled be26 instances the terms of the agreement actually
nine of the agreefore the annual school district meeting, and that

ments were completed after the district meeting.

One superintendent

that he represented did
advised the author that the school district
came under the city form
not hold a school district meeting as it
to contact one superintendent.
of government, and the author was unable

asked to forward
All of the nine superintendents were

negotiating positions of the
documentation that would reflect the
with
superintendent was able to comply
school boards, but only one
the request.

doubtful that they would be
The others were extremely

any
and in fact did not forward
able to locate the information,

information.
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In seven school districts, the author was advised by the
respec-

tive school superintendents that the settlements that were reached

®fter the annual school district meeting did not reflect any changes
in the school board's negotiating position Just prior to the annual

school district meeting.
In one school district, salary was the only area of disagreement.

A five percent salary increase for the teachers had been voted at the
annual school district meeting.

When a settlement was reached after

the annual school district meeting, the school board agreed to a 6.3

percent salary increase for the teachers.
Of these nine agreements settled after the annual school district

meeting, the services of a mediator were engaged to help resolve the

dispute in one school district.
areas of disagreement;

arbitration, duration of agreement, salary,

personnel files, and insurance.
on arbitration.

In this instance, there were five

The school board changed its position

While it had previously not been willing to agree to

arbitration, it agreed to advisory arbitration.

The board also

settled for a one year agreement where previously it had been insisting
on a multi-year agreement.

The board also agreed to a two hundred

more than
dollar increase on the base salary which was fifty dollars
annual school district
it had been willing to agree to prior to the

meeting.

insurance,
Lastly, in the areas of personnel files and

position of the board.
the final settlement reflected the initial

with the
Based on the data, the author would conclude that
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exception of the one school district noted above substantial change
did not take place in the negotiating positions of the school boards
in those districts where the collective bargaining agreements were

settled after the annual school district meeting.

WHAT HAS BEEN THE CHANGE IN THE SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING BEFORE AND AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF RSA
273-A? FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS STUDY, THE SCOPE
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WILL INCLUDE:

I.

Negotiations Procedures
1.
2.

3.

A.

5.
6.

II,

Organizational Benefits
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

8.

9.

III.

Definition of scope
Time limits
Resolution of interest disputes
Per RSA 273-A
a.
Per the provisions of the master agreement
b.
No strike clause
Multiple year contracts
Reserve Clause

Dues deductions
Agency fee
Use of facilities
Grievance procedure
Grievance limited to agreement
a.
Final determination by superintendent
b.
Final determination by school board
c.
Final determination by arbiter-advisory
d.
Final determination by arbiter-binding
e.
Organizational grievances
Class action grievances
Representational rights in grievances
Organizational access to employer's records
Time off for Association activities

Direct Economic Benefits
1.

2.

experience
Compensation by preparation and years of
Compensation by merit
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3.
4.
5.

6.

8.

9.

10.

11.
12.
13.

14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

IV.

Longevity pay
Credit for experience outside the school district
Retirement bonus
Medical insurance
a.
flat amount
b.
percentage
c.
full payment
Dental Insurance
a.
flat amount
b.
percentage
full payment
c.
Life insurance
a.
flat amount
b.
percentage
full payment
c.
Disability insurance
flat amount
a.
b.
percentage
full payment
c.
Course reimbursement
flat amount
a.
percentage
b.
full payment
c.
maximum amount budgeted or "cap"
d.
Comprehensive extra-curricular pay schedule
Athletic pay schedule
Personal leave
3 days or more
a.
1 or 2 days
b.
Sick leave
15 days or more per annum
a.
less than 15 days per annum
b.
cumulative to more than 60 days
c.
cumulative to less than 60 days
d.
sick leave bank
e.
Sabbatical leave
Maternity leave
Adoption leave
Bereavement leave
Military leave

Policy Matters/Working Conditions
1.

2.

3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

Class size
Teaching load
Preparation periods
Curriculum participation
Textbook selection
Need for specialized teachers
Staff evaluation
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8.
9.

10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Posting of vacancies
Staff selection
Staff transfer
Promotions
Staff termination
Reduction in force
Professional requirements for beginning teachers
Staff development (Recertification)
Funds budgeted for staff development
School calendar
Length of school year
Length of school day
Academic freedom
Discipline for just cause
Restrictions on faculty meetings

The data that were utilized to answer this question were obtained
from the collective bargaining agreements that were forwarded to the
of the
author by the New Hampshire school superintendents for each

three years;

1975-1976, 1977-1978, and 1978-1979.

Fifty-two collective

in effect for
bargaining agreements covering 59 school districts were

the 1975-1976 school year.

The author was able to collect the 52 agree-

from the 1975-1976
ments, and consequently, all of the information

pertained to this question is
collective bargaining agreements that

included in the data analysis.
covering the 1976-1977 school
The collective bargaining agreements
as the author considered this
year were not Included in the research
aware
year. The negotiators were
period of time to be a transitional
Assuming
not bound by Its provisions.
of RSA 273-A, but they were
Is the
Impact on the negotiators. It
that this would have had some
for the
collective bargaining agreements
the
that
opinion
author's
was
been atypical. This issue
1976-1977 school year may have

107 Chapter III.
cussed In more detail on page
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Seventy-eight collective bargaining agreements coveming 85

school districts were in effect for the 1977-1978 school year.
author was able to collect the 78 agreements.

The

Of the 78 agreements

six are multiple year agreements, and were negotiated at the same
time as the 1975-1976 agreements prior to the enactment of RSA 273-A
(August 1975), and will not be considered for this question.

Fourteen

agreements covernlng 20 school districts were negotiated as part
of a multiple year agreement, and were negotiated at the same time

as the 1976-1977 agreements.

Becuase the 1976-1977 agreements are

not being considered in this study, those fourteen 1977-1978 agree-

ments will also not be considered.

Therefore, for the purpose of

59 school
this question 58 collective bargaining agreements covering

districts for 1977-1978 will be considered.

These 58 agreements

agreements or the
were all negotiated in 1976-1977 and are single year
first year of multiple year agreements.
93 school
Eight-six collective bargaining agreements coveming

school year.
districts were in effect for the 1978-1979

was able to collect 83 of the 86 agreements.

This author

However, of the 83

were negotiated as part
agreements, 28 covernlng 29 school districts
the
and were negotiated along with
of a multiple year agreement,

1977-1978 agreements.

for 1977These 28 were Included In the data

In Che data for 1978-1979.
1978, and will not be Included

Additionally

as part
school districts were negotiated
five agreements covernlng six
same time as
and were negotiated at the
of a multiple year agreement,

Che 1976-1977 agreements.

also not
These five agreements will
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considered.

Therefore, for the purpose of this question, 30 agreements

covering 55 school districts In 1978-1979 will be considered.

These

50 agreements were all negotiated In 1977-1978 and are single year

agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.

Negotiations procedures and basic parameters

.

RSA 273-A appears to

have had a mixed effect on the negotiations procedures and basic
parameters listed In Table A (page 138) In that three of these Items
Increased, two decreased, and one showed little change.

The most

noticeable Increase took place In the area of multiple year contracts,
scope
and the decline Involved the clauses providing a definition of

and a no strike clause.

bargaining
As can be seen In Table A, the number of collective
before the
agreements containing a definition of scope Immediately
(562).
enactment of RSA 273-A was 29 of the 52 agreements

The number

negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978of collective bargaining agreements
scope changed to 32 out of the
1979 that contained a definition of
the 50 agreements (A62) respectively.
58 agreements (55%) and 23 out of

agreements in effect for
The number of collective bargaining
A1 (79%).
1975-1976 that Included time limits was

The number of time

49
and 1978-1979 was to change to
limits negotiated for 1977-1978

(85%) and A5 (90%) respectively.
In
bargaining agreements that were
The number of collective
Interest disputes
Included a resolution of
effect for 1975-1976 that
Interest disputes
number of resolution of
clause was 36 (69%) . The
1978-1979 were AO (702)
for 1977-1978 and
negotiated
were
that
clauses
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TABLE

4

NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SPECIFYING
CERTAIN NEGOTIATIONS PROCEDURES
AND BASIC PARAMETERS

Before RSA 273-A

Negotiations
Procedures and
Basic Parameters

After RSA 273-A

1975- 1976^
N - 52

1977- 1978^

freq. pet.

freq. pet

N - 58

1978- 1979^
N - 50
freq

pet

Definition of scope

29

56%

32

55%

23

46%

Time limits;
Initiation of the
collective bargaining process

41

79%

49

85%

45

90%

Resolution of
Interest disputes:

36

69%

40

70%

34

68%

0%

20

35%

16

32%

36

69%

20

35%

18

36%

27

52%

20

35%

21

42%

8

15%

28

48%

20

23

44%

24

41%

26

per RSA 273-A
b. per master
agreement
a.

No strike clause

Multiple year
contracts
Reserve clause

-0-

52%

the agreements
^The Intent of the author was to consider all of
of RSA 273-A.
enactment
that were in effect inmediately before the

those agreements
^The intent of the author was to consider only
reviewed only
he
Therefore,
that were negotiated for 1977-1978.
multiple year agreemen s.
single year agreements or the first year of

only those agreements
^The intent of the author was to consider
Therefore, he reviewed only
that were negotiated for 1978-1979.
multiple year agreements,
single year agreements or the first year of
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and 34 (68%) respectively.

The number of collective bargaining agreements that were in

effect for 1975-1976 that contained a resolution of Interest disputes

clause per the provisions of RSA 273-A was zero.

The number of

resolution of Interest disputes clauses per the provisions of RSA
273-A that were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was 20 (35%)
and 16 (32%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect for

1975-1976 that contained a resolution of interest disputes clause per
the provisions of the agreement was 36 (69%).

The number of resol-

ution of interest disputes clauses per the provisions of the master
agreement that were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was 20
(35%) and 18 (36%).
for 1975The number of no strike clauses that were in effect

1976 was 27 (52%).

negotiaThe number of no strike clauses that were

to 20 (35%) and 21
ted for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was to change

(42%) respectively.

1975-1976 that had been
The number of agreements in effect in
contract was eight (15*).
negotiated as part of a multiple year

The

negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978number of agreements that were
wa
part of a multiple year contract
1979 that were negotiated as
(98*) and 20 (40%) respectively.

agreements that were in
The number of collective bargaining
23 (44%).
contained a reserve clause was
effect in 1975-1976 which
for 1977bargaining agreements negotiated
The number of collective
to 24 (41
such a clause was increased
containing
1978-1979
1978 and

)
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and 26 (52%) respectively,

RSA 273-A appears to have brought about a decline in several
of the procedures listed in Table 4; these include definition of

scope, resolution of Interest disputes per the master agreement, and

no strike clause.

It is the author’s opinion that these procedures

declined because they are also covered by the provisions of RSA 273-A,
and, consequently the negotiators saw no need to include them in the

collective bargaining agreements.

The percentage of collective bar-

gaining agreements containing a definition of scope clause declined
from 56 in 1975-1976 to 46 in 1978-1979.

The percentage of collective

bargaining agreements containing a no strike clause declined from
52 in 1975-1976 to 42 in 1978-1979.

The percentage of collective

disputes
bargaining agreements containing a resolution of interest

between 1975-1976 and
clause per the master agreement also declined
1978-1979.
enactment of a colOne change that usually accompanies the

collective bargaining becomes more
lective bargaining statute is that
formal.

Increase in several negoTable 4 indicates that there was an

found in more formal and sophlstl
tlatlons procedures that are usually
percentage of collective bargaining
cated collective bargaining. The
1975clause Increased from 79 In
agreements containing a time limits
bargaining
The percentage of collective
1976 to 90 In 1978-1979.
agreement
as part of a multi year
agreements that were negotiated
to 40 In 1978-1979.
increased from 15 In 1975-1976

The percentage

clause
agreements containing a reserve
of collective bargaining

lAl

increased slightly.
Prior to the enactment of RSA 272-k, the only resolution of
interest disputes clauses were the ones that had been negotiated as
part of the collective bargaining agreements.

The enactment of the

statute which took place after the 1975-1976 collective bargaining

agreements were negotiated was one of the main reasons why the
disputes
number of agreements containing a resolution of interest
20 in 1977-1978.
clause per RSA 273-A went from zero in 1975-1976 to

disputes clauses
The decrease in the number of resolution of interest
to 20 in 1977-1978 can
per the master agreement from 36 in 1975-1976

be attributed to the same reason.

The important point to note here

resolution of interest disputes clauses
is that the total number of
1978-1979.
changed very little from 1975-1976 to
no strike clauses in effect
The change between the number of

was
number negotiated for 1977-1978 (20)
for 1975-1976 (27) and the

rather large.

one considers that more
It was especially so when

latter year.
agreements were negotiated in the

The number and per-

for 1978-1979 while somewhat
centage of such clauses negotiated
figures. The
still below the 1975-1976
larger than for 1977-1978 Is
percentage of
decline In the number and
the
attribute
would
author
was studied to
three year period that
the
during
clauses
no strike
public employees.
now prohibits strikes by
the fact that RSA 273-A
no strike provision,
therefore, can now use the
employer,
public
The
ordering the striking
a court Injunction
obtain
to
273-A
of RSA
a no
not have to rely on
to work, and does
back
employees
public
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strike provision in the collective bargaining agreement to obtain an
inj unction.

The number and percentage of multiple year agreements increased

substantially between 1975-1976 and 1977-1978.

While both the number

and percentage declined the following year, the author would conclude
that the overall Increase that took place during the three year

period that was studied was substantial.

It may be that the present

Inflationary spiral has had a mixed effect on the increase in multiple
year agreements.

Some school board members would argue that the terms

of a multiple year agreement might have less overall financial impact

than those of several single year agreements, and others might be con-

cerned that inflation would place the community in a position of not

being able to honor the commitments of a long term agreement.

It is

increase in the
the author's opinion that the main reason for the

bargaining can
number of multiple year agreements is that collective
unsettling process.
be a very time consuming, expensive, and even
process are pleased when
Those who are directly concerned with the
be even more pleased if they
it is over, and certainly they would

Involved with it again for
thought that they did not have to become
two or more years.

grievances.
nr.anlzatlonal benefits per r.'lnlne to

RSA 273-A appears

benefits
effect on certain organizational
to have had a nearly uniform
all but two of the Items
pertaining to grievances in that
period that
meaningful increase during the
Table 5 (page 1A3) had a
substantial change
that Increased, the most
Items
the
Of
studied.
was

1A3

TABLE

5

NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SPECIFYING
CERTAIN ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS
PERTAINING TO GRIEVANCES

Before RSA

Organizational
Benefits Pertaining
to Grievances

b.

2 7 3-

1975-1976^

1977-1978^

1978-1979^

N - 52

N - 58

N - 50

freq. pet.

freq. pet.

freq. pet

37

71%

57

99%

50

100%

Grievance limited
to agreement

36

69%

45

78%

42

84%

Final determination
by superintendent

-0-

Grievance procedure
a.

After RSA

2 7 3-

-0-

-0-

Final determination
by school board no advisory arbitration process

8

15%

19

33%

11

22%

Final determination
by school board
with provision
for advisory
arbitration

25%

20

35%

22

44%

13

Provision for
binding arbitration

31%

18

31%

17

34%

16

Organizational grievances

27%

20

35%

17

34%

14

Class action grievances

29

50%

52%

37%

26

19

Representational
rights in grievances

71%

82%

50%

41

41

26

c.

d.

e.

1A4

TABLE

5

— Continued

^The intent of the author was to consider all of the agreements
that were in effect immediately before the enactment of RSA 273-A.
2

The intent of the author was to consider only those agreements
that were negotiated for 1977-1978. Therefore, he reviewed only
single year agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.
3

The intent of the author was to consider only those agreements
Therefore, he reviewed only single
that were negotiated for 1978-1979.
year agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.
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that took place involved the clause granting representational rights
In the grievance process to teacher associations.

The two items that

did not follow this trend were binding arbitration of grievances and
final determination of grievances by the superintendent.

No change

at all took place relative to the clause wherein the final determina-

tion in the grievance procedure was made by the superintendent, and
the change in percentage in the clauses providing for binding arbitra-

tion of grievances was small.
As can be seen in Table 5, (page 143) the number of collective

bargaining agreements in effect for 1975-1976 that contained a grievance procedure was 37 out of the 52 agreements (71%).

The number

1977-1978 and 1978'
of grievance procedures that were negotiated for
out of the 50
1979 was 57 out of the 58 agreements (99%) and 50

agreements (100%) respectively.
in effect in
The number of collective bargaining agreements

grievances to violations
1975-1976 which contained a clause limiting

was 36 of the 52 agreements (69%).
of the provisions of the agreement
agreements negotiated for 1977The number of collective bargaining
to the
a clause limiting grievances
1978 and 1978-1979 that contained

agreement increased to 45 (78%)
violations of the provisions of the
and 42 (84%) respectively.
for 1975-1976 contained a
None of the agreements in effect
determination
procedure in which the final
clause in the grievance

schools, nor did
the superintendent of
on a grievance was made by
1978-1979 contain
negotiated for 1977-1978 and
any of the agreements

\
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such a clause.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect for

1975-1976 that contained a grievance procedure wherein the final

determination was made by the school board with no provision for

arbitration was eight (15%),

The number of collective bargaining

agreements negotiated for 1977—1978 and 1978-1979 that contained such
a clause was to change to 19

(33%) and 11 (22%) respectively.

The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect for

1975-1976 containing a grievance procedure that provided for advisory

arbitration with the final determination by the school board was
thirteen (25%).

The number of grievance procedures negotiated for

with
1977-1978 and 1978-1979 that provided for advisory arbitration
increased to 20 (35%)
the final determination by the school board was
and 22 (44%) respectively.
in effect in
The number of collective bargaining agreements

the grievance process
1975-1976 wherein the final determination in

was binding arbitration was 16 (31%).

The number of grievance pro-

1978-1979 that provided for
cedures negotiated for 1977-1978 and
17 (3«) respectively.
binding arbitration was 18 (31%) and

agreements In effect for
The number of collective bargaining

organizational grievance clause
1975-1976 that contained an
grievance clauses negotiated
The number of organizational
(27%).
respectively.
was 20 (35%) and 17 (3«)
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979
effect for
bargaining agreements in
The number of collective
was 19 (37%)
action grievance clause
1975-1976 that contained a class
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The number of class action grievance clauses negotiated for 1977-1978

and 1978-1979 was 29 (50%) and 26 (52%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect for

1975-1976 that contained a clause granting representational rights
in the grievance process to teacher associations was 26 (50%).

The

number of representational rights clauses that were negotiated for
1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was to change to 41 (71%) and 41

(827.)

rcspoc-

tlvely
Based on the data contained in Table

5

(page 143), the author

procedure
would conclude that the increased interest in the grievance

brought forth two important changes.

The first is that whereas in

some form of
1975-1976 37 out of the 52 agreements (71%) contained
N

agreements (100%)
grievance procedure by 1978-1979 50 out of the 50
The second is that whereas

contained some form of grievance procedure.

agreements (56%) contained some form of
in 1975-1976 29 out of the 52
out of the 50 agreements (78%)
arbitration procedure by 1978-1979 39

procedure.
contained some form of arbitration

limiting grievances to the
with regard to the number o£ clauses
found a
bargaining agreement, the author
provisions of the collective

substantial change.

here Is that as a
The Important point to note

year period
took place during the three
result of the Increase that
negotiated agreements
small fraction of the
that was studied only a
provisions of the
limiting grievances to the
do not contain a clause
number of
The Increase In the
collective bargaining agreement.
the agreement may be
to the provisions of
grievances
limiting
Clauses
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attributed to a compromise between the teacher association and the
school board.

It would seem that the teacher association would pre-

fer a grievance procedure with a broad definition as to what con-

stitutes a grievance wherein It would be able to grieve school district practices and policies in addition to the provisions of the

collective bargaining agreement.

It would also seem that the school

board would prefer a grievance procedure with a narrow definition as
procedure
to what constitutes a grievance especially If the grievance

provides for some form of arbitration.

It is the author’s opinion

position on this
that most school boards would take a very strong

procedure that did
matter, and would refuse to accept a grievance
collective bargaining
not limit grievances to the provisions of the
agreement.

association of
Therefore, the acceptance by the teacher

grievances to the provisions of the
a grievance procedure limiting

acceptance of the school
collective bargaining agreement may be an
least some kind of grievance
board’s position in order to obtain at

procedure
•n,e

that contained a clause
number and percentage of agreements

boards
of grievances by school
providing for the final determination
school
Increased sharply between the
without advisory arbitration
of
however, the number and percentage
years 1975-1976 and 1977-1978.
the folclause declined considerably
agreements containing such a
during the three
the overall increase
lowing year. and. as a result

rather modest.
year period studied, was

The Immediate rise and

to the fact
provision might be attributed
this
of
decline
subsequent
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that 1977-1978 was the first year that school boards and teacher

associations negotiated under the provisions of RSA 273-A, and that
the interest in collective bargaining had increased dramatically.
It would not seem that a grievance procedure wherein the school board

was the final arbiter would be acceptable to the teacher association.
In those Instances wherein the teacher association was negotiating
a grievance procedure for the first time, it might have been willing
to accept a clause wherein the school board was the final arbiter

in the grievance procedure as a trade-off for obtaining a grievance

procedure with the thought of negotiating a more acceptable one in
the future.

The percentage and number of clauses providing for advisory

arbitration increased moderately between the years 1975-1976 and
1977-1978.

It is important to note that,

while the numerical in-

1978crease in advisory arbitration clauses between 1977-1978 and

1979 was slight, the percentage Increase was moderate.

The change

for binding arbitrain the number and percentage of clauses providing

that the author would
tion during the period of time studied was such

consider it to be small.

The important point to note here is that

for some form of arbitrathe number of grievance procedures providing
to 39 (78%) in 1978-1979 and
tlon Increased from 29 (56%) in 1975-1976

place In the area of advisory
that almost all of the growth took
arbitration.
took place in the area of
Having considered the changes that

with provision for advisory
final determination by school board
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arbitration and final determination by arbiter-binding. It Is the
opinion of this writer that the change or lack of change in these
areas is interrelated.

Some school boards are opposed to binding

arbitration because they would no longer be able to make the final
determination on certain Issues.

They consider this to be an abdica-

tion of their responsibility to the voters of the school district

because the voters have elected the school board members to make
the decisions involving the affairs of the school district.

At the

same time, the teacher associations are adamant in their demands for

binding arbitration.
is a compromise.

A clause that provides advisory arbitration

On the one hand, it satisfies the need of the

teacher associations to a certain extent in that it provides their

members with some form of arbitration.

On the other hand, it removes

the
the objection of the school boards in that the decision of

make the
arbitrator is advisory, and it is the school board that will
final decision.
and class
The increased interest in organizational grievances

action grievances was also evident.

The percentage of collective

increased from 27 in
bargaining agreements containing the former

percentage of collective
1975-1976 to 35 in 1977-1978 while the
latter increased from 37 in 1975
bargaining agreements containing the
1976 to 50 in 1977-1978.

of
Both the number and the percentage

reand class action grievances
clauses providing for organizational
1977-1978 and 1978-1979. However,
mained approximately the same in
of
overall increase in the percentage
the author concluded that the
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clauses providing for class action grievances during the three year

period that was studied was substantial.

The most substantial change

involved the collective bargaining agreements granting representational
rights in the grievance process to teacher associations.

The author

found that a large change in the number and percentage of agreements

containing such a clause took place during the years 1975-1976 and
1977-1978.

While the number of agreements containing such a clause

did not change the following year, the percentage of agreements con-

taining such a clause continued its upward trend.

Certain other organizational benefits

.

The change in the selected

trend that was
items as listed in Table 6 (page 152) followed the upward
items that are
established in the previous table with three of the five

contained in the table showing a noticeable increase.

Of the items that

place involved the clause
changed, the most noticeable increase that took

facilities to the teacher
granting the right to use the school district's

association.

upward trend were
The two items that did not follow the

employer's records.
agency fee and organizational access to

The change

in these two clauses was small.

the number of collective
As can be seen In Table 6 (page 152),

1975-1975 whereby the school board
bargaining agreements In effect In
to the
teachers’ paychecks as a service
agreed to deduct dues from the

The
of the 52 agreements (602).
teachers’ association was 31 out
1977-1978
that were negotiated for
number of dues deduction clauses

agreements (782) and
to 45 out of the 58
change
to
was
1978-1979
and

agreements (74%) respectively.
37 out of the 50
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TABLE

6

NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SPECIFYING
CERTAIN OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS

After RSA 273-A

Before RSA 273-A

Certain
Other Organizational
Benefits

1975- 1976^
N - 52

f req

pet

Dues deductions

31

60%

Agency fee

-0-

0%

Use of facilities

17

Organizational access
to employer’s
records

21

1977- 1978^

1978- 1979^

N - 58

N - 50

freq. pet

freq. pet

78%

37

74%

-0-

0%

1

2%

33%

33

57%

27

54%

40%

27

47%

22

44%

45

\

Time off for
association
activities

19

37%

24

41%

26

52%

^reements
all of
intent of the author was to consider
273-A.
RSA
the enactment of
that were in effect immediately before

^he

consider only those agreements
^The intent of the author was to
Therefore, he reviewed only
that were negotiated for 1977-1978.
year of multiple year agreements.
single year agreements or the first

consider only those agreements
The intent of the author was to
Therefore he reviewed only single
that were negotiated for 1978-1979
of multiple year agreements.
year agreements or the first year
3
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The collective bargaining agreements in effect for 1975-1976 as

well as the collective bargaining agreements negotiated for 1977-1978
did not contain an agency fee clause.

One agreement (2%) negotiated in

1978-1979 provided for an agency fee clause.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect for

1975-1976 that contained a clause whereby the teachers’ association
was allowed to use the school facilities was 17 (33%)

.

The number of

was
use of facilities clauses negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979
33 (57%) and 27 (54%) respectively.
in effect for
The number of collective bargaining agreements

association
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing the teachers’
board) was 21 (40%).
with access to their employer’s records (school

agreements negotiated for 1977The number of collective bargaining
clause was 27 (47%) and 22
1978 and 1978-1979 that contained such a
(44%) respectively.

agreements in effect for
The number of collective bargaining

providing staff members with
1975-1976 that contained a clause
activities was 19 (37%).
off to attend association

The number of

1977-1973
activities clauses negotiated for
time off for association
respectively.
to 24 (41%) and 26 (52%)
and 1978-1979 was increased
the
Table 6 could be to strengthen
The purpose of the items in
benefit
organization or to provide a
teachers- association as an
membership. The
better able to serve the
whereby the association is
from 60 in
for dues deductions rose
percentage of clauses providing
the association
This item strengthens
1978-1979.
in
74
to
1975-1976
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as an organization.

The regular collection of dues is essential

Therefore,

to the establishment and survival of most organizations.

this clause is very Important to the teacher associations.

It

is

certainly much easier to have the employer deduct dues as an automatic

payroll deduction than it is to collect from the members on an Individ'
ual basis.

The inclusion of the clause allowing the association to

staff
use the school district’s facilities and the clause allowing

associamembers to have time off from their duties to represent the
is better able
tion places the association in a position whereby it

to serve its members.

The former clause increased from 33% in 1975-

clause increased from 37% in
1976 to 54% in 1978-1979, and the latter

1975-1976 to 52% in 1978-1979.

Agency fee, one of the two items in Table

6 that

showed little

which has political implications.
change, is an item the negotiation of
all staff members would pay to
The agency fee is a sum of money that

not wish to Join the association.
the association even if they did
share
that since all staff members
The teacher associations contend
association negotiates they should
equally in the benefits that the

association.
share In the expenses of the

The school boards contend

to join the
to forcing staff members
that this would be tantamount
helped
data that RSA 273-A has not
It is obvious from the
union.

they should
convince school boards that
teacher associations to

the agency fee issue.
change their position on

n.,.., economic

b enefits

pertalnlnf to compensation.

RSA 273-A appears

In Table
effect on the items listed
to have had a mixed

7

(page 155)

155

TABLE

7

NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SPECIFYING
CERTAIN DIRECT ECONOMIC BENEFITS
PERTAINING TO COMPENSATION

After RSA 273-A

Before RSA 273-A

Direct Economic
Benefits Pertaining
to Compensation

N - 52

1977- 1978^
N - 58

1978- 1979^
N - 50

freq. pet

freq. pet

freq

pet

1975- 1976^

5

9%

4

7%

-0-

0%

46

89%

54

93%

50

100%

Salary schedule by
merit

1

2%

Additional compensation by merit

5

Longevity pay
Credit for experience
outside the school
district

No salary provision
Salary schedule
by preparation
and years of
experience

Retirement bonus

-0-

0%

-0-

0%

10%

5

9%

2

4%

15

29%

11

19%

14

28%

21

40%

25

43%

27

54%

5

10%

8

14%

5

10%

agreements
of
intent of the author was to consider all
273-A.
RSA
of
enactment
the
that were in effect Immediately before

^he

only those
^The intent of the author was to consider
Therefore, he reviewed only single
that were negotiated for 1977-1978.
multiple year agreements.
year agreements or the first year of

consider only those
^The intent of the author was to
Therefore, he reviewed only sing
that were negotiated for 1978-1979.
of multiple year agreements.
year agreements or the first year
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since two increased moderately, two did not change much, and three
declined.

The most noticeable increase involved the clause that

provides for a salary schedule by preparation and years of experience,
and the most noticeable decline involved the collective bargaining

agreements that did not provide for a salary clause either by prep-

aration and years of experience or by merit.
As can be seen in Table

7

(page 155)

,

the number of collective

bargaining agreements in effect in 1975-1976 that did not contain a
clause providing for a salary schedule by preparation and years of

experience or by merit was five out of the 52 agreements (9%).

The

1977-1978
number of collective bargaining agreements negotiated for
of the 58 agreements
that did not contain such a clause was four out

(7%).

were negotiated
All of the collective bargaining agreements that

for a salary schedule.
for 1978-1979 contained a clause providing

agreements in effect in
The number of collective bargaining
for a salary schedule
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing

was 46 (89%)
by preparation and years of experience

.

The number of

and 1978-1979 was Increased to
such clauses negotiated for 1977-1978

respectively.
54 (93%) and 50 (100%)
agreements In effect for
The number of collective bargaining

providing for a salary schedul
1975-1976 that contained a clause
agreement,
None of the collective bargaining
by merit was one (2%).
a clause
1977-1978 or 1978-1979 contained
for
negotiated
were
that
by merit.
providing for a salary schedule

effect for
bargaining agreements in
The number of collective
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1975-1976 that contained a clause providing for additional compensation
by merit was five (10%).

The number of collective bargaining agree-

ments negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 that contained such a
clause was five (9%) and two (A%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect for

1975-1976 that contained a clause providing for longevity pay was
15 (29%).

The number of collective bargaining agreements negotiated

for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 that contained such a clause was to change
to eleven (19%) and fourteen (28%) respectively.

The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect for

1975-1976 that contained an agreement providing credit for experience

outside the school district was 21 (40%).

The number of clauses pro-

were negotiated
viding for experience outside the school district that
25 (43%) and 27 (54%)
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was increased to

respectively.
agreements in effect for
The number of collective bargaining
for retirement bonus was
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing

five (10%).

1977-1978 and 1978
The number of clauses negotiated for

was eight (14%) and five (10%)
1979 that contained such a clause
respectively.

bargaining agreements that did
While the number of collective
declined
for a salary schedule only
not contain a clause providing
1975-1976
only declined by nine between
by five and the percentage
noticeable
considered this to be the most
and 1978-1979, the author
collective
decline was that all of the
because the result of the

decline
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bargaining agreements negotiated for 1978-1979 contained a clause
providing for a salary schedule.

While the number of salary schedules by preparation and years
of experience only Increased by four and the percentage only Increased

by eleven between 1975-1976 and 1978-1979, the author considered this
to be the most noticeable change because the Increase brought the

percentage of agreements containing such a clause to lOOZ.
The percentage of collective bargaining agreements that contained

declined from
a clause providing for a salary program based on merit
2% in 1975-1976 to 0% in 1978-1979.

The percentage of collective

additional
bargaining agreements that contained a clause providing for
four in 1978compensation by merit declined from ten in 1975-1976 to
1979.

merit compensation
It is important to note that these latter

compensation programs as
programs were supplementary to the uniform
salary schedule based
were specified in the clauses providing for a
on preparation and years of experience.
has
is not surprising that there
In the oplnon of the author, it

percentage of clauses providing for
been a noticeable increase in the
de
and years of experience, and a
a salary schedule by preparation
claus
salary schedule by merit or
Cline in clauses providing for a
associ
by merit, because teacher
providing for additional compensation

provide for
in favor of programs that
atlons have consistently been
a uniform rate of pay.

contained
bargaining agreements that
The percentage of collective
1975-1976 to
pay declined from 29 in
longevity
for
providing
a clause
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19 in 1977-1978; however,

the percentage of agreements containing

such a clause Increased the following year to 28.

This writer con-

cluded that the decline in the percentage of the longevity pay clause
from 29% in 1975-1976 to 28% in 1978-1979 did not constitute a change
of much importance.

The percentage of clauses providing credit for experience out-

side the school district increased from AO in 1975-1976 to 5A in
1978-1979.

The author concluded that this was a moderate change.

It

are in
is the opinion of the author that the teacher associations

previous
favor of a clause that gives teachers salary credit for their
years of experience.

At the same time, the teacher associations have

the school
sought to incorporate a statement which would prohibit

credit than that
board from giving a newly hired teacher more salary

her years of experiwhich the teacher is entitled to according to his or
ence.

teacher associations have
It is this writer’s opinion that the

efforts to incorporate this statement
not been very successful in their
into the collective bargaining agreement.

agreements containing a
The percentage of collective bargaining
at the time of the teacher's
clause providing for a bonus payment
1975-1976 to 14% In 1977-1978; howretirement Increased from 10% In
the
bonus clauses declined to ten
ever. the percentage of retirement
change in
concluded that there was little
following year. The author

three-year
bonus clauses during the
the percentage of retirement

period that was studied.

mv.ct economlr benefits pertaining

to

Insure

It would appear
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that the effect of RSA 273-A has been one whereby the change in
the Items listed in Table 8 (page 161) has been uniform in that all

items listed Increased from pre 273-A levels.

The most noticeable

change was in the area of medical insurance in that as of 1977-1978
all collective bargaining agreements contained a clause wherein this

fringe benefit was provided to staff members.

Medical insurance was

also Included as a fringe benefit in all of the collective bargaining

agreements that were negotiated for 1978-1979.

The least noticeable

change took place in the area of disability insurance.
As can be seen in Table 8 (page 161) the number of collective

bargaining agreements in effect in 1975-1976 that contained a clause
providing medical insurance as a fringe benefit was 44 out of 52
(85%).

The number of medical insurance clauses that were negotiated

for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was 58 (100%) and 50 (100%) respectively.

The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect for

1975-1976 that contained a clause providing dental insurance as a
fringe benefit was one (2%)

.

The number of dental insurance clauses

was Increased to
that were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979

three (5%) and five (10%) respectively.
in effect for
The number of collective bargaining agreements

was 21 (40%).
1975-1976 that contained a life insurance clause

The

for 1977-1978 and 1978number of life insurance clauses negotiated

respectively.
1979 was to change to 26 (45%) and 29 (58%)

agreements in effect for
The number of collective bargaining
]^

for disability insurance
975_1976 that contained a clause providing
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TABLE

8

NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SPECIFYING
CERTAIN DIRECT ECONOMIC BENEFITS
PERTAINING TO INSURANCE

After RSA 273-A

Before RSA 273-A

Direct Economic
Benefits Pertaining
to Insurance

1975-1976
N - 52

freq. pet.

29
1

2%

3

Dental insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment

Disability insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment

freq. pet.
58

4A
9

6

16
10

32

1978-1979
50

N

58

N

85%
17%
12%
56%

Medical insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment

Life insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment

1977-1978

freq. pet.

100%
30%
20%
50%

100%
28%
17%
55%

50

5

29
0

15

10
25

0
0

0%
0%

2

1

2%

0

5%
3%
2%
0%

21

40%
0%

26
0

45%
0%

4%
37%

1

2%

2

25

43%

27

12

21%
2%
0%
19%

11

0
2

19
9

0
0
9

17%
0%
0%
17%

1

1

0
11

2

0
3

1

1

9

10%
4%
0%
6%
58%
0%
4%
54%
22%
2%
2%
18%

only those agreements
^The intent of the author was to consider
the enactment of RSA 273-A.
that were in effect immediately before
only those agreements
^The Intent of the author was to consider
he reviewed only single
Therefore,
that were negotiated for 1977-1978.
multiple year agreements.
year agreements or the first year of
only those ^^reements
Intent of the author was to consider
Therefore, he reviewed only sing
that were negotiated for 1978-1979.
year agreements.
ye« agLemeLs or the first year of multiple

\he
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was 9 (17%).

The number of disability insurance clauses that were

negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was increased to 12 (21%)
and 11 (22%) respectively.

The author considered the increase in the number and percentage
of clauses providing medical Insurance as a benefit to be substantial.

The important point to note here is that all collective bargaining

agreements now contain a clause that provides medical insurance as
a fringe benefit.

The percentage of medical insurance clauses wherein the school

board has agreed to pay for the staff members' medical insurance

with the staff
coverage up to a specified sum of money (flat amount)
showed a moderate
member paying the remainder of the cost, if any,
\

Increase.

amount of
Table 8A (page 163) shows in detail the flat

insurance.
money paid by school districts toward medical

paying a flat amount
Of the nine school districts that were
1975-1976. one was paying less
of money toward medical Insurance In

per annum and eight were paying
than one hundred dollars ($100.00)
and five hundred dollars
between three hundred and one ($301.00)
that were paying
Of the 15 school districts
($500.00) per annum.
1978-1979, four
toward medical Insurance In
a flat amount of money

hundred
and one ($101.00) and three
were paying between one hundred
hundred
one was paying between three
dollars ($300.00) per annum,
annum, five
hundred dollars ($500.00) per
five
and
($301.00)
one
and
and seven hundred
hundred and one ($501.00)
five
between
paying
were
between seven
and five were paying
dollars ($700.00) per annum,

163

TABLE 8A

MEDICAL INSURANCE;
FLAT AMOUNT

Before RSA 273-A

Flat Amount
In Dollars

1975- 1976
N - 9

After RSA 273-A

1978- 19 79
N - 15

pet

freq.

pet

freq.

0 - 100

1

11%

0

0%

101 - 300

0

0%

4

27%

301 - 500

8

89%

1

7%

501 - 700

0

0%

5

33%

701 - 900

0

0%

5

33Z
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and one ($701.00) and nine hundred dollars ($900.00) per annum.
In 1975-1976 none of the school districts were paying over five

hundred dollars per annum toward the cost of medical Insurance,
however, by 1978-1979 33% of the school districts were paying over
five hundred dollars and 33% of the school districts were paying over

seven hundred dollars.

This writer concluded that there has been

a substantial Increase In the amount of money that the school boards

have agreed to commit toward the cost of medical Insurance.
The percentage of clauses wherein the school board has agreed
to pay a percentage of the medical Insurance cost showed a moderate

Increase.

Table 8B (page 165) shows In detail the percentage of

medical Insurance paid by several districts.

Of the six school dis-

Insurance plan
tricts that were paying a percentage of the medical
74% toward the Individual
In 1975-1976, two were paying between 50 and

staff member’s coverage only.

One district was paying between 75 and

coverage and between 50 and
99% toward the Individual staff member’s
coverage.
74% toward the staff member’s family

One district was

family coverage.
paying 65% toward both the Individual and

Two dis-

toward both the Individual and
tricts were paying between 75 and 99%
same percentage toward the covfamily coverage, and were paying the
or her family.
erage of the other members of his

Of the ten

covpercentage of the medical Insurance
districts that were paying a
the Inpaying between 75 and 99% toward
erage In 1978-1979, three were
between
One district was paying
only.
dividual staff member’s coverage

however, that same
Individual and family coverage;
the
toward
99%
and
75
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TABLE 8B

MEDICAL INSURANCE:
PERCENTAGE

After RSA 273-A

Before RSA 273-A

1978-1979

1975-1976

Extent of Medical
Coverage

N - 10

N " 6

percentage paid by
district

percentage paid by
district

25-49

50-74

75-99

25-49

50-74

75-99

Individual only

0

2

0

0

0

3

Individual and
small percentage
for family (same
districts)

0

1

1

0

0

1

Individual and
family

0

1

2

0

0

6
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district was paying a lower percentage toward the family coverage.
Six districts were paying between 75 and 99% toward both the individual
and family coverage, and were paying the same percentage toward the

coverage of the other members of his or her family.
The author noted that two substantial changes took place relative
to medical insurance coverage.

The first change was that whereas in

1975-1976 50% of the school districts were providing benefits within
the 75 to 99% range by 1978-1979 all of the school districts were

providing benefits within the 75-99% range.

The second change was

were paying
that whereas in 1975-1976 33 1/3% of these districts
the 75 to 99%
toward both the individual and family coverage within

districts were paying
range at the same rate, by 1978-1979 60% of these

within the 75-99% range
toward both the individual and family coverage
at the same rate.

breakout of medical insurTable 8C (page 167) shows a detailed

ance-full payment as found in Table 8.

The clauses wherein the school

individual staff member’s
board agreed to pay the full cost of the

1975-1976 to 36% in 1978-1979.
coverage declined from 45% in

The

the
agreed to pay the full cost of
clauses wherein the school board
coverage
plus a portion of the family
individual staff member's coverage

28% in 1978-1979.
changed from 27% in 1975-1976 to

The percentage of

cost
board agreed to pay the full
clauses wherein the school
increased
coverage and family coverage
the individual staff member’s

from 28% to 36%.
noted above were
writer, the changes as
this
of
opinion
the
in
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TABLE 8C

MEDICAL INSURANCE;
FULL PAYMENT

Before RSA 273-A

Full Payment

After RSA 273-A

1978- 1979
N - 25

1975- 1976
N - 29

freq.

pet.

9

36%

0%

2

8%

1

3%

0

0%

Individual + 50% to
74% of family
coverage

2

7%

2

8%

Individual + 75% to
99% of family
coverage

5

17%

3

12%

Individual + full
family coverage

8

28%

9

36%

freq.

pet.

13

45%

Individual + 1% to
24% of family
coverage

0

Individual + 25% to
49% of family
coverage

Individual

'
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not substantial.

It is important to note that the change that did

occur was such that the school districts paid more of the medical
Insurance premiums in 1978-1979 than in the previous years.
It is even more important to note that in all three types of

medical Insurance clauses (flat amount, percentage, and full payment)
the school boards agreed to increase the amount of money that they paid

toward the cost of medical Insurance.

In the opinion of the author,

is a
this is an important trend to note in that medical insurance

associations,
benefit that ranks high on the priority list of teacher

insurance but also
not only because of the spiraling cost of medical
benefits.
because their members do not have to pay taxes on fringe

bargaining agreements
The change in the percentage of collective

moderate as the percentage
that provided a dental Insurance plan was
1978-1979.
increased from two in 1975-1976 to ten In

It Is difficult

as the percentages ate quite
to attach any meaning to this Increase
small.

fringe benefit that
In the opinion of the author, it is a

number and percentage.
will continue to Increase both in

Although

did
are small, this fringe benefit
the numbers at the present time

years.
register an Increase in two consecutive

More Importantly as

benefit
to rise it will be a fringe
the cost of dental care continues

attractive to teacher associations.
that will become increasingly
collective bargaining agreements
The number and percentage of
1978-1979.
both in 1977-1978 and
providing life Insurance increased
agreements that contained a life
the 21 collective bargaining
Of

members
thirteen provided the staff
insurance clause in 1975-1976,
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with a policy which Included a death benefit that fell within the range
of two thousand ($2,000.00) to five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) and six

provided the staff members with a policy which included a death benefit
that fell within the range of five thousand and one ($5,001.00) to ten

thousand dollars ($10,000.00).

Of the 29 collective bargaining agree-

ments that contained a life insurance clause in 1978-1979, twelve provided
the staff members with a death benefit policy which fell within the range
of two thousand ($2,000.00) to five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), ten

provided the staff members with a death benefit policy which fell within
the range of five thousand and one ($5,001.00) to ten thousand dollars

($10,000.00), and seven provided the staff members with a death benefit

policy which fell within the range of ten thousand and one ($10,001.00)
to twenty thousand dollars

($20,000.00).

This writer concluded that the increase in districts providing
1975-1976
life insurance as a fringe benefit, which went from 40% in
to 58% in 1978-1979, was substantial.

The author also concluded that

benefits was subthe increase in the financial value of the death
stantial.

provided a
In 1975-1976 32% of the life insurance policies

($5,001.00) and ten
death benefit between five thousand and one

policies provided a
thousand dollars ($10,000.00), and none of the
dollars ($10,000.00).
death benefit of more than ten thousand

By

policies providing a
1978-1979 the percentage of life Insurance
dollars had increased to
death benefit of more than five thousand
five
providing a death benefit between
59% with 35% of the policies

thousand dollars ($10,000.00),
thousand and one ($5,001.00) and ten
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and 2A% of the policies providing a death benefit between ten

thousand and one ($10,001.00) and twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00).
In the opinion of the author, this is a fringe benefit that will

continue to Increase in percentage and value, and in fact the author
was surprised that more agreements did not already provide for this

benefit.

This is a benefit that the school boards can provide at a

minimal cost, and at the same time it is an attractive fringe benefit
that the
to the teacher associations especially when it is apparent

school boards are willing to assume the entire cost.
provided
The percentage of collective bargaining agreements that
17 in 1975-1976 to 22 in
a disability insurance clause increased from

1978-1979.

increase.
The author concluded that this was a slight

of a bsence.
ntrect economic benefits pertaining to leaves

RSA 273-A

on the items listed in
appears to have had a nearly uniform effect
items with the exception of one
Table 9 (page 171) in that all of the

increased.

with the most
There were several substantial changes

for personal leave.
noticeable being that item providing

This was

and also beof the size of the Increase,
the most noticeable because

could be
providing for personal leave
cause by 1978-1979 a clause
been
bargaining agreements that had
found in all of the collective
was adoption
item that did not increase
negotiated for that year. The
leave.

collective
(page 171). the number of
AS can be seen in Table 9
clause
1975-1976 that contained a
agreements in effect in

bargaining

agreements (77Z).
was 40 out of the 52
providing for personal leave
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TABLE

9

NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SPECIFYING
CERTAIN DIRECT ECONOMIC BENEFITS PERTAINING
TO LEAVES OF ABSENCE

After RSA 273-A

Before RSA 273-A

Direct Economic
Benefits Pertaining
to Leaves of Absence

1975- 1976^
N = 52

f req.

1977- 1978^
N = 58

1978- 1979^
N - 50

pet.

f req

pet

f req.

pet

77%

53

8

62%
15%

39
lA

91%
67%
2A%

50
35
15

100%
70%
30%

46

89%

58

100%

50

100%

26

50%

33

57%

37

7A%

20

39%

25

A 3%

13

26%

AA

85%

53

91%

A8

96%

1

1

11

2%
19%

1

7

2%
1A%

17

2%
3A%

Sabbatical leave

19

37%

20

35%

26

52%

Maternity leave

28

5A%

AA

76%

39

78%

13

25%

8

15%

13

26%

Adoption leave

26

50%

28

5A%

30

60%

Bereavement leave

23

A6%

28

5A%

27

5A%

Military leave

Personal leave
a. 3 days or more
b. 1 or 2 days

AO
32

Sick leave
a. 15 days or more
per annum
b. less than 15 days
per annum
c. cumulative to
more than 60
days
d. cumulative to
less than 60
days
e. sick leave bank
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TABLE

9

— Continued

The intent of the author was to consider all of the agreements
that were in effect immediately before the enactment of RSA 273-A.
2

The intent of the author was to consider only those agreements
that were negotiated for 1977-1978. Therefore, he reviewed only single
year agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.
3

The Intent of the author was to consider only those agreements
that were negotiated for 1978-1979. Therefore, he reviewed only single
year agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.
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Of the 40, 32 (62%) provided for 3 or more days of personal leave

and 8 (15%) provided for less than

3

days of personal leave.

The

number of such clauses that were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 19781979 was Increased to 53 out of the 58 agreements (91%) and 50 out
of the 50 agreements (100%) respectively.

Of the 53 personal leave

clauses that were negotiated for 1977-1978, 39 (67%) provided for
3

or more days and 14 (24%) provided for less than 3 days.

Of the

50 personal leave clauses that were negotiated for 1978-1979, 35

(70%) provided for 3 or more days and 15 (30%) provided for less

than 3 days.

The number of collective bargaining agreements that were in

effect for 1975-1976 that contained a sick leave clause was 46 (89%).
of sick
Of the 46 agreements, 26 (50%) provided for 15 or more days

days of sick
leave per annum and 20 (39%) provided for less than 15

leave per annum.

Additionally, 44 (85%) of the 52 agreements provided

and one agreement (2%)
for sick leave cumulative to 60 or more days,
60 days.
provided for sick leave cumulative to less than

Lastly,

for a sick leave
seven (14%) of the fifty-two agreements provided
bank.

were negotiated for 1977nie number of sick leave clauses that
58 (100%) and 50 (100%).
1978 and 1978-1979 was to change to

Of the

for 1977-1978, 33 (57%) provided
58 agreements that were negotiated

provided for
leave per annum, and 25 (A3%)
for 15 or more days of sick
53 agreement.
leave per annum. Additionally,
less than 15 days of sick
or more, and one
leave cumulative to 60 days
sick
for
provided
(91%)
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agreement (2%) provided for sick leave cumulative to less than 60
days.

Lastly, eleven (19%) of the fifty-eight agreements provided

for a sick leave bank.
37

Of the 50 agreements negotiated for 1978-1979,

(74%) provided for 15 or more days of sick leave per annum, and

13 (26%) provided for less than 15 days of sick leave per annum.

Additionally, 48 agreements (96%) provided for sick leave cumulative
to 60 days or more, and one agreement (2%) provided for sick leave

cumulative to less than 60 days.

Lastly, 17 (34%) of the 50 agreements

negotiated for 1978-1979 provided for a sick leave bank.
The number of collective bargaining agreements that were in

effect for 1975-1976 that contained a sabbatical leave clause was 19
(37%).

The number of sabbatical leave clauses that were negotiated

for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was 20 (35%) and 26 (52%) respectively.

The number of collective bargaining agreements that were in

effect for 1975-1976 that contained a maternity leave clause was 28
(54%).

The number of maternity leave clauses negotiated for 1977-

1978 and 1978-1979 was 44 (76%) and 39 (78%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements that were in

was
effect for 1975-1976 that contained an adoption leave clause
13 (25%).

negotiated
The number of adoption leave clauses that were

and 13 (26%)
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was to change to 8 (15%)

respectively.
agreements that were in
The number of collective bargaining

bereavement leave clause was
effect for 1975-1976 that contained a
26 (50%).

were negotiated for 1977-1978
The nueiber of such clauses Chat
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and 1978-1979 was 28 (5A%) and 30 (60%) respectively.

The number of collective bargaining agreements that were in

effect for 1975-1976 that contained a military leave clause was 23
(46%).

The number of military leave clauses that were negotiated

for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was 28 (54%) and 27 (54%) respectively.

With regard to the change in the number of collective bargaining
agreements that contained a clause providing personal leave, the

percentage of such clauses increased from 77 in 1975—1976 to 100 in
1978-1979.

The author also concluded that this change was substantial

because as of 1978-1979 all of the collective bargaining agreements
leave to the
that were negotiated for that year provided personal

staff members.

The major share of the increase was accounted for by

personal leave.
those clauses providing for one or two days of

The

providing for three or
change in the number and percentage of clauses

more days of personal leave was much smaller.
in the clauses providWhile the number and percentage increase

substantial, the author, nevertheless,
ing sick leave benefits was not

because in both 1977-1978 and
concluded that the change was important
agreements contained a clause provid1978-1979 all of the negotiated
ing sick leave benefits.

concluded
Based on the data, this writer

percentage of
Increase in the number and
that there was a substantial
annum. This indays of sick leave per
clauses providing 15 or more
in the
only by the overall increase
crease was brought about not
leave benefits,
clauses providing for sick
number and percentage of
less than 15
the clauses providing for
but also by the decline in

176

days per annum.

The percentage of collective bargaining agreements

containing a clause that allows staff members to accumulate 60 or

more days of sick leave increased from 85 in 1975-1976 to 96 in
1978-1979 while the percentage of clauses allowing staff members to

accumulate up to 60 days of sick leave did not change during the three
year period that was studied.
The collective bargaining agreements containing a sick leave

bank clause increased from 14% in 1975-1976 to 34% in 1978-1979, and
the author concluded that this change was substantial.
In the opinion of the author, the improvement in the area of

boards
sick leave fringe benefits was one which allowed both school
needs.
and teacher associations to satisfy their respective

The

the teacher associaschoold boards were able to agree to the demands of

benefit package for
tions and at the same time improve the fringe
increases in their
staff members without having to make substantial

Increased sick leave benefits
operating budgets because by and large the
are not utilized.

teacher associaAt the same time, this enabled the

members for an Improved fringe
tions to satisfy the demands of their

benefits package.

leads one to conAn analysis of the Improvements

provided Is protection to the
clude that essentially what Is being
school
Illness or disability, and the
staff members against long term
Insurance.
through the method of self
boards are providing this benefit
In this area for
see continued improvements
This writer would expect to
the above mentioned reasons.

clause
agreements that contained a
The collective bargaining
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providing for a sabbatical leave increased from 37% in 1975-1976 to
52% in 1978-1979, and the author concluded that as a fringe benefit
this change was substantial.

However, whereas only one of the 19

sabbatical leave clauses in effect for 1975-1976 provided staff
members with an unpaid sabbatical leave, eight of the 26 sabbatical
leave clauses negotiated for 1978-1979 provided staff members with
an unpaid sabbatical leave.

Based on these data, the author concluded that in terms of an
economic fringe benefit to staff members there was not a change,
as the number of paid sabbatical leave clauses did not increase

between 1975-1976 and 1978-1979.

It may be that the teacher associa-

tions were willing to accept an unpaid sabbatical leave in order to

have a sabbatical leave clause in the collective bargaining ‘agreement

with the thought of negotiating a paid sabbatical leave at a future
date.

The collective bargaining agreements that contained a clause
1975-1976 to 78%
providing for maternity leave increased from 54% in
this change was substantial.
in 1978-1979, and the author concluded that

maternity leave
However, in 1975-1976 ten out of the twenty-eight
staff members, and in
clauses provided a paid leave of absence to the
leaves of absence
1978-1979 fourteen out of thirty-nine maternity

provided a paid leave of absence.

As the percentage of paid maternity

1975-1976 and in 1978-1979. the author
leaves of absence was 36 in both
fringe benefit there was not a
concluded that in terms of an economic
change.

clauses declined from 25 in
The percentage of adoption leave
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1975-1976 to 15 in 1977-1978,

The percentage of collective bargaining

agreements containing such a clause Increased the following year to
26.

This writer concluded that there was little change In the per-

centage of adoption leave clauses during the three year period that
was studied.
The percentage of collective bargaining agreements providing for

bereavement leave and military leave Increased between 1975-1976 and
1978-1979.

The former Increased from 50% In 1975-1976 to 60% In 1978-

1979, and the latter Increased from 46% In 1975-1976 to 54% In 19781979.

The size of both changes was such that the author considered

them to be moderate.

Other direct economic benefits

.

It would appear that RSA 273-A had

(page 179)
only a moderate effect on the Items listed In Table 10

.

with

area of course reimthe most noticeable Increase taking place In the

place In the area of
bursement and the least noticeable Increase taking
'

athletic pay schedules.
the number of collective
As can be seen In Table 10 (page 179),

1975-1976 that contained a clause
bargaining agreements in effect In
out of the 52 agreements
providing for course reimbursement was 39
clauses that were negotiated
The number of course reimbursement
(75%).

agreeIncreased to 46 out of the 58
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was

agreements (86%) respectively.
ments (79%) and 43 out of the 50
In
bargaining agreements In effect
The number of collective
pay schedule
comprehensive extra-curricular
1975-1976 that contained a
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TABLE 10

NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
SPECIFYING CERTAIN OTHER DIRECT
ECONOMIC BENEFITS

After RSA 273-A

Before RSA 273-A

Other Direct
Economic Benefits

Course reimbursement
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
d. course reimbursemont: maximum
amount budgeted
or "Cap"

Comprehensive extracurricular pay
schedule

Athletic pay schedule

1975- 1976^
N = 52

1977- 1978^
N - 58

1978- 1979^

freq. pet

freq. pet

freq. pet

N - 50

43

86%

32

64%

4
7

8%
14%

9

79%
52%
12%
16%

23%

14

24%

20

40%

20

39%

24

41%

22

44%

1

2%

4

7%

2

4%

39
25

75%

9

48%
10%
17%

12

5

46
30
7

^reements
all of
^The intent of the author was to consider
RSA
the enactment of
that were in effect iiranediately before
consider only those agreements
^The intent of the author was to
Therefore, he reviewed only single
that were negotiated for 1977-1978.
multiple year agreement s
year agreements or the first year of

consider only those
3The intent of the author was to
he reviewed only
Therefore,
1978-1979.
that were negotiated for
agreements.
year
of multiple
year agreements or the first year

g
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was 20 (39%).

The number of comprehensive extra-curricular pay

schedules negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was 2A (AIX) and
22 (44%) respectively.

The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect in

1975-1976 that contained an athletic pay schedule was one (2%).

The

number of athletic pay schedules negotiated for 1977-1978 and 19781979 was four (7%) and two (4%) respectively.
Tlie

collective bargaining agreements containing a clause pro-

viding for course reimbursement increased from 75% in 1975-1976 to
86% in 1978-1979.
to be moderate.

This writer considered the percentage increase

The important point to note, however, is that the

change was consistent in that the percentage increased in both years,
the coland that as a result of the increase only a small fraction of

provide
lective bargaining agreements negotiated for 1978-1979 did not

course reimbursement as a fringe benefit.

The author would expect

this upward trend to continue.

wherein the school
There was a substantial change in the clause
sum of money toward a
board agrees to pay a flat amount or specific

Increased from 48 in 1975course as the percentage of such clauses
1976 to 64 in 1978-1979.

that
During the same period of time, clauses

or full payment of the cost of
provide for a percentage reimbursement
1975The former changed from 10% in
the course showed little change.
in 1975-1976
the latter changed from 17%
1976 to 8% in 1978-1979, and
change in the clause
There was also a substantial
to 14% in 1978-1979.

board and
or "cap” wherein the school
entitled maximum amount budgeted
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the teachers' association agreed to the total amount of money that

will be spent for course reimbursement.

The percentage of such

clauses increased from 23 in 1975-1976 to 40 in 1978-1979.

It

is

the author's opinion that the increases noted above may have occurred

because school boards wish to place some controls on the ever-increasing
costs of course reimbursement.

The maximum amount budgeted or "cap"

clause also provides the school board with a specific sum of money
that it may use for budgeting purposes.

It

is also the author s opinion

the need
that as the costs of college courses continue to rise, and as
to increase,
for more accountability in budgeting procedures continues

amount budthe percentage of the flat amount clauses and the maximum

geted or "cap" clause will continue to increase.

providing for
The percentage of collective bargaining agreements
from 39 in 1975comprehensive extra-curricular pay schedules changed
of collective bargaining
1976 to 44 in 1978-1979, and the percentage

schedules changed from two in
agreements providing for athletic pay

1975-1976 to four in 1978-1979.

The author concluded that neither

change was large.
n.
ons pertaining to instructio
Policy matters/working conditi

11
effect on the items in Table
273-A appears to have had a mixed
been
the overall effect to have
(page 182): the author considers

slight.

one showed
11, three declined,
Of the Items listed in Table

showed moderate
slight Increase, and two
no change, one sh<»ed a
that proincreases involved the clauses
increases. The two moderate
of teaching load.
and the determination
vided for preparation periods
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TABLE

11

NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SPECIFYING
CERTAIN POLICY MATTERS /WORKING CONDITIONS
PERTAINING TO INSTRUCTION

Before RSA

Policy Matters/
Working Conditions
Pertaining To

After RSA

2 7 3-

2 7 3-

1978- 1979^

N - 52

1977- 1978^
N - 58

freq. pet

freq. pet

freq. pet

1975-1976^

N - 50

Textbook selection

2

4%

2

3%

0

0%

6%

5

9%

8%

3

4

Class size

4

4%

8

14%

5

10%

Teaching load

10

19%

14

24%

14

28%

Preparation periods

Curriculum participation

40%

13

23%

12

24%

21

Need for specialized
teachers

0%

0

0%

0

0%

0

8

14%

8%

6

12%

4

Academic freedom

agreements that
was to consider all of the
^The intent of the author
273-A.
before the enactment of RSA
were in effect immediately

agrLmeLs

multiple year agreements.
or the first year of

^The intent of ^he author

rg«erert"rth"arsryr if

^“iLefoniritogle
luUlple ;ear agreements.

year

183

The moBt noticeable decrease Involved the clause that provided for

curriculum participation by staff members.
As can be seen in Table 11 (page 182), the number of collective

bargaining agreements in effect in 1975-1976 that provided for staff
participation in textbook, selection was two out of the 52 agreemente
(A%)

.

The number of textbook selection clauses that were negotiated

for 1977-1978 was two out of the 58 agreements (3%).

None of the

collective bargaining agreements that were negotiated for 1978-1979

contained a clause providing for the participation of staff members
in textbook selection.

The number of collective bargaining agreements that were in

effect in 1975-1976 that contained a clause providing for the deter-

mination of class size was three (6%).

The number of class size

and four
clauses negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was five (9Z)
(

87,) respectively.
in effect in
The number of collective bargaining agreements

the determination of
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing for

teaching load was four (4%)

.

The number of teaching load clauses

and 1978-1979 was eight (141) and
that were negotiated for 1977-1978
five (10%) respectively.

agreements in effect in
The number of collective bargaining

providing for the determlnatlo
1975-1976 that contained a clause

periods was ten (19%).
the number of preparation

The number of pre-

was
lor 1977-1978 and 1978-1979
paration period clauses negotiated
respectively.
fourteen (24%) and fourteen (28%)
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The number of collective bargaining agreements In effect in

1975-1976 that contained a clause providing for curriculum participation
was 21 (40%).

The number of curriculum participation clauses that

were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was thirteen (23%) and
twelve (24%) respectively.

None of the collective bargaining agreements in effect for 19751976 contained a clause providing for staff participation in the deter-

mination of the need for specialized teachers, nor did any of the collective bargaining agreements negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979

contain such a clause.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect in
was
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing for academic freedom

six (12%).

The number of academic freedom clauses that were negotiated

respectively.
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was eight (14%) and four (8%)

participation in
The percentage of clauses providing for staff
to 0 in 1978-1979.
textbook selection declined from 4 in 1975-1976

was a slight change.
The author concluded that a decline of 4X

The

collective bargaining
Important point to note is that none of the
1978-1979 contained a clause that
agreements that were negotiated for

members in textbook selection.
provided for the participation of staff
the maximum sites of the
The percentage of clauses specifying
in
staff members changed from six
classes that might be assigned to
this was
The author concluded that
1975-1976 to eight in 1978-1979.

a slight change.
of
providing for the determination
The percentage of clauses
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teaching load had increased from four In 1975-1976 to ten in 19781979.

This writer concluded that this was a moderate Increase.

However, the increase in the percentage of clauses Involving the

determination of teaching load may be larger than what it appears to
be in that teaching load applies in most Instances to only those

districts that maintain high schools.

As approximately 50Z of the

school districts in New Hampshire maintain a high school, the 6Z

change in teaching load between 1975-1976 and 1978-1979 is equivalent
to a 12% change in secondary schools.

The percentage of clauses providing for the determination of the

number of preparation periods increased from 19 in 1975-1976 to 28
in 1978-1979.

The author concluded that this was a moderate change.

clause
The collective bargaining agreements that contained a

declined from
providing for curriculum participation by staff members
40% in 1975-1976 to 24% in 1978-1979.

was a substantial decrease.
in Table 11.

The author concluded that this

This was also the most noticeable change

associations did not
It would appear that teacher

participation clause in the
consider the Inclusion of a curriculum
priority.
collective bargaining agreement to be a

It

may be that

this clause in the collective
school boards did not wish to include
willing to agree to something else
bargaining agreement, and were
In return for leaving the
which the teacher association wanted

out of the agreement.
curriculum participation clause
deproviding for academic freedom
The percentage of clauses
The author
to eight In 1978-1979.
clined from twelve In 1975-1976
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concluded that this was a slight change.
It would appear that the Items listed In Table 11 were not very

high on the priority list of the teacher associations.

It may be that

some of these Items were brought up In the collective bargaining

sessions, and rather than have them Included In the collective bargaining agreements, the school boards agreed to make arrangements outside
of the collective bargaining agreements which satisfied the concerns

and needs of the teacher associations.

increases
It is also the opinion of this writer that substantial
in the near
will not take place amongst the items listed in Table 11

future.

in the
Given the present economic conditions and the decrease

fringe benefits, and
number of staff positions in education, economics,

welfare of the association
clauses related more closely to the direct
continue to be the priority of the
or the individual staff member will
of clause found in Table 11.
teacher associations rather than the type

pertainin g to
Policy matters/working conditions

st^.

RSA 273-A

12
on the items listed in Table
appears to have had a definite effect
none
items showing an Increase and
(page 187) with all but two of the

of the items showing a decrease.

inThe most noticeable Increase

clause.
volved the reduction in force

The two clauses that did not

selection and promotions.
change at all were staff
in
bargaining agreements in effect
The number of collective
was
providing for staff evaluation
1975-1976 that contained a clause

agreements (39%).
20 out of the 52

evaluation
The number of staff

30 out
1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was
for
negotiated
were
clauses that
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TABLE 12

NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SPECIFYING
CERTAIN POLICY MATTERS /WORKING CONDITIONS
PERTAINING TO STAFF

Before RSA 273-A

Policy Matters/
Working Conditions
Pertaining To
Staff

1

After RSA 273-A

1977- 1978^
N - 58

1978- 1979^

pet

freq. pet

f

20

39%

30

52%

26

52%

Posting of vacancies

8

15%

11

19%

18

36%

Staff selection

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

Promotions

4

8%

4

7%

4

8%

14

27%

15

26%

17

34%

Staff termination

1

2%

4

7%

3

6%

Reduction in force
a. completely
seniority
b. partially
seniority
c. no seniority

5

10%

21

36%

19

38%

2

4%

9

16%

3

6%

1

4

7%

2

2%
4%

8

14%

6
10

12%
20%

Professional requirements for beginning
teachers

5

10%

11

19%

12

24%

Discipline for just
cause

9

17%

17

29%

16

32%

1975- 1976^
N - 52

f

Staff evaluation

Staff transfer

req

N - 50

rrq. pet
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TABLE 12

Continued

^The intent of the author was to consider all of the agreements
that were in effect imraediately before the enactment of RSA 273-A.
2

The intent of the author was to consider only those agreements
that were negotiated for 1977-1978.
Therefore, he reviewed only single
year agreement or the first year of multiple year agreements.
3

The intent of the author was to consider only those agreements
that were negotiated for 1978-1979. Therefore, he reviewed only single
year agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.
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of the 58 agreements (52%) and 26 out of the 50 agreements (52%)

respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect in

1975-1976 containing a clause that provided for the posting of staff

vacancies that occur within the school district was eight (15%).

The

number of posting of vacancy clauses that were negotiated for 19771978 and 1978-1979 was eleven (19%) and 18 (36%) respectively.
None of the collective bargaining agreements that were re-

viewed contained a staff selection clause wherein procedures were

established that provided for the involvement of staff members in
the hiring of new staff members.

effect in
The number of collective bargaining agreements in

procedures
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing that specific
the school district was
be followed relative to promotions within

four (8%).

negotiated for
The number of promotion clauses that were

four (8%) respectively.
1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was four (7%) and

agreements in effect in
The number of collective bargaining
that specific procedures
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing

transfers within the school district
be followed relative to staff
that were
of staff transfer clauses
was fourteen (27%). The number
re1978-1979 was 15 (26%) and 17 (34%)
negotiated for 1977-1978 and

spectively
in
bargaining agreements in effect
The number of collective
specific
contained a clause providing
1975-1976 and 1978-1979 that
the school
termination of staff within
procedures relative to the
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district was one (2%).

The number of staff termination clauses that

were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was four (7Z) and three
(6%) respectively.

The number of collective bargaining agreements In effect for

1975-1976 that contained a reduction In force clause providing that
specific procedures be followed In the event of a layoff of staff

members due to the lack of work was five (10%).

The number of reduc-

tion In force clauses that were negotiated In 1977-1978 and 1978-1979

was 21 (36%) and 19 (38%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements In effect In

1975-1976 that contained a clause requiring that beginning teachers
meet certain professional requirements was five (10%).

The number

1978-1979 which
of clauses that were negotiated In 1977-1978 and

professional requirements
required that beginning teachers meet certain
was eleven (19%) and twelve (24%) respectively.

agreements that were In
The number of collective bargaining
stating that staff members
effect in 1975-1976 that contained a clause

was nine (17X).
may only be disciplined for just cause

The number

1977-1978
clauses that were negotiated In
of discipline for Just cause
16 (32%) respectively.
and 1978-1979 was 17 (29%) and

agreements that contained a clause
The collective bargaining
be followed relative to staff
specifying that certain procedures
The
1975-1976 to 52% In 1977-1978.
evaluation changed from 39% In
This
year.
not change the following
percentage of such clauses did
In an era when
was a moderate change.
writer concluded that this
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more emphasis is being placed on accountability, and reduction in
force is becoming more imminent in a number of school districts, the

lack of growth between 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was surprising.

It

may be that some school boards and teacher associations reached an

informal agreement on an evaluation procedure, and did not include
the evaluation procedure in the collective bargaining agreement.

The provisions of the staff evaluation clauses that were found
in the various collective bargaining agreements were quite similar.

They specify that the teacher is to be aware of all of the observations, and that the staff evaluation program is to be conducted in an

open atmosphere.

Some of the clauses specify the number of times

that a teacher is to be observed each year.

The observations are to

within
be reduced to writing, and the teacher is to be given a copy
a specified number of days after the observation.

A conference is

person who has performed the
to be held between the teacher and the
the receipt of
observation within a specified number of days after

the report.

observation is to help
The person who has performed the

may have been observed, and
the teacher correct any deficiencies that
conferences.
the teacher may request additional

The teacher is ashed

attach a response if he or she does
to sign the evaluation, and may
not agree with the evaluation.

the
No document may be placed in

teacher.
the prior knowledge of the
teacher's personnel folder without
may review
procedures whereby the teachers
The clauses also provide

their personnel folder.

vacancies
providing for the posting of
The percentage of clauses
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changed from 15 in 1975-1976 to 36 in 1978-1979.
that this was a substantial increase.

The author concluded

In the opinion of the author

this clause will continue to increase both in percentage and number.

Teacher associations feel very strongly that staff members should be
given the opportunity to apply for both professional positions as veil
from outas extracurricular assignments before candidates are hired

side the school district.

They further believe that all staff members

positions.
should be given equal opportunity to apply for these
that contained
The percentage of collective bargaining agreements

be followed relative to
a clause providing that specific procedures
increased from 27 in 1975staff transfers within the school district
1976 to 34 in 1978-1979.

moderate
The author concluded that this was a

change.

clauses that were found In
The provisions of the staff transfer

agreements were quite similar.
the various collective bargaining

They

teacher
for a voluntary transfer the
state that In order to be eligible
date
the administration by a specific
must submit a written request to

be transferred.
stating that he or she wishes to

They also state that

Involuntary transevery effort to avoid
the administration will make
Involuntary transfer
and In the case of an
fers after a specific date,
appeal the transfer.
the superintendent to
the teacher may meet with
an appeal of an Insuperintendent In the case of
The decision of the
final.
voluntary transfer shall be
of clauses dealing
change In the frequency
no
or
little
was
There
It may be that
termination of staff members.
and
promotion
with the
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the changes Involving the staff selection, promotion, staff transfer,

and staff termination clauses ranged from no change at all to a moder-

ate change because the teacher associations are of the opinion that
they will meet more resistance from school boards in the negotiation
of these matters.

With this thought in mind, teacher associations

may prefer, at least for the present, to place their emphasis in
areas such as economics, fringe benefits, and organizational benefits

where they believe that they will be able to make greater gains.
The collective bargaining agreements that contained a clause

specifying that certain procedures be followed in the event of a
1978reduction of force increased from 10% in 1975-1976 to 38% in
1979.

The author concluded that this was a substantial change.

In

took place in the
the opinion of the author, a substantial increase
is a very real
percentage of reduction in force clauses because this

issue in education today.

As a result of declining enrollments and

expenditure of educational
the demand for more accountability in the
Increasingly concerned
budgets, senior staff members are becoming

about retaining their positions.

In all probability, they are

associations to negotiate reduction
placing pressure upon the teacher
school districts where
It may also be that in those
in force clauses.

with a reduction in force that
the school board may be confronted
clause in the
include a reduction in force
the school board wishes to

order to avoid any misunderstanding
collective bargaining agreement in
This writer
force should take place.
when and if the reduction in
clauses to become
of reduction in force
would expect the negotiation
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the future.
an even higher priority of teacher associations in
in the
The reduction in force clauses that the author found

question of the laycollective bargaining agreements approached the
ways.
off of staff members in several different

The number of

1975-1976 stating that the
reduction in force clauses in effect in

be made solely on the
determination as to who will be laid off will
basis of seniority was two (4%).

Tl>e

number of such clauses that

1978-1979 was nine
were negotiated for 1977-1978 and
(6%) respectively.

(16J;)

and three

In 1975-1976
The number of clauses In effect

will be
to who will be laid off
stating that the determination as
one (2X).
on the basis of seniority was
s^de at least to some extent
1977-1978 and
that were negotiated for
The number of such clauses
Some of these
(12%) respectively.
1978-1979 was four (7%) and six
not necwill be considered, but will
clauses state that seniority
factor.
essarily be the determining

Others state that

but do not state
before tenured teachers,
off
laid
be
must
teachers
seniority. The
laid off according to
be
will
teachers
that tenured
mention seniority
1975-1976 that do not
In
effect
In
number of clauses
were neg
of such clauses that
was two (4%). The number
ten (20%) respectively,
was eight (14%) and
1,77-1978 and 1978-1979
are laid off will
those teachers who
that
state
some of these clauses
district
positions In the school
other
for
be considered
important
is the most
Quality
1-bAt qual
y education
that
state
Others
certified.
school board wi
of a layoff, the
event
the
in
consideration, and,
rl

teachers.
retain the best
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The Increase in the reduction in force clauses from lOZ in

1975-1976 to 38% in 1978-1979 was not one that was entirely favorable
to the teacher associations as those clauses mentioning some form of

seniority only increased from 6% in 1975-1976 to 18% in 1978-1979

while the percentage of clauses that did not mention seniority at all
Increased from 4% in 1975-1976 to 20% in 1978-1979.
The collective bargaining agreements that contained a clause

specifying certain professional requirements for beginning teachers
Increased from 10% in 1975-1976 to 24% in 1978-1979.

concluded that this was a moderate increase.

The author

These clauses state

that a school board may only hire certified teachers.

New Hampshire

school board from
State Department of Education regulations prohibit a

more than 20
employing an uncertified teacher in a classroom for
the teacher associaconsecutive days, therefore, one might wonder why

tions would want such a clause.

It may be that teacher associations

that school boards will
want this clause simply as an added assurance

only hire certified personnel.

If school boards were to hire un-

where the collective bargaining
certified personnel in those districts
would both violate the regulation,
agreement contains such a clause, they
barEducation, and breach the collective
of the State Department of
gaining agreement.
contained
bargaining agreements that
The percentage of collective
1975 1975 to
clause Increased from 17 In
a discipline for just cause
to be a substantial ch g
The author considered this
32 In 1978-1979.
disciplined for
staff member may only be
a
that
state
clauses
These
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just cause, and just cause is not further defined.

Certain other policy matters /working conditions

.

RSA 273-A appears

to have had a definite effect on the items listed in Table 13

(page 197) with all but one of the clauses showing an Increase.

The

most noticeable increase involved the clause pertaining to staff
development.

The item that decreased Involved the clause wherein

funds were budgeted for staff development.

The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect in

1975-1976 that contained a clause providing for staff development
(Recertification) was three out of the 52 agreements (6%)

.

The

for 1977number of staff development clauses that were negotiated

agreements (22Z) and
1978 and 1978-1979 was thirteen out of the 58
17 out of the 50 agreements

(34%) respectively.

agreements in effect in
The number of collective bargaining
funds for staff develop1975-1976 that contained a clause providing

ment was two (4%).

for 1977The number of such clauses negotiated

one (2%).
1978 and 1978-1979 was 0 (0%) and

agreements in effect in
The number of collective bargaining
in
providing for staff participation
1975-1976 that contained a clause

calendar was 18 (35%).
th. development o£ the school

The number of

1978-1979 was
negotiated for 1977-1978 and
clauses
calendar
school
23 (46%) respectively.
to change to 22 (38%) and

effect In
bargaining agreements In
The number of collective
of the school
clause specifying the length
1975-1976 that contained a
year clauses that
number of length of school
The
(40%).
21
was
year

197

TABLE 13

NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
SPECIFYING CERTAIN OTHER POLICY
MATTERS /WORKING CONDITIONS

Before RSA

After RSA

2 7 3-

2 7 3-

CM

1975-19761

Certain Other
Policy Matters/

N -

N - 52

freq. pet.

Staff development
(Recertification)

Funds budgeted for
staff development
School calendar

Length of school

year

Length of school day

Restrictions on
faculty meetings

1977-

00

os

00

freq. pet

19 78- 1979^
N - 50

freq. pet

3

6%

13

22%

17

34%

2

4%

0

0%

1

2%

18

35%

22

38%

23

46%

21

40%

33

57%

26

52%

12

23%

16

28%

15

30%

2

4%

6

10%

5

10%

^teements
of
intent of the author was to consider all
the enactment of RSA Z73-A.
that were in effect immediately before

Hhe

consider only those
^The Intent of the author was to
,
he reviewed only slngl
Therefore,
that were negotiated for 1977-1978.
multiple year agreements.
year agreements or the first year of

consider only those agreements
^The intent of the author was to
Therefore, he reviewed only sing
that were negotiated for 1978-1979.
of multiple year agreements.
year agreements or the first year
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were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was 33 (57X) and 26 (52X)
respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect in 1975-

1976 that contained a clause specifying the length of the school day

was twelve (23%).

The number of length of school day clauses that

were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 Increased to 16 (28%) and
15 (30%)

respectively.

1975'
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect in

on faculty
1976 that contained a clause providing for restrictions

meetings was two (4%).

The number of restrictions on faculty meeting

1978-1979 was six
clauses that were negotiated for 1977-1978 and
(10%) and five (10%) respectively.

agreements that contained
The percentage of collective bargaining
•a

(Recertification) Increased
clause relative to staff development

1978-1979.
from six In 1975-1976 to 34 In
to be a substantial change.

The author considered this

of
The New Hampshire State Department

for professional staff members
Education's recertification program
workshops
allows staff members to Include
in local school districts

college
training activltes as well as
and other types of In-service
recertification
programs. The former
courses In their recertification
and
courses toward recertification,
program only recognized college
schedules in colas well as the salary
the reimbursement provisions
course credits
only recognized college
agreements
bargaining
lective
opinion that
m^bers. It Is this writer's
staff
by
acquired
that were
Included In the
that are now being
clauses
development
the staff
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collective bargaining agreements are the result of the teacher associations' desire to obtain reimbursement for funds expended on staff

development activities and salary recognition for staff development

activities other than college courses.

It is also the author's opinion

that the percentage of these clauses will continue to increase in the
future.

The percentage of collective bargaining agreements that contain

development declined
a clause providing funds specifically for staff

from 4 in 1975-1976 to
was a slight change.

2 in

1978-1979.

This writer concluded that this

not
It may be that teacher associations are

have from the very
emphasizing this clause because school districts

budgeted specific sums of
inception of the staff development program
programs.
money to develop in-service training
that contained a clause
The collective bargaining agreements

the development of the school
providing for staff participation In

bargaining agreements that concalendar as well as those collective
the
length of the school year and
tained a clause specifying Che
In
moderate Increases. The Items
length of the school day showed

length of the
the school calendar, the
volving the determination of
interrelated In
of the school day are
length
the
and
year,
school
member's workday.
own way with the staff
that each deals In Its
taken place In these Items
the changes that have
It would appear from
the present status
great deal of concern about
that there Is not a
associations. It may also
of the teacher
part
the
on
clauses
el these
negotiation of which would
the clause, the
items
three
the
of
be that
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meet with the most resistance on the part of school boards would
be the one specifying the length of the school day.

It Is the

author's opinion that school boards would consider this to be a

management prerogative, and would be very reluctant to Include the
clause In the collective bargaining agreement.

The school calendar

clauses have, to this point, only allowed the staff to participate
In an advisory capacity.

It is quite probable that anything beyond

the school
an advisory capacity would meet with strong resistance by

board.

year clauses
In this writer's opinion, the length of school

school districts
have only stated what has been the practice in many

have not generated a great
for a number of years, and most likely

deal of discussion.

percentage of
In Che opinion of the author the

these kinds of clauses will
collective bargaining agreements having

Increases will Involve
continue to Increase but the more noticeable
school year clauses.
the school calendar and length of

bargaining agreements that contained
The percentage of collective
Increased from
restrictions on faculty meetings
a clause specifying
that this
1978-1979. The author concluded
four In 1975-1976 to ten In

was a moderate Increase.

there has not been a
It would appear that

having unwithout adequate notice or
great deal of calling meetings
In
of school administrators
lengthy meetings on the part

necessarily
this area.

growth In the
opinion that any future
It Is the author’s

meetings will
restrictions on faculty
percentage of clauses specifying
meetings In this
Is misuse of faculty
there
not
or
whether
depend on

area by school administrators.
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Sunmary of Findings

The findings In this chapter indicate that;

there has been a definite

increase in collective bargaining since the enactment of RSA 273-A; there

have been very definite gains by the teacher associations relative to the

collective bargaining agreement clauses that were reviewed in this study;
and it would appear that RSA 273~A has had an impact on the increase in
the teacher
the collective bargaining activity as well as on the gains made by

associations.

Question one

.

evidenced
The growth in collective bargaining activity was

agreements in effect
by the increase in the number of collective bargaining

after the enactment of RSA 273-A.

An analysis of this Increase revealed

the present law is limited in
that the potential for further growth under

the school boards in the large and
that, with but a few exceptions, all of

Hampshire have entered into collective
medium sized school districts in New

bargaining agreements
author to conclude that It Is
The provisions of RSA 273-A led the
be organthe small school districts will
highly unlikely that very many of

bargaining.
ised for the purpose of collective

RSA 273-A provides that

less than ten
teacher association represents
school districts wherein the
have to enter Into
coMsunlty of Interest do not
staff members with the same

the teacher association.
collective negotiations with
Indicates that
gathered for this study
A review of the materials
took place during
activity in New Hampshire
bargaining
collective
intensive
period
(1968-1973) and the three-year
1970's
early
and
the late 1960's
Except for
enactment of RSA 273-A.
the
following
(1975-1978) immediately
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these two periods, the growth of collective bargaining can be characterized
as gradual.

Question two

It would appear that RSA 273-A had a very definite impact

.

on the status of recognition clauses as found In the collective bargaining

agreements.

After the enactment of RSA 273-A, there was an Increase In the

percentage of collective bargaining agreements that contained a recognition
clause.

The important point to note, however, is that virtually all of the

collective bargaining agreements that were negotiated for 1978-1979 contain
ed such a clause.

It would appear that the influence of RSA 273-A also

that there was
extended to the specificity of the recognition clauses, in

that included specific
an increase in the percentage of recognition clauses

percentage of recognition
personnel positions as well as an increase in the

clauses that excluded specific personnel positions.

question three

.

bargaining poslRSA 273-A had very little impact on the

districts wherein the collective
tlons of the school boards la those school
the annual school district meeting.
bargaining agreement was settled after
of the
was studied only a small percentage
In the base year (1977-1978) that

were In effect for that year were
collective bargaining agreements that
district meeting. Of the agreem
settled after the annual school
author found
school district meeting, the
annual
the
after
settled
were
between the
were substantial differences
only one Instance wherein there
school board
bargaining agreement that the
provisions of the collective
of that same
collective bargaining positions
finally agreed to and the

meeting.
annual school district
school board prior to the

Question four .

in
some very definite changes
The author noted that
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the scope of collective bargaining have taken place since the enactment
of RSA 273-A.

It would appear that the enactment of RSA 273-A haa

had a very definite impact on the scope of collective bargaining in New

Hampshire.

RSA 273-A appears to have had an increasing effect on some items
and a decreasing effect on other items listed under Certain Negotiations

Procedures and Basic Parameters in that after the enactment of the
and two
statute three of the clauses in this section showed an increase
of the clauses showed a decrease.

This writer attributed the decrease

to the fact that the
of the definition of scope and no strike clauses

provisions of RSA
provisions of these clauses are now covered by the
no longer may see a
273-A, and as a result some of the negotiators

collective bargaining agreements.
need to include these clauses in the

year contracts Is attributed by
The substantial Increase In multiple
negotiating parties to reduce the amount
the author to the desire of the
conrequired by the process when It Is
of time as well as the expense

ducted on an annual basis,
Items
very definite effect on the
RSA 273-A appears to have had a

There
Benefits Pertaining to Grievances.
listed under Organizational
agreements conIn the collective bargaining
Increase
substantial
a
was
Increase all of
and as a result of this
procedure,
grievance
a
taining
for 1978-1979
agreements that were negotiated
the collective bargaining
was the
Another very Important change
contained a grievance procedure.
for some form
grievance procedures providing
substantial Increase In the
of arbitration.

the grievance
Increase the majority of
AS a result of this
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procedures that were negotiated for 1978-1979 provided for some form
of arbitration.

Additionally, the author noted substantial changes

In the clauses providing for class action grievances as well as those

providing teacher associations with representational rights In the
grievance process.
It would appear that RSA 273-A had a definite Impact on the

clauses providing for dues deductions, use of facilities, and time
clauses
off for association activities as the percentage of these

Increase^ substantially after the enactment of the statute.
effect on the type
It would appear that RSA 273-A had a definite
as there was an Increase
of compensation programs that were negotiated

by preparation and years
In the clauses providing for compensation
of experience.

Tlie

Increase
Important point to note concerning this

were negotiated for 1978-1979 conIs that all of the contracts that
of salary program.
talned a clause providing for this type

None of

for 1978-1979 provided for a
the agreements that were negotiated

salary schedule by merit.

clauses
There was also a decline In the

by merit.
providing for additional compensation

Lastly, there was

experience
clauses specifying credit for
a moderate increase in the

outside the school district.
impact on
273-A had a very definite
It would appear that RSA

insurance fringe benefits to
those clauses that provide
providing medical
Increases In the clauses
as there were noticeable
Increases In those
benefits and moderate
insurance and life Insurance
Insurance benefits.
Insurance and disability
dental
providing
clauses
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It is very important to note that the increase in the medical insurance

clause was such that all of the collective bargaining agreements that

were negotiated for 1978-1979 contained such a clause.

It

is also

Important to note the very substantial gains in the amount of money
that school boards pay toward the cost of medical insurance and the

amount of life Insurance coverage that school boards provide for staff

members
on those
It would appear that RSA 273-A had a very definite effect

those
clauses that provide leave of absence fringe benefits because

sabbatical leave
clauses providing for: personal leave, sick leave,
and those clauses
and maternity leave showed substantial increases

moderate increases.
providing for bereavement and military leave showed
in the clauses providing personal
It should be noted that the Increase

collective bargaining agreeleave benefits was such that all of the

contained such a clause.
mcnts that were negotiated for 1978-1979

It

Increase In the clauses providing
Is also Important to note that the
all of the collective bargaining
sick leave benefits was such that
1978-1979 contained such a clause,
agreements that were negotiated for
to
providing for sick leave cumulative
and the Increase in the clauses
the collec
such that virtually all of
more than 60 days per annum was

1978-1979 contained
that were negotiated for
tlve bargaining agreements
clauses proChat the Increase In the
noted
author
The
clause.
such a
Include an
leave benefits did not
maternity
and
sabbatical
viding for
As a result,
and maternity leave clauses.
increase In paid sabbatical
additional fringe
the increase did provide
the author concluded that
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benefits but did not provide additional economic fringe benefits.
It would appear that the effect of RSA 273-A on the items listed

under Certain Other Direct Economic Benefits was not noticeable as
the increase in the clauses providing for course reimbursement as well
as those providing for comprehensive extracurricular pay schedules

was moderate.

The increase in the clauses providing for athletic pay

schedules was slight.

An important point to note is that as a result

reimbursement,
of the increase of the clauses providing for course

negotiated for
only a small percentage of the agreements that were

1978-1979 did not contain such a clause.
have a definite effect
It would appear that RSA 273-A did not

Matters /Working Conditions
on the items listed under Certain Policy
the various clauses were
Pertaining to Instruction as the changes in

quite mixed and none of them were large.

The most noticeable change

for the Involvement of staff
was the decrease In the clauses providing

members In curriculum development.

The decline In the clauses pro-

none
textbook selection was such that
viding for staff Involvement In
1978agreements that were negotiated lor
bargaining
collective
the
of
load
The clauses specifying teaching
1979 contained such a clause.
clauses
moderate Increases while the
and preparation periods showed

slight increase.
specifying class size showed a
effect on the
RSA 273-A had a definite
It would appear that

Conditions Pertaining
Policy Matters/Uorklng
Certain
under
listed
Items
vacancies, reproviding for: posting of
to Staff as those clauses
teachers.
requirements for beginning
duction in force, professional
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and discipline for just cause showed substantial increases.

Those

clauses providing for staff evaluation as well as those clauses pro-

viding for staff transfers showed moderate increases while the clauses
specifying procedures for staff termination showed a slight increase.
for
It is important to note the increase in the clauses providing

in
reduction in force, because in the opinion of the author reduction
in colforce is considered to be one of the more important issues

lective bargaining.

definite effect on the
It would appear that RSA 273-A had a

Matters/Working Conditions
Items listed under Certain Other Policy
development (Recertification)
because the clauses providing for staff
clauses providing for staff
showed a substantial Increase while the

school calendar, the length
Involvement in the determination of the
of the school day showed moderate
of the school year, and the length

increases.

restrictions on faculty meetings
The clauses providing for

showed a moderate Increase.

decrease was
The only item that showed a

constaff development and the author
Che clause providing funds for

sidered this decrease to be slight.

CHAPTER

V

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Introduction

bargaining process Is the
The ultimate goal of the collective
the rules and regulations
negotiation of a written agreement containing
for a stated period of time.
that will gover^i the workplace

While the

an Important part of the
collective bargaining process has been

private sector for many years.
employer-employee relationship In the
Important force
1960’s that It has become an
It has only been since the
in public education.

so many years
There were many reasons why for

Among
force In public education.
collective bargaining was not a
public employment,
that were peculiar to
these reasons were the benefits
utilise the collective
as professionals to
the reluctance of teachers
public employer,
concept embraced by the
bargaining process, and the
not have to negotiate
was sovereign and did
that the public employer
of post World War
The devastating effect
employee.
public
with the
with the m
power of teachers coupled
purchasing
the
Inflation on
were winning
In the private sector
employees
that
gains
favorable wage
other factors
bargaining as well as
collective
of
with the assistance
amongst teachers,
greater sense of militancy
a
develop
to
helped
fact, the
gulte rapid, and. In
was
teachers
of
begun, the organisation
sector unions were
were made by public
that
gains
largest membership

U

level.
made on the local
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Along with their desire to improve their economic position,
teachers also wanted to have a greater share in those decisions

pertaining to their working conditions as well as those decisions

pertaining to educational policies.

The collective bargaining process

has in fact given teachers a greater share in the decision making
process as it relates to their working conditions; however, their

involvement in decision making as it relates to educational policy
has not been substantial.

Thomas Love contended that greater emphasis

would be placed on the negotiation of educational policy as colyears
lective bargaining became more sophisticated; however, several
the major
later Perry and Wildman contended that economics was still

concern of the teachers.
on the negotiation
In spite of the emphasis that has been placed
of economic benefits,

there is question as to whether or not col-

on the economic status
lective bargaining has had a long term effect

of teachers.^

the initial
Moreover, Ronald Fitzgerald contended that

teachers were paid out of budget
economic gains that were made by the
gains that were made by teachers
surpluses, and the subsequent economic

Ions
^Murphy and Hoover. "Negotlat
=^r?ZnMoranrCot
Bureaucracy
,
Reinforced
Professlonallzation or
Cresswell and
sad
Barealnln v: Readings In Policy
Murphy, p. A76; Zack, "Impasses,
"The Anatomy
Workers and Public
ntl\.mms: Neeotlatlons
i
of Militant Professionalization,
243* Doherty, "Teacher BarIn Educat^n. eds.
In The CollecOve
^“s^^t^/j^erlence,"
aectoi.
f
Private
gaining: The Relevance of

—

—
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were paid for by cutbacks in the educational program.

While Thomas Love concluded that the negotiation of educational
policy was not significant, he also concluded that the negotiation

process was used by the parties to establish procedures outside of the

collective bargaining process whereby the teachers could be more in-

volved in the development of the educational program.
reached the same conclusion.

Ronald Fitzgerald

Fitzgerald held that curriculum develop-

table because
ment is not usually discussed at the collective bargaining

school districts that
of its complexity, and in a large number of the
in curriculum develophe reviewed mechanisms for involving the teachers

ment had been established.

4

Design of the Study
directed at the collection
The overall design of the study was
bargaining
selected changes In collective
of useful Information about

New Hampshire RSA 273-A Public
before and after the enactment of
objective of the study was to
Employee Labor Relations. The main
following
helpful to the members of the
provide information that might be
groups
Goodwin, p. 195;
Education, eds. Carlton and
in
s
Negotiation
Dilemma;
Public Education!
Impact_q f Negotiations in
and Perry and Wildman, The
162-63 and 152.
Rvidence From the Schools* PP
In
Negotiating Te;™s Interested
^Fitzgerald, "Guidelines for
Educational Programs, PP.
Facilitating Improvement In
•

rri

i4r^fnri^?rair^irzgrra^^^^^^^

in
,
Decision Making, PP- 71,
Facllltat g Improvements
^Interested in Facilitating
Teams
Negotiating
for
79Educational Programs," p.
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1.

Local chapters of the New Hampshire Education Association and
the New Hampshire Federation of Teachers

2.

Local school boards

3.

New Hampshire Education Association

4.

New Hampshire Federation of Teachers

5.

New Hampshire School Administrators Association

6.

New Hampshire School Boards Association

members
The selected questions found on pages 96-99 were mailed to
Involved in
of the aforementioned groups as well as several people
of these
education In New Hampshire who were not affiliated with any

groups.

considered to
The respondents were asked to select what they

five least Important
be the five most Important questions and the

questions.

the purposes
The author then selected four questions for

of the study.

In the order
Three of the four questions were selected

respondents as found in Table 1 (page 101)
of importance assigned by the
of collective bargaining agreements
The question dealing with the number

selected
enactment of RSA 273-A was not
In effect before and after the
by the
Important questions. It was selected
as one of the five most

because of the importance attached
author to be Included in the study
field repre
Hampshire Education Association
to this matter by the New
by the author.
sentatlves who were Interviewed

were found In the collective
-In
studv wer
In the study
The data that were used
year and those
for the 1975-1976 school
bargaining agre^nents In effect
school years
1977-1978 and the 1978-1979
the
for
negotiated
that were
year agreements,
the first year of multiple
or
agreements
year
as single
negotiated for the
agreements that were
The collective bargaining
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1976-1977 school year were not reviewed as the author considered this
to be a transitional year.

Though RSA 273-A had been enacted Into

law before the 1976-1977 collective bargaining agreements were negotiated.
Its provisions were such that they did not require the negotiators to

follow the procedures found In the statute until the following year.

Because the negotiators were aware of the provisions of RSA 273-A, but

were not bound by them, the author took the position that the collective
bargaining agreements that were negotiated for 1976—1977 were atypical,
and therefore, did not include them in the study.

The author also re-

viewed the records of the New Hampshire State Department of Education
compiling
and the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board in
the data that were used in the study.

people and
The author mailed the selected questions to twenty

received fourteen responses (70%).

One response was received from at

groups mentioned on page 211,
least one representative of each one of the

bargaining agreements by personally
The author acquired the collective
district superintendents,
contacting the various Now Hampshire school

bargaining agreements that were in
and received all of the collective
collective bargaining agreements that
effect for 1975-1976, all of the
that
all but three of the agreements
were in effect for 1977-1978, and

were in effect for 1978-1979.

to be
The design of the study was able

followed without difficulty.

Results of the Study
that.
of this study demonstrate
In general the findings
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there has been a definite increase in the number of collective
bargaining agreements in effect and the number of staff
members who are covered by these agreements;

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

there has been a definite increase in the collective bargaining
agreement clauses that provide fringe benefits;
there has been a definite Increase in the collective bargaining
agreement clauses involving various working conditions of the
staff members;

there *has been a definite increase in the clauses providing
for a grievance procedure and more importantly some form of
arbitration;
clauses
there has not been n substantial Increase In the
policy.
involving educational

definite effect on the aelected
It would appear that RSA 273-A haa had a
public school districts
changes in collective bargaining in New Hampshire
was based along with a summary
The four questions upon which this study

question are contained in the following
of the findings relative to each
pages.

been tbe change in the number
The first question is, "What has
the
agreements in effect before and after
of collective bargaining
tabulated
this question the author
enactment of RSA 273-A?" In answering
in effect for
bargaining agreements that were
the number of collective
number of
were studied as well as the
each of the three years that
agreements
by the collective bargaining
covered
were
who
members
staff
tabulations can
The results of these
years.
three
the
of
in each one
bargaining
The number of collective
117).
be found in Table 2 (page
RSA 273-A in
before the enactment of
agreements in effect iMtedlately
the 1975-1976 school
be those in effect for
would
which
1975.
August
1977-1978 school
increased to 78 for the
number
This
52.
year, was

2IA

year, and further Increased to 86 for the 1978-1979 school year.

The

number of staff members who were covered by collective bargaining

agreements in 1975-1976 was 6,158.

This number Increased to 8,023 for

the 1977-1978 school year and further Increased to 8,356 for the 1978-

1979 school year.

In general it can be said that there are more col-

lective bargaining agreements being negotiated since the enactment of

RSA

2 7 3- A,

and they are becoming more complex as they contain more

clauses
composiThe next question is, ’*What have been the changes in the

recognition clauses of
tion of the bargaining units as contained in the
and after the enactcollective bargaining agreements negotiated before

ment of RSA 273-A?"

question
The data that were used to answer this

agreements that were forwarded
were taken from the collective bargaining
school superintendents.
to the author by the New Hampshire

analysis Is depicted in Table

3

(page 125).

The data

The author reviewed the

bargaining agreements that
recognition clauses of all of the collective
school year, and the recognition
were in effect for the 1975-1976
agreements that were negotiated
clauses of those collective bargaining
year agree1978-1979 school years as single
for the 1977-1978 and the

multiple year agreements.
ments or the first year of
more specificity
by the author was toward
In general the trend found
a recognibargaining agreements containing
collective
of
The percentage
of the collective
point where virtually all
tion clause increased to the
1978-1979 contained such
were negotiated for
bargaining agreements that
a clause.

recognition
agreements containing a
The collective bargaining
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clause including or excluding specific personnel positions increased
and the majority of the collective bargaining agreements that were

negotiated for 1978-1979 contained such a clause.

The author did not

find substantial increases in the clauses including or excluding such

positions as department chairman, nurses, etc., nor did he find a

substantial change in the types of positions found in the inclusion or

exclusion section of the recognition clauses.
The next question is,

’’In

school districts where collective

school
bargaining agreements were not finalized prior to the annual

negotiating position
district meeting, what were the changes between the
school district meetings
held by the school boards prior to the annual

collective bargaining
and the position that they agreed to in the

agreement finalized subsequent to the meeting?”

The data that were

from the collective bargainutilized to an«er this question were taken
for the 1977-1978 year, the coning agreements that were negotiated

New Hampshire school superintendent,
versations that the author held with
particular agreements, and the
relative to the negotiation of these
In
Employee Labor Relations board.
records of the New Hampshire Public
not win any
the teacher associations did
general the author found that

collective
school boards in those
additional concessions from the
school district
settled after the annual
were
that
agreements
bargaining

meetings
the scope of
has been the change in
The last question is. "What
of RSA 273 A?
and after the enactment
collective bargaining before
includes
collective bargaining
study, the scope of
this
of
purposes
rhe
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those items listed on pages 100-103.

The data that were utilized to

answer this question were taken from the collective bargaining agree-

ments that were forwarded to the author by the New Hampshire school
The author reviewed all of the collective bargaining

superintendents.

agreements that were negotiated for the 1975-1976 school year, and
the collective* bargaining agreements that were negotiated for the 1977

1978 and the 1978-1979 school years as single year agreements or the
first year of multiple year agreements.

Negotiations procedures and basic parameters

.

RSA 273-A appears to have

parameters
had a mixed effect on the negotiations procedures and basic

listed in Table

4

(page 138) in that three of these items Increased,

two decreased and one showed little change.

The most noticeable increase

on a multiple
involved the number of agreements that were negotiated

involved the definition of
year basis, and the two items that declined

scope clauses and no strike clauses.

In general it can be said that the

resulted in more concern for
Increased collective bargaining activity

negotiations process.
procedures providing for an orderly
grievance_s.
nrpanizational benefits per taining to

RSA 273-A appears to

items listed in Table
have had a definite effect on the

5

(page 143)

increase
showing a moderate to substantial
with all but two of the items
clauses granting
that took place Involved
The most substantial Increase

associations
grievance process to teacher
representational rights In the
at all were
slight Increase or no Increase
The two Items that showed a
process by
determination In the grievance
those providing for the final
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In general it can be said that

an arbitrator or by the superintendent.

all agreements as of 1978-1979 contained a grievance procedure, and
that the majority of these grievance procedures provided for some form
of arbitration.

The grievance procedures that are being negotiated

also tend to provide more clauses such as;

representational rights in

«r

grievances, grievances limited to agreement, class action grievances,
and organizational grievances.

Other organizational benefits

.

RSA 273-A appears to have had a definite

effect on the items listed in Table

6

(page 152) with three of the five

increase.
clauses found in this table showing a noticeable

In general

teacher associations appeared
it can be said that the emphasis of the
help it to survive as an
to be on those clauses that would either
members.
organization or help it to better serve its
I

ntrect economlr. benefits pertaining

to

compensation.

RSA 273-A appears

155)
the Items listed In Table 7 (page
to have had a mixed effect on

dedid not change much, and three
since two Increased moderately, two
emphasis was placed on salary
In general It can be said that
clined.
all of the
and years of experience as
schedules based on preparation
contained such a salary schedule.
agreements negotiated for 1978-1979

providing salary
Increase In the clauses
There was also a moderate
None
outside of the school district.
experience
for
credit
schedule
for 1978-1979 containbargaining agreements negotiated
of the collective
collective bargaining agreebased on merit, and the
ed a salary schedule
compensation by merit
providing for additional
clause
a
containing
ments
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declined during the period that was studied.

Finally, the collective

bargaining agreements containing a clause providing for longevity pay
or retirement bonus did not change much.

Direct economic benefits pertaining to insurance
to have had

.

aMeflnlte effect on the items listed

RSA 273-A appears
in Table 8 (page 161)

vlth the clauses providing medical and life insurance benefits showing

substantial Increases and the clauses providing dental and disability
Insurance benefits showing moderate increases.

The monies paid by the

medical insurance
school district toward the cost of the staff members’
provided to the staff
program and the amount of life insurance coverage

members increased substantially.
leaves of absence.
Direct economic benefits pertaining to

RSA 273-A

the Items listed In Table 9
appears to have had a definite effect on

(page 171).

to the staff member,
The trend was to provide more benefits

showed an Increase.
as all but one of the Items

The clauses providing

leave
sabbatical leave, and maternity
for personal leave, sick leave,
InAdditionally, there were substantial
showed substantial Increases.
sick leave
to staff members within the
creases in the benefits provided
leave of
of clauses providing for.
clauses, l.e., the percentage
and a sick
cumulative to more than 60 days,
more days per annum, leave

leave bank.

airier economic benefits

.

RSA 273-A did not
It would appear that

In
179).
listed In Table 10 (page
Items
the
on
effect
have a definite
course reimbursement
the trend was to provide
general It can be said that
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as a benefit to more staff members as the percentage of collective

bargaining agreements containing a course reimbursement clause increased.

At the same time, the percentage of collective bargaining

agreements containing a maximum amount budgeted or "cap" clause
Increased, thereby restricting the course reimbursement benefit.

Policy matters /working conditions pertaining to instruction

.

RSA 273-A

(page
appears to have had a mixed effect on the items listed in Table
182).

showed no
There was no set pattern as three items declined, one

moderate change.
change, one showed a slight change, and two showed a
not placed on the negotiation
In general it can be said that emphasis was

instruction.
of educational policies relating to

rtaining to staff.
Policy matters /working conditions pe

RSA 273 A

the items listed in Table 12
appears to have had a definite effect on
(page 187).

of vacancies, reducThose clauses providing for: posting

and
requirements for beginning teachers,
tion in force, professional
substantial Increases. Those clause,
discipline for Just cause showed
for
well as those clauses providing
providing for staff evaluation as
specifying
Increases while the clauses
staff transfers showed moderate
general
showed a slight Increase. In
procedures for staff termination

working conditions
clauses dealing with the
those
that
said
be
can
It
members increased.
and Job security of staff
/workin g conditiojis.
r.prfain other policy matt ers

RSA 273-A appears to

Table 13 (page 197)
on the items listed in
have had a definite effect
13 showing an increase
clauses listed in Table
six
the
of
five
with
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The clauses providing for staff development (Recertification) showed
a substantial increase while the clauses providing for staff involvement

in the determination of the school calendar, the length of the school

year, and the length of the school day showed moderate increases.

The clauses providing for restrictions on faculty meetings showed a

moderate increase.

In general it can be said that those clauses dealing

members tend
with the working conditions or professional status of staff
to increase.

Projected Usefulness of the Study
study to those groups or
The Information made available in this

bargaining agreements in New
individuals who negotiate collective
assist them in making more
Hampshire public school districts will

be
of the process as they will
rational decisions during the course
New
of collective bargaining in
more knowledgeable about the status

Hampshire public school districts.

to
It will help the negotiator,

cite the
proposals as they will be able to
write and defend certain
in colhave already been accepted
extent to which these proposals
school districts.
in New Hampshire public
lective bargaining agreements
the inclusion of
them in arguing against
Conversely, it will assist
cite the extent to which
they will be able to
because
proposals
certain
bargaining
included in other collective
these proposals have been

agreements
assist these
in this study will
available
made
The information
into proper perspective.
collective bargaining
organizations in putting
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On the one hand, the evidence clearly demonstrates to school boards
that their fear of losing control of the school district's educational

program as a result of the collective bargaining process is unfounded
as the negotiation of educational policy has been minimal.

On the other

staff members
hand, the evidence clearly demonstrates to public school

them to resolve
that the collective bargaining process has helped

scxne

them to become involved in
of their concerns, but that it has not helped

management of the school
the development of educational policy or the
district to the extent that they night like.
that the enactment of colIn conclusion the study demonstrates

bring about radical changes in
lective bargaining legislation did not
public school districts.
the operation of New Hampshire
of Findings
R elationship Between the Summary
And the Review of the Literature

representsuccess of the negotiators who
The primary concern and
appears to have
collective bargaining process
ed the teachers In the
The
benefits and working conditions.
been In the areas of economic
clauses dealing with
on the gains In those
above conclusion Is based
members as well as
provided to bargaining unit
benefits
fringe
the
same bargainworking conditions of those
the
with
dealing
Chose clauses
ing unit members.

pertaining
with those of studies
closely
correlate
These findings
other states,
collective bargaining In
of
Implications
to the results and
on School System
N g
T
of Teacher Negotiations
of
Impact
"The
in
Thomas Love
The
A. Wildman in
i'er y and Wesley
R. Perry
A Charles R
and
Decision Making,"
1-

..

»•
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Impact of Negotiations In Public Education concluded that one of the

immediate results of the collective bargaining process was to give
teachers an opportunity to participate in the determination of their
-

working conditions.

5

New Hampshire
To date, the negotiation of educational policy in
has been slight.

negotiation
Thomas Love concluded In his study that the

has not been substantial.
of educational policy In school districts

Teams Interested In
Ronald Fitzgerald In "Guidelines for Negotiating

Programs," concluded that the
Facilitating Improvement In Educational
not utilized to negotiate
collective bargaining process is generally

curriculum.
complex educational policies such as

He vent on to state,

districts that he surveyed, the
however, that In many of the school
utilized to develop mechanisms for
collective bargaining process was
in curriculum development.
the Involvement of staff members

It

bargaining process was not utilized
would appear that the collective
decline of
Hampshire, i.e., the percentage
for this purpose In New
particiagreements containing a curriculum
those collective bargaining
mean that the
should not be construed to
pation clause. This finding
not Involve
public school districts ate
teachers In Hew Hampshire

curriculum development.

*Love.
^1,
c is ion Making,” PP*
al Programs," p*

79.

the
that RSA 273-A and
The finding indicate,

isy^'^and^ntzgerlld^^uldellnes for
EducationImprovements in Educati
rFiriiiratlng Trunrovements

^
^
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collective bargaining process have not contributed to the involvement
of teachers in curriculum development.

Recommendations for Further Study
the findings
On the basis of the research that was conducted, and

recommends that a followthat were presented in this study, the author
consider the following
up study be conducted and that it should
questions:
1.

2.

3

4

5.

were made in the
Have the gains in the fringe benefits that
in subIncreased
period that was studied been sustained or
sequent collective bargaining agreements?
negotiated during the
Have the salary schedules that were
economic gains to the
period that was studied brought real
economic gains been sustained
teachers, and if so have these
collective bargaining agreements?
or increased in subsequent
the New Hampshire public
Have the educational programs in
to offset the budget
schLl districts been cut back in order by the econom c g
about
increases that have been brought
^^ucational
in the negotiation of
Has there been an increase
v
bargaining agreement that h
policies In the collective
ua
period of time that
Len negotiated subsequent to the
studied?

Has there been an

"Elective bargaining

the
negotiated subsequent to
studied?
period of time that was
reduction In force
and percentage of the
The change In the number
such that It was not
that was studied was
period
the
during
clauses
recommend
The author would
Af-tn trends.
-rpnds
specific
any
determine
possible to
understand
A
^n
In order to better
conducted
be
analysis
that a more in-depth
are agreeing
teacher associations
and
boards
scnoux
school
the
„hv tne
the reasons why

Zen

rg'reem^nL'rtarrave

1

,
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to the various types of reduction in force clauses.

As stated above,

the author recommends that the collective bargaining agreements negotianot
ted subsequent «to this study be reviewed to determine whether or

reduction
there has been an increase in the number and percentage of the
in force clauses.

Should there once again be a lack of a clear-cut

analysis be conducted
trend, the author would recommend that an in-depth

subsequent to the author's
of those reduction in force clauses negotiated
study.
a formal study of the work
To the best of this writer’s knowledge,

Labor Relations Board (PELRB) has
of the New Hampshire Public Employee

not been conducted.

a study be
The author would recommend that such

of PELRB In 1975.
conducted beginning with the establishment

The study

PELRB
that have been brought before
should review the types of cases
have
that the decisions of PELRB
with an analysis of the Implications
process In New Hampshire.
had on the collective bargaining
were also
to the selected questions
The Inqulrees who responded
One of these suggestions
for the study.
asked to suggest questions
Included with the
study and others have been
was incorporated Into the
remainder of the
The following are the
reco™endatlons listed above.
the respondents:
as they were made by
suggestions, worded exactly
1.

Has the

f .^rannial

fernTreaterslLe
2.

school risSct^mleUng®

273-A7
the adoption of RSA

made
An analysis should be

/^^Jt“rdrb;%re t^acrer'

:ss:c!ariiir:nrttrh:i''u:!onrsubsequent
those previously made.
of RSA 273-A from

to the adoption
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3.

Has the Impasse procedure been more effective than procedures
used before its passage?

4.

both
Has the negotiations process been more workable for
sides since the passage of RSA 273-A?
to approAn analysis should be made of the issues relative
to the
priating money for an agreement reached subsequent
annual meeting.

5.

be conducted which would
This writer would recommend that a study
districts have been required
Include those states where public school
the organization representing the
by state statute to negotiate with

period of ten or more years. The
school district's staff members for a
process
of the collective bargaining
study would compare the results
of
Immediately following the enactment
during the first three years
the collective
legislation, and the results of
the collective bargaining

preceding
three year period Immediately
bargaining process during the

consider the following questions:
the study, and It would
1.

Did the collective
//,°rg”eltret“nrrr''both'o£
"f gains during
securing real economic
the periods studied?
gains,
oKio ^n
to «?ecure real economic
able
If the teachers were
economic
these
,

2.

ra-Tf^tt rbrs^^hf ed:rat^oral^rogramsl
r^rthe-iroirereniiirat^
raarai^;:^:;: -rif
studied?
was
the latter period that

4.

Has there been a

rrCt"

roTeri:a/of

^“^of'^Chose^who participated
the study?
^tlme suggested for

Importance
the reader of the
author would remind
the
Closing
in
well-informed negotiator
bargaining. The
collective
of research In
course of the
decisions during the
rational
more
„I11 be able to mahe
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collective bargaining process.

There is a much greater likelihood

that the well-informed negotiator will approach the collective bar-

gaining table with a positive attitude toward the collective bargaining
process and a commitment to negotiate a mutually satisfactory agreement.
This attitude and commitment will play a very important part in deterthe
mining the effectiveness of the collective bargaining sessions and

resultant collective bargaining agreement.
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